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THE UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR CIVIL
LIABILITY
David A. Bagley*
How technologically vulnerable the whole of modern civiliza-
tion has become.
- Soviet Academician Georgiy Arbatov, in Pravda, 9
May 1986 (twelve days after the explosion at Chernobyl,
Ukraine)'
Our technology has outpaced our understanding, our cleverness
has grown faster than our wisdom.
- Dr. Roger Revelle, Chairman of the United States Na-
tional Committee for International Biological Programs2
I. INTRODUCTION - A NUCLEAR ENERGY WORLD
It is the grist of which mystical lore is made; it surpasses
comprehension, and is forbidden and revered. Its talismans are
objects of wonderment and apprehension, and its priesthood
alone is literate. It transcends temporal power, and yet nations
seek to exploit it, while its enormity makes it ubiquitous, neces-
sarily a common heritage. It is placed under yoke, but never
completely controlled, because although corporeal it has no lim-
its. The unthinkable is the essence of nuclear energy, the preem-
minent technological feat of this era.
Yet interest in nuclear energy - and the perils and dilem-
mas it poses - often wanes. Perhaps this is the ephemerality of
the human attention span in a time of instant information in-
dicators about everything, and perhaps it reflects the psychic
need not to confront the unthinkable, especially when other
predicaments overwhelm us. Perhaps it is simply a feeling of im-
potence in the face of perceived intractability. And perhaps it
will take another disaster to focus the world's attention on the
unsolved problems, if only for a while.
* A.B. University of Missouri, J.D. University of Oklahoma, LL.M. New York Uni-
versity, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York.
1. NIGEL HAWKES ET AL., CHERNOBYL: THE END OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM 133 (1986)
[hereinafter HAWKES].
2. Id. at 215.
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Despite safety fears and recent lackluster economics, there
is every reason to believe that the worldwide industry in nuclear
power is far from moribund,3 and that it will continue to play a
critical role in the world energy picture far into the future.4 Nu-
clear exporting nations expect to continue global sales and pro-
motional activities,5 and developing nations will look to nuclear
3. See, e.g., Fleming Meeks & James Drummond, The Greenest Form of Power,
FORBES, June 11, 1990, at 116 [hereinafter Meeks]; Michael L. Wald, Fighting the
Greenhouse Effect, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 28, 1988, at C1 (even environmentalists are reex-
amining nuclear energy in light of current trends concerning global warming and acid
rain, which are universally agreed to be a product of fossil fuel overuse). See also John
Urqhart, Canada Nuclear Industry Expects Orders To Rise, Plans Compact Reactor for
U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1990, at B4 (expected increase in orders to the Canadian
nuclear industry from foreign purchasers, including United States companies).
4. Today 429 reactors are operating worldwide to generate electricity in 25 coun-
tries. Peter Miller, Our Electric Future, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1991, at 60; see also
U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, 1989 INTERNATIONAL REACTOR SURVEY [hereinafter
USCEA].
There are 111 operating plants in the United States, supplying almost 20% of nu-
clear power needs; there were only 72 at the time of the Three Mile Island accident. See
Matthew L. Wald, 10 Years After Three Mile Island, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 23, 1989, at D1
[hereinafter Wald]. Notwithstanding the publicity surrounding Chernobyl, nuclear power
electricity generation increased during 1988 by 10% in the United States, 14% in Japan,
and 3% (from 35% to 38%) in Western Europe. Yousseff M. Ibrahim, Key OPEC Prob-
lem: The Loss of Control, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1988, at D5. France and Belgium obtain
over 70% and 60%, respectively, of their electricity generation from nuclear reactors,
and the former U.S.S.R. had hoped to double its percentage to more than 20% by the
end of the century. See Stephen Greenhouse, Safety Issues Test European Faith in
Nuclear Power, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 31, 1988, § 4, at 28 [hereinafter Greenhouse].
5. Increased opportunities for future sales have played a significant role in the ap-
proval by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) of exports to foreign coun-
tries. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESS, NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION: DOE HAS INSUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS,
GAOIRCED-86-144 at 37 (1986) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
In 1981, President Reagan instructed governmental departments to act expedi-
tiously on requests for United States nuclear assistance, and stated that the United
States would not oppose reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad where it
"does not constitute a proliferation risk." Statement of President Reagan, Nuclear Non-
proliferation, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 768 (July 16, 1981) [hereinafter Statement].
In 1982 he issued a policy directive allowing assistance in sensitive nuclear reprocessing
technology to countries so long as statutory criteria were met. GAO REPORT, supra, at 48.
U.S. mhnufacturers are working on advanced reactor designs, with government sup-
port in the form of streamlined licensing, in the hope of increasing plant orders by the
mid-1990s. Meeks, supra note 3, at 16; Matthew L. Wald, Japanese Now Ahead in Nu-
clear Power, Too, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1990, at D1. Japanese expenditures for commer-
cial research and development are far greater. Id.
However, U.S. entities are far from the majority, or even a significant fraction, of the
worldwide suppliers; the USCEA lists only four U.S. manufacturers among 36. Among
the newly-emerging suppliers are Argentina, China, and South Africa. USCEA, supra
note 4. See also Review of 1985 U.S. Government Nonproliferation Activities: Hearings
Before Senate Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes,
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power to fulfill ever-increasing portions of their needs.'
The grave challenges of the nuclear present and future are
the current archetype of physical science surpassing social sci-
ence, as it always does. Those who would recast the legal order
to fit the era must search for a construct beyond the nation-
states-based paradigm. No such legal system is adequate to deal
with the consequences of an accidental unleashing of nuclear
forces; nevertheless, and notwithstanding the global melange of
conflicting ideologies and competing interests, the logic of law
and social order demands that a legal regimen be sought.
All of the available data suggest the inexorable need for a
legal framework that will compensate victims and justly appor-
tion liability in the event of an accident causing damage from
nuclear power. Accordingly, this article discusses the current le-
gal framework in the United States that would be used to com-
pensate victims and apportion liability for a nuclear accident oc-
curring outside the United States.
This Article contains two companion themes. The first,
which occupies the majority of the article, is that United States
businesses and the government will be sought to be held liable
in a United States forum for a portion, or all, of the massive
injury from a nuclear disaster in which facilities and/or materi-
als from the United States are involved. Although direct prece-
dent is currently nonexistent, there are situations which offer
useful analogies. There are also numerous bases under interna-
tional law for asserting such claims. By the same analysis, how-
ever, there are also bases in law for insuring that the portion of
legal responsibility borne by United States entities is no more
than what is just. Determining the extent of liability is governed
by familiar precepts, in accordance with international law.
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986) (testimony of Richard T. Kennedy, Ambassador at Large).
All of these countries can be expected to be aggressive competitors.
6. The GAO estimates that by the year 2000 more than half the countries of the
world with nuclear reactors will be developing countries. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY CONCERNS, GAO/NSIAD-85-128 (1985) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT 1985].
Present examples abound. India has a stated policy of raising its proportion, of
power generated from nuclear energy from its current 3% to 10%. See Stephen R. Weis-
man, India's Nuclear Energy Policy Raises New Doubts on Arms, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1988, at Al. Taiwan has an established nuclear generation program. See Stephen Engel-
berg & Michael R. Gordan, Taipei Halts Work on Secret Plant To Make Nuclear Bomb
Ingredient, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1988, at Al. Despite public opposition, Mexico has
begun operation of its first nuclear power plant. The plant is United States-built. US-
CEA, supra note 4.
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The issue of liability is always shadowed by the companion
truth that justice and the compensation of victims of nuclear
disaster require a truly global system of cooperation and alloca-
tion of responsibility. The unfortunate lack of such a framework
is the second, underlying theme of this Article. The discussion
herein illustrates the profound need for a worldwide convention
to establish a legal regime to govern the numerous claims that
would arise out of a nuclear power accident. The substance of
such a worldwide convention is, however, a topic for another ef-
fort. What is treated in this Article is how the legal structure
might function given the current legal structure. Thus, this Arti-
cle considers how issues of nuclear disaster liability and loss-
spreading might play out within the currently existing legal
framework.
II. NUCLEAR ENERGY SCENARIOS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
GIVING RISE TO LITIGATION INSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Currently, several types of events may cause individuals, en-
tities, and governments to seek to hold United States actors lia-
ble for injury and losses related to nuclear catastrophe. The sce-
nario is one in which a mishap occurs outside the United States
at a power generating facility or research station and is assert-
edly the responsibility of one or more individuals and/or entities
from the United States who did not act affirmatively to cause
the harm.7 The United States, like many other nations, has do-
mestic laws that purport to control civil liability arising from
7. This Article does not consider warfare, in which overwhelming circumstances dis-
place methodologies normal to international dispute resolution. Also excluded are other
special hazards associated with military uses of nuclear energy, such as weapons testing
and deployment. See generally ANGELO MIATELLO, LA RESPONSABILITIE INTERNATIONALE
ENCOURUE EN RAISON DES ACTIVITES LIEES A L'UTILIZATION DE L'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE ch. 5
(1986).
The subject of mishaps at nuclear weapons production plants is also beyond the
scope of this undertaking because there are relatively few nations which (avowedly) pos-
sess nuclear weapons production capability. Moreover, the responsibility for such a mis-
hap would lie squarely with the producing government. See Keith Schneider, Energy
Dept. Says it Kept Secret Mishaps at Nuclear Weapon Plant, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1988,
at Al.
Finally, this Article omits further treatment of the weighty and worsening burden of
nuclear waste disposal. It is assumed for present purposes that the liability for damage
would devolve upon the entity having custody of and determining to place the materials,
under known principles of legal accountability. To the extent that the United States
Government or companies might be held partially responsible, however, the principles
herein developed could be brought to bear in order to allocate that responsibility.
[Vol. XVlll:2
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nuclear disasters within its borders, but no positive law sources
exist for claims asserted against United States entities arising
from accidents occurring outside the United States.9 What
makes the subject truly compelling is the potentially massive
scope of injury and damage."0
A. Types of Disasters and Injuries
However numerous the imaginable scenarios, events and
studies suggest certain categories of occurrences likely to cause
nuclear harm of the type with which this Article is concerned.,,
The most prominent is the unexpected but widely feared catas-
trophe known as the "nuclear accident,"' 2 usually thought of in
8. See infra notes 182-209 & 234-46 and accompanying text regarding United States
and foreign municipal laws with respect to such liability.
9. See infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
10. See also infra note 13. The sums which European nations have spent for eco-
nomic losses alone arising from the Chernobyl incident are beyond ready comprehension.
See The Accident at Chernobyl - Economic Damage and its Compensation in Western
Europe, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. (partial compendium) 58 (1987). See also Serge Schme-
mann, Chernobyl and the Europeans: Radiation and Doubts Linger, N.Y. TIms, June
12, 1988, at Al.
Those scientists who have attempted to quantify the potential for harm seem uni-
formly to have come to the conclusion that it is for all practical purposes incalculable.
See numerous authorities cited in David M. Rocchio, The Price-Anderson Act: Alloca-
tion of the Extraordinary Risk of Nuclear-Generated Electricity: A Model Punitive
Damage Provision, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 521, 523 (1987). See, e.g., Gerald L.
Pollack, Severe Accidents and Terrorist Threats at Nuclear Reactors, in PREVENTING
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 66 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1987) [hereinafter
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORIsM]. As early as 1957, the National Academy of Science
was warning that the "hazard related to radioactive wastes is so great that no element of
doubt should be allowed to exist regarding safety." See Keith Schneider, United States
Scales Back Plan for Burial of Atomic Waste, N.Y. Tirs, Mar. 11, 1988, at Al.
11. See generally NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), THIRD PARTY LIABILITY (1990).
12. Before Chernobyl, from January 1971 to September 1985, significant or poten-
tially significant safety incidents were estimated'to have occurred at 151 nuclear power
reactors in other countries, although their extent and seriousness have never been fully
disclosed. See GAO REPORT 1985, supra note 6, at 6, 35.
In the United States, a study by Worldwatch Institute has estimated that since the
1979 accident at Three Mile Island nuclear plants have experienced more than 30,000
mishaps, some with the potential to be more serious than Three Mile Island. See Wald,
supra note 4, at Dl.
The more serious incidents, of the type commonly conjured by the phrase "nuclear
accident," are discussed infra note 13. However, additional possibilities are burgeoning.
During recent years, a United States F-16 fighter-bomber crashed within seconds' flying
time of a German nuclear reactor, and the Soviet Government became sufficiently con-
cerned to request American assistance in evaluating earthquake risks to two reactors in
Armenia. James 0. Jackson et al., Hellfire from the Heavens, TIME, Sept. 12, 1988, at 36;
Matthew L. Wald, For the U.S. and Soviets, a Nuclear Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
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connection with generation or experimentation facilities,'13 but
also a threat with respect to materials in transit. 4
1989, § 4, at 6.
Moreover, there are an estimated 42 nuclear-powered spacecrafts in orbit. Cosmos
1900, a crippled Soviet satellite, was in a decaying earth orbit and would have re-entered
the atmosphere and spilled radioactivity over a large portion of the planet from its 50
kilograms of enriched uranium, until a last-ditch booster deployment successfully lifted
it back into higher orbit. Proposed United States satellites will carry many times the
quantity of radioactive materials. See Steven Aftergood, et al., Nuclear Power in Space,
Sci. Am., June 1991, at 42; Karl Grossman, We Don't Need Nuclear Reactors in Space,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 31, 1991, at 55; David Whitehouse, Law in Orbit, NEW SCIENTIST,
July 7, 1988, at 41.
13. The most celebrated overseas accident is, of course, the April 26, 1986 core
meltdown, explosion, and attendant massive (50 tons of particles) radioactive gases leak
at Chernobyl, Ukraine. For a detailed account, see HAWKES, supra note 1, at 97. Initial
reports were that more than 135,000 persons suffered exposure, 30,000-50,000 cases of
long-term cancer were expected, and the initial direct cost to the Soviet Union would
exceed $3 billion. Id. at v. See also Victoria Riess Hartke, Note, The International Fall-
out From Chernobyl, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 319 (1986) [hereinafter Hartke, Note]. Sadly, it
has recently been revealed that the damage was much greater in scope - it now appears
that at least 150,000 people stand in grave risk of cancer, vast areas are turning out to be
uninhabitable due to radiation contamination, and the ultimate cost estimate has
reached as high as $415 billion. See Carrol Bogert, Chernobyl's Legacy, NEWSWEEK, May
7, 1990, at 30; Felicity Barringer, Evolution in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1990, at 1
[hereinafter Barringer, Evolution]. It now appears the toll of deaths and illness will be
equally great outside the former U.S.S.R., where doses were lower but exposed popula-
tions far greater. See Felicity Barringer, Chernobyl: Five Years Later the Danger Per-
sists, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 14, 1991, § 6, at 28 [hereinafter Barringer].
Radioactive leaks are an ever-present risk. After Three Mile Island, it became
known that a similar incident had occurred in 1974 at a plant in Switzerland. See GAO
REPORT 1985, supra note 6, at 22. In addition, a state-of-the-art breeder reactor near the
Swiss border in France was closed during the Spring of 1987 due to leaks of highly vola-
tile and corrosive sodium gas. See Greenhouse, supra note 4.
Fires at nuclear installations have also given rise to serious peril. The most serious
(and longest-concealed) is the 1957 blaze at the British plant at Windscale, the full re-
port of which was never published and the full extent of whose damage and injury was
never made known. See, e.g., Thomas J. Connolly, et al., World Nuclear Energy Paths,
WORLD NUcLEAR ENERGY 216, 252 & 291 (Ian Smart ed. 1982). Interestingly, the British
Government has urged United States contractors to invest in nuclear power stations in
Britain when it privatizes its industry, offering as incentive less restrictive regulations
than here. Nuclear Plan By Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1988, at D7. In 1982, a serious
fire occurred at a nuclear plant in Soviet Armenia. GAO REPORT 1985, supra note 6, at
26, and the most recent reported such incident (described by one organization as the
most serious since Chernobyl) occurred at the American-built Vandellos I reactor in
Spain, Nuclear Reactor in Spain Catches Fire, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 26, 1989, at A3. In
addition, it has recently been disclosed that in Germany a single pump was all that pre-
vented a reactor from core meltdown after a 1976 fire. Ferdinand Protzman, Upheaval in
the East, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1990, at A10.
14. Most transportation of nuclear materials is by ordinary commercial carriers, who
determine what security and safety measures are indicated. A recent agreement between
the United States and Japan allows plutonium to be shipped from Europe to Japan by
sea as well as by air, creating an increased risk of hijacking and sabotage. There are also
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Another potential peril which has received significant atten-
tion is that of terrorist acts leading to widespread nuclear in-
jury.15 That there are thus far no actual such incidents is mirac-
ulous, in view of the past actions of disaffected groups."6
unresolved questions about whether air transport containers can be made crashproof.
See John H. Cushman, Moving Plutonium by Sea Assailed, N.Y. TIMus, Aug. 6, 1988, §
1, at 4; see also Frank Greve, Warhead Depots: A Weak Link in NATO's Security,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 13, 1983, at F2.
There is no comprehensive transnational positive law regimen that regulates ac-
countability for accidents during transportation. The Convention Relating to Civil Lia-
bility in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, infra note 170, shifts liabil-
ity for damage caused by nuclear incidents occurring in the course of maritime transport
to the nuclear operator (and away from the carrier) in accordance with the multilateral
conventions discussed infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text. The United States is
not a party to this Convention. Furthermore, the Convention would have no effect on the
responsibility of United States suppliers because the United States is also not party to
the multistate treaties. The Brussels 1971 Convention, infra note 170. Moreover, the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air (Warsaw Convention), which limits damage caused by air carrier accidents, contains
no exclusion for nuclear damage, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, and Mon-
treal Protocol No. 4 thereto (dated Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAW (Docs. Suppl. 991, 996) (2d ed. 1981).
15. This category does not include the much-feared hazard of terrorists actually det-
onating a nuclear explosive device or weapon. Such an action would, in familiar liability
terms, constitute a supervening cause (see infra notes 369-80 and accompanying text),
and in any case nuclear weapons detonations, at whomever's hands, are beyond the scope
of this writing (and, for that matter, the ability of the existing legal system to afford
redress). See generally STUDIES IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM (Augustus R. Norton & Martin
H. Greenberg eds., 1979) [hereinafter STUDIES IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM]. Cf. J. Carson
Mark et al., Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?, in PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERROR-
IsM, supra note 10, at 55; Robert K. Mullen, Mass Destruction and Terrorism, in INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM: CURRENT RESEARCH AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (Alan Buckley &
Daniel Olson, eds., 1979) at 57 [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM]. A chilling twist
on the subject is recalled by a reported incident in Sinkiang province during the Chinese
Cultural Revolution in 1967 in which a military commander threatened to seize and use
weapons at a nuclear base if Maoists tried to usurp a local provisional government. See
William Epstein, Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear War, in THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR
WAR (Franklyn Griffiths & John C. Palyani eds., 1980).
16. There have been numerous attacks on nuclear facilities, but thus far none has
caused the release of significantly damaging radiation. See Michael Flood, Nuclear Sabo-
tage, in STUDIES IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM, supra note 15, at 128. For example, political
extremists in Western Europe (in particular, Breton and Basque separatists,,in France
and Spain respectively) have launched raids against nuclear reactors. Brian M. Jenkins,
International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
supra note 15, at 101. In a political demonstration, a dissident member of the Bundestag
in West Germany successfully carried a bazooka onto a nuclear site. See STUDIES IN NU-
CLEAR TERRORISM, supra note 15, at 125.
Then-Prime Minister Gandhi registered a complaint in 1985 with the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation for failing to inform him that arrested Sikh extremists
had been planning to blow up a nuclear power plant in India. Stephen R. Weisman, His
Visit Nearing, Gandhi Faults U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1985, at A3. The beleagured
reactor begun in the Philippines, infra note 23, was never placed in operation, due in
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The enormous harm resulting from a nuclear mishap will
land most heavily upon masses of individuals. For most, from a
personal injury standpoint, the greatest hazard is radiation
poisoning and contamination.17 In addition, there will be eco-
nomic losses and substantial destruction of real and personal
property that provide for a decent quality of life."' Within the
range of foreseeable causality, other injury may also be posited
whose variety and extent can only be imagined. 19
The other significant class that will seek redress for losses
suffered is governments. Apart from damage to the environment
and public property normally constituting the bases of national
rights of action,20 there will be emergency assistance costs of a
magnitude hitherto unknown.2'
part to terrorist concerns; the New Peoples' Army had succeeded in demolishing towers
which would have carried power from it before it was completed. Fox Butterfield,
Philipines Expected to File Suit Against Westinghouse, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1988, at
Dl.
For a fuller discussion, plus an appendix of nuclear-related terrorist acts including
attacks on installations, see Konrad Kellen, The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism, in
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM, supra note 10, at 104; see also Louis RENE BERES,
TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT (1979). Some even have sug-
gested that nuclear terrorism is a more likely cause of catastrophe than accident. See
Thomas D. Davies, What Nuclear Means and Targets Might Terrorists Find Attrac-
tive?, in NUCLEAR TERRORIsM: DEFINING THE THREAT (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexan-
der eds., 1986) [hereinafter Davies]; Dumas, Human Fallibility and Weapons, 36 BULL.
AToMIc SCIENTIST 15 (1980). This is made more forceful by the recognition that light
water power plants, which are the great majority of those operating, are inherently sus-
ceptible to sabotage, especially when aided by an insider. See Davies, supra, at 62.
17. See GAO REPORT 1985, supra note 6, at 2; see also THE MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2364-65 (Robert Berkow ed., 15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MERCK
MANUAL]. The United States National Institute of Health has begun a study of cancer
deaths which appear to be concentrated near nuclear power plants in this country. See
Cancer Clusters Prompt U.S. Study, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 5, 1988, at All.
18. See Study by OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, The Accident at Chernobyl -
Economic Damage and its Compensation in Western Europe, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 58
(1987) [hereinafter OECD Nuclear Energy Agency], in which governmental compensa-
tion to injured persons for economic loss in the former Soviet Union and twelve other
neighboring countries is recounted.
The pecuniary aftermath of Chernobyl has continued to be measured throughout
Europe, especially in terms of impaired crops and agricultural production capacity. See
Schmemann, supra note 10, at 1; Francis X. Clives, Once Again, Chernobyl Takes a
Toll, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1989, § 1, at 4 [hereinafter Clives].
19. Emotional distress is a recognized after-effect. See MERCK MANUAL, supra note
17, at 2367. Other injury could include such "obvious remote" consequences as auto acci-
dents, heart attacks and the like, and other property damage.
20. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text regarding suits by governments as
parens patriae.
21. For a listing of the mind-boggling sums expended by other European countries
in the wake of the 1986 accident at Chernobyl, see OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, supra
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B. United States Involvement
It is the participation of United States persons and enti-
ties,2" both private and public, which forms the foundation for
the presence of litigation in its courts.23 Several varieties of such
involvement may be identified. First are the design, manufacture
and/or export of nuclear facilities, components, and technology
by United States suppliers.2 4 The attendant governmental affili-
note 18.
Even the minor leak at Three Mile Island required "substantial technical support
and major commitments of resources" to deal with the immediate operational problems,
which is beyond the capabilities of many countries. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at
29.
The Chernobyl disaster caused 200,000 persons to be evacuated at once from the
area; by 1989, the total cost of relocation was estimated at $16 billion. Barringer, supra
note 13, at 1; Clives, supra note 18, at 4. In 1990, the Soviet Parliament voted an addi-
tional $26 billion to aid victims. Bogert, supra note 13, at 30.
22. There is a striking paucity of comprehensive data sources concerning the United
States nuclear industry; indeed, there are no central governmental clearinghouses of in-
formation. The best private source is the trade association, United States Council of
Energy Awareness (USCEA, formerly Atomic Industrial Forum), Suite 400, 1776 1 Street
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Historically, the industry has been composed of private
companies who resisted standardization and information-sharing. Governmental agencies
have also suffered from a lack of direction and mission definition.
23. See supra note 22 and infra notes 24-30, 48, 72 and accompanying text.
There is already evidence that problems with American reactors abroad lead to liti-
gation in United States courts. In 1971, after the Philippines expressed an interest, the
State Department instructed the United States embassy to "give all possible encourage-
ment" to the purchase of a reactor, and the Export-Import Bank underwrote the project
through loans and guarantees exceeding $600 million. The proposed site was 14 miles
from a potentially active volcano and would not have met United States standards. See
Nicholas C. Yost, American Governmental Responsibility for the Environmental Effects
of Actions Abroad, 43 ALB. L. REV. 528 (1979). Construction was begun in 1976, and
completed in 1985, but the reactor was never activated due to sabotage, political, and
safety concerns. In late 1988, the Philippine Government announced that it would file
suit in federal court against Westinghouse Electric Corporation, alleging the plant was
defective and sold as part of a conspiracy involving former President Marcos (overruns
led to a cost of $2.2 billion, and the interest exceeded $350,000 per day). See Fox Butter-
field, Philippines Expected to File Suit Against Westinghouse, N.Y. TINIEs, Dec. 1,
1988, at D1. The litigation thus far is reported in Republic of the Philippines v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 774 F. Supp. 1438 (D.N.J. 1991); see also Republic of the Philippines
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd 951 F.2d 1414 (3d
Cir. 1991).
It has also been charged that an American-made reactor in Spain experienced design
difficulties similar to those at a plant in the United States, leading to a 1982 rupture and
radiation leak with population evacuation. EL PMs (Madrid), Aug. 2, 1985, at 37.
24. United States companies were principal constructors and/or designers of 54 gen-
erating reactors in 17 foreign countries; it is impossible to determine how many of the
remaining reactors contain United States-furnished or designed components. USCEA,
supra note 4. However, the United States GAO asserts that United States-designed reac-
tors comprise the majority of power plants worldwide. See INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
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ation is found in the licensing process.25 These are coupled with
continuing technical training and support from companies and
government.26
Additional varieties of official involvement may
readily be divined. There are direct sales and special licens-
ing of materials 27  and other technology trans-
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR SAFETY CONCERNS 33 (Sept. 30, 1985).
During the halcyon days of nuclear expansion prior to the 1980's, four major United
States firms were reported to have 250 reactors completed or due for completion world-
wide through 1995. See Mans L6nnroth & William Walker, The Viability of the Civil
Nuclear Industry, in WORLD NUCLEAR ENERGY 206 (Ian Smart ed., 1982).
During the same period, the United States was reponsible for nearly 85% of nuclear
exports among free-market countries. See Bertrand Barre, France's Pragmatic Approach
to Nonproliferation, in THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NONPROLIFERATION 63, 67 (Rodney
W. Jones, et al. eds., 1985).
The former U.S.S.R.'s State Committee for Supervision on Nuclear Power Safety
visited San Francisco to request the help of Bechtel Power, Inc. in designing reactors.
See Matthew L. Wald, Russians Talk of Nuclear Aid by U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, May 23, 1989,
at D5.
25. There is a complex scheme of federal control over nuclear exports, divided
among two departments (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [hereinafter NRC] and the
DOE and one cabinet-level agency (the Commerce Department). See GAO REPORT,
supra note 5, at 14, and Regulations at 10 C.F.R. 110 (1988). For a synthesized explana-
tion, see Jeffrey S. Linder, Note, Discretion and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
The Need to Assess Foreign Effects of American Nuclear Exports, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L.
477 (1983) [hereinafter Linder, Note]; see also Hearings before the House Subcommittee
on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong.
(May 15, 1986, No. 99-140). However, many exports of nuclear materials and technology
are done under "general licenses" and therefore itemized records of them are not kept.
Telephone interview with Mary Peterson, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Feb. 29,
1988).
In 1987, 36 nuclear export license applications were submitted to the NRC and re-
ferred for executive review; another 84 were approved by it without such review, pursu-
ant to established procedures. These included reactors, components and materials. See
State Department, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (1988) at 78 [hereinafter State Dep't].
26. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other agencies offer training programs
in technology use and nuclear safety to United States trading partners. See GAO REPORT
1985, supra note 6, at 19; State Dep't, supra note 25, at 67. In addition, since its found-
ing in 1957, the United States has utilized the United Nations' International Atomic
Energy Agency [hereinafter IAEA] as a means for providing technical assistance and
cooperation through grants and in-kind programs. State Dep't, supra note 25, at 38.
Such endeavors are also part of the "Agreements for Cooperation" (see infra note 253
and accompanying text) the United States has with 27 nations and organizations. State
Dep't, supra note 25, at 41.
27. In 1987, DOE received $400 million from sales of enriched uranium to 13 na-
tions. See State Dep't, supra note 25, at 10. The United States is a leading member of a
19-nation body known as the "Zangger Committee" which attempts to arrive at agreed-
upon procedures concerning the export of fissionable and other nuclear materials. Re-
garding national exports of nuclear material generally, see Report of the International
Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Nuclear Control Institute, in PREVENT-
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fers2 s by the United States Government, historically the world's
premier purveyor.2 9 In addition, the United States Government
has provided long-standing encouragement and support to the
nuclear industry and its export endeavors.30
These activities will be the foundation of asserted private
and public United States accountability" in cases brought to re-
dress the mammoth losses suffered when the primal force of nu-
clear energy bolts from the grasp of stricken handlers. It is then
that the international system of dispute resolution, as it exists,
and the jurists who apply it, will find themselves facing their
greatest trial.
ing NUCLEAR TERRORISM at 7 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Task Force Report].
In 1988, the Senate ratified a 30-year agreement to sell American uranium and en-
richment apparatus to Japan, notwithstanding strongly-expressed reservations on the
part of some legislators. See discussion in 83 AM. J. INT'L L., 63 (1989).
28. The GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 74, says that during the years 1980-85 the
Secretary of Energy authorized 47 "non-sensitive" technology transfer deals with "re-
stricted" countries and 19 "sensitive" instances of "assistance" to developed nations.
As buyer countries strive to become more self-sufficient in the nuclear sphere, a pat-
tern has emerged in which exporters have fewer turnkey nuclear plant contracts, and
instead have had to increase technology transfer sales. See Erwin Hickel, The Politics of
Nuclear Exports in West Germany, in NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WORLD POLITICS 62, 67
(Robert Boardman & James Keely eds., 1983) [hereinafter BOARDMAN & KEELY].
29. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
The enriched uranium in the approximately 140 research reactors in the world has
primarily come from the United States. See Task Force Report, supra note 27, at 49.
30. It has been considered that domestic employment and energy security, the na-
tion's balance of trade, and nonproliferation efforts are all served by a healthy nuclear
export industry. See State Dep't, supra note 25, at 10. During the 1970's, while the
United States was the supplier of 70% of all power reactors in operation or on order
worldwide, 80% of foreign purchases were financed by the United States Export-Import
Bank. I. Herbert Scheinberg, Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1975, at 36. See also George D.
Applebaum, Comment, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of International Devel-
opment, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 321 (1975-76).
The United States is no longer the single premier exporting nation. As domestic
markets in other countries have become saturated, there has been pressure to penetrate
more export markets, even at the cost of reduced restrictions. There is now intensive
export competition from France, West Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Switzerland, and other "second-tier" suppliers, such as Argentina, Brazil, and India, who
are now rapidly entering the fray. See generally Robert Boardman & James Keely, Nu-
clear Export Policies and the Non-Proliferation Regime, in BOARDMAN & KEELY, supra
note 28, at 1.
In Germany, as an example, nuclear exports have been seen as a key ingredient of
the economy, owing to slackening domestic demand and idle production facilities. See
Hrickel, supra note 28, at 65.
31. See infra notes 48-54, 72-80 and accompanying text.
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III. SUITS IN UNITED STATES COURTS
A central premise underlying this writing is that there is no
comprehensive system to which the United States is a party that
specially governs the recompense of loss and injury arising from
a nuclear accident outside the United States.2 Compensation
for loss or injury in such situations therefore reverts to ordinary
private law solutions and procedures. In the wake of a nuclear
power disaster at a facility where there has been substantial
United States involvement,33 many claimants will consider the
United States the optimal forum.34 This may be due to the qual-
ity of justice, but numerous other factors operate as well to in-
sure that suits will be initially commenced in United States
courts.3 5
A. Parties
1. Plaintiffs
Under the traditional private law model, the plaintiffs
most likely first in time (and right, as indicated below)
are injured individuals. In the United States, foreign indivi-
duals may institute suits in state court,36 although federal
32. See infra notes 176, 199-209 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
34. It would be useless to attempt to summarize, let alone synopsize or synthesize,
the plethora of suits in which persons have sought the succor of United States justice in
claims all over the globe. Perhaps the most striking recent example is the In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev'd in part 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) litigation arising out of the Bhopal disaster, infra notes 110, 116-
19, 132, 136 & 141 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of some factors favoring the choice of a United States forum, see
WARREN FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS BY FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN THE UNITED
STATES 11-13 (1987). Furthermore, in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601 (1987), a duty is stated on the part of a country caus-
ing environmental injury to another aggrieved nation, which is said to include giving
access to its tribunals to private citizens. Cf. The Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988
& Supp. 1 1989), granting foreign claimants the same remedies as domestic ones if recip-
rocal rights are afforded.
35. This would be so, if for no other reason, by virtue of the ancient maxim actor
forum rei sequitur (the plaintiff follows the domicile of the defendant, being the forum
generale). ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 20 (1943). This would, of
course, erase jurisdictional difficulties as to the principal defendant. See also infra note
95 and accompanying text for a discussion of choice of forum and the manifold related
considerations.
36. Ordinarily, nonresident aliens -are permitted to enter state courts as a matter of
comity. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984) (dictum) (af-
firming dismissal, however, on forum non conveniens grounds). The Texas Supreme
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court 37 action will be far more probable. 8
A disaster such as a major nuclear power accident also inev-
itably entails the central involvement of the government (or gov-
ernments) in whose territory injury occurs. In asserting the re-
sulting claims, such governments are likely to proceed in United
States courts. A suit in its own courts is unsatisfactory since the
foreign state would be hard pressed to enforce a judgment be-
yond its own borders. 9 It is also likely that the foreign state will
not resort to an international forum. 40 United States federal
Court has ruled that Texas courts -must entertain suits arising from incidents in foreign
countries against any companies having a principal place of business in the state. Dow
Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
37. Article III, Section 2 (whose enabling "diversity" statute is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332
(1988 & Supp. II 1990)), provides for jurisdiction over controversies "between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects," as well as those to which
the United States is party, see infra text accompanying notes 73-79. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. See also 13B CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (JuRIs. 2D)
§ 3521 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT]. If a non-United States person or entity is im-
pleaded, the suit is likely to remain in federal court if the claim between aliens is ancil-
lary to one over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Republic of China v.
American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952); 13 WRIGHT, § 3523.
Moreover, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), a private defendant
may be, and a foreign governmental defendant (see infra text accompanying notes 81-93)
will be, entitled to remove to federal court. See also 14A WRIGHT, supra, §§ 3721, 3723.
These sections explain why virtually all substantial cases involving foreign parties
and complex issues are litigated in federal courts.
38. The principal points regarding actions by individuals relate to causation and
suits in multiple fora, which await treatment below. See infra text accompanying notes
152-68 regarding problems of suits in multiple fora, and text accompanying notes 339-51
concerning the difficulties associated with indeterminate plaintiffs and causation in fact.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 415-25 for a discussion of recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
40. The subject of suits before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is well be-
yond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that such suits must be state against state,
be based upon international law, and are usually thought of as means whereby states can
assert rights as parens patriae or on behalf of individual citizens where a remedy in the
offending state's courts would be unavailing. There are at least three reasons a state
might not be likely to choose the ICJ: first, liability lies in part with private entities;
second, the limits on the tribunal's compulsory jurisdiction; third, the questionable en-
forceability of any judgment rendered. For a terse and useful discussion, see THOMAS M.
FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986); see also SHABTAz ROSENNE, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 161, 528 (1985).
The use of an arbitral tribunal is also a possibility. This would alleviate jurisdic-
tional problems (assuming a proper compromis could be drawn), and could ease (al-
though by no means solve) difficulties of liability apportionment and compensation as-
sessment. Also, arbitration has a worthy tradition in disputes concerning damage of one
state due to activities in another - The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A.
1905 (1949) being the paradigmatic case in point. For a suggestion of how arbitration
might work in the context of transnational radiation pollution, see Ann Voorhees Bil-
lingsley, Private Party Protection Against Transnational Pollution Through Compul-
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courts, on the other hand, are expressly granted jurisdiction 41 in
actions in which foreign states are plaintiffs.42
A threshold inquiry in a suit in a United States court is
what interests a foreign state may and may not assert. Those it
may not assert include two broad categories: those of the state in
its own right, and those held by its citizens in their individual
capacities. As to the former, it is difficult to conceptualize losses
of a nation apart from its citizens in the context of a mass tort.43
Moreover, there may also be legal obstacles to a state's "own"
rights being enforced in the courts of other nations.44 As to the
sory Arbitration: A Proposal, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW 339 (1982).
41. In addition, supplemental jurisdiction is available in a suit by a private plaintiff.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
42. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391,
1441 & 1601-1611 (1988 & Supp. H 1990) [hereinafter FSIA], discussed infra notes 84-91
and accompanying text, provides diversity of citizenship jurisdiction where a foreign
state is plaintiff and citizens, including resident aliens, of a United States state or differ-
ent states, are defendants.
Foreign states have long been held entitled to prosecute civil actions in courts of the
United States upon the same basis as domestic corporations or individuals. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) for the best-known discussion. See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FORICN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 721 cmt.
1 (1987).
In order to bring suit, the foreign state must be one that is recognized by our execu-
tive branch. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 419; Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 478
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973). In view of the objectives sought to be achieved by the United
States Government in furnishing and licensing materials and equipment to foreign coun-
tries pursuant to agreement, see infra text accompanying notes 249-55, it is to be hoped
that a situation will never arise where a United States-supplied nuclear facility is located
in a country the United States does not recognize. However, it may happen (for example,
the United States had an agreement to supply nuclear materials to Iran, Agreement on
Atomic Energy: Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Non-proliferation Treaty,
June 19, 1973, U.S.-Iran, 25 U.S.T. 853, T.I.A.S. No. 7829 (entered into force May 15,
1974), for two reactors, construction of which was suspended following the 1979 Iranian
Revolution); if it does, the courts of the United States will be faced with what can only
be described as an extremely difficult situation.
43. Compare the situation in antitrust cases, where it has been noted that a state
may be considered an injured party if it has been damaged in its purchases. Pfizer, Inc.
v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976), see also infra
note 45 and accompanying text.
44. This refers to the venerable principle (whose origins are not precisely known but
whose most famous articulations are in Holnan v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341 (K.B. 1775) and
Government of India v. Taylor, 1955 A.C. 491 (H.L.)) that no action could be maintained
in the courts of a nation on a right created by the revenue law of a foreign state (some-
times called the "revenue rule"). Although apparently carried forward into United States
law, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 610 (1934), this principle would
appear inapplicable to an action for redress of injury from a mass tort, which only in-
volves sovereign rights as a necessary incident. In any case, leading scholars now that
maintain that the concept should be strictly confined to the limits of legislative jurisdic-
tion, and that transnational activities have rendered unworkable the traditional distinc-
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latter category, courts of the United States will not entertain
suits in which foreign governments seek to assert the individual
interests of their citizens.45 However, the foreign state will be
allowed to participate as plaintiff in the capacity of parens pa-
triae.46 In this way, the foreign state can press claims for injuries
to its environment, property and infrastructure, and its emer-
gency assistance and clean-up costs. 4 This augurs that, in addi-
tion to multiple actions by individuals, those parties liable may
face exposure to massive damages in favor of a determined and
substantial litigant.
2. Private Defendants
The United States-based company determined by plaintiffs
to be principally responsible for a nuclear disaster will be an ob-
vious principal private defendant.48 Depending on the facts and
tions sought to be preserved by the rule. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA: CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS
FOR THEIR INTERACTION 321 (1979); see generally F.A. Mann, The International Enforce-
ment of Public Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 608 (1987).
45. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 618 (citing, inter alia, the well-established preference for
class actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, for multiple plaintiffs' causes of action); Republic
of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 350 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1965).
The mere fact that it may be difficult for individual citizens to sue by virtue of
distance or foreign residence will not justify parens patriae standing; they will not be
given rights greater than United States plaintiffs by allowing their government to bring
suit upon their behalf. Pfizer, 522 F.2d at 617-19.
In Union Carbide, the Government of India had passed a statute purporting to
grant it the exclusive right to represent the victims of the gas leak in all fora; although
this was apparently one of the grounds of the motions to dismiss (the Court refers to
"standir.g." Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 199), the case was dismissed on the basis of
forum non conveniens without the issue having been reached.
46. Parens patriae refers to a concept of protection of "quasi-sovereign" interests,
such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, water rights, environmental damage
and the like. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979); see generally Comment, State Protection of its
Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 411 (1970), but see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Pfi-
zer, 522 F.2d at 616, the Court distinguished quasi-sovereign rights which a state might
assert and individual rights which a state may not assert. The distinction appears to be
both settled and widely recognized.
47. See also supra notes 10 & 13.
48. No discussion of parties defendant will be complete without mention of insur-
ance. For exceptional risks such as those of a nuclear incident, insurance is available to
operators and suppliers on an international pooling basis. It is required by law to be
maintained in most countries (including some Cold War Eastern European states and
the People's Republic of China), and insurance representatives were consulted when
multilateral conventions were drawn up concerning nuclear liability. In the United
States, before a license for export is obtained, the NRC requires the applicant to furnish
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the bases of liability asserted,49 there may be more than one
such domestic party who may be haled into United States courts
without impediment. °
The more problematic issues concern whether and how
United States defendants may require others to share the colos-
sal burdens of defense and damage awards that will accompany
litigation in the wake of a nuclear power disaster. 1 The most
likely scenario is of United States defendants seeking to have
various additional parties held liable.2 This is due to the fact
proof of "financial protection" (usually in the form of insurance). 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)
(1988). Most companies presumably maintain substantial coverage, both for liability to
third parties and on-site damage. However, the rather complex governmental "indem-
nity" system under United States law, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-
86, has only limited applicability to overseas facilities. The Proceedings of the Munich
Symposium of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, September 10-14, 1984, NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIA-
BILITY AND INSURANCE, (OECD ed., 1985) contain useful discussions of insurance coverage
and availability.
However, ordinary insurance protection would not be available. Most casualty and
liability policies contain standard "Nuclear Liability Exclusion" clauses.
Whether insurers may be made actual parties defendant may be seen as a choice of
law matter. In suits based upon diversity jurisdiction, the question seems to be uniformly
governed by state law. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 3629. Some states con-
sider the question "procedural" and hence controlled by lex fori, while others apply
choice of law and public policy analyses. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS LAW 45, 122, 133, 134 (1986) [hereinafter LEFLAR]; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 162, cmt. d (1971), and infra notes 212-15 and accompany-
ing text.
49. Under traditional civil law concepts and modern legislative reforms in common
law jurisdictions, there do not appear to be significant inconsistencies in the law of joint
and several liability among tortfeasors. See generally FREDERICK H. LAWSON, NEGLI-
GENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 76 (1950); FREDERICK H. LAWSON & B.S. MARKESINIS, ToRTious
LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 126 (1982);
JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 228-32 (6th ed. 1983); WARREN FREEDMAN, JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: ALLOCATION OF RISKS AND APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES 43 (1987).
50. Naturally, in any suit, whether in state or federal court, traditional in personam
jurisdiction requirements, under the rule in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny, must be satisfied.
See also infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text regarding impleader and supple-
mental jurisdiction.
51. See infra notes 55-71, 81-93 and accompanying text.
52. A United States court might also entertain a nuclear accident suit involving
strictly foreign plaintiffs and defendants. In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld a portion of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §
1330(a) (1988), allowing suit by an alien against a foreign instrumentality. In addition,
under the well-known rule in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), a state
may be sued by an alien in the United States for violations of international law under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28.U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). However, Filartiga was narrowed in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), where the
Supreme Court-held that the FSIA (see infra text accompanying notes 81-91) provided
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that multiple entities participated " in the design, construction,
and operation of the nuclear facility, the furnishing of nuclear
materials and supplying of components, and may share the duty
to guard against the occurrence. 54
If a foreign private defendant who supplied components or
performed services in connection with the reactor is to be held
liable by a United States co-defendant, its amenability to suit
will depend on procedural rules governing impleader in United.
States courts55 and the meeting of due process standards. 6 Im-
pleader of third parties is governed by an adaptable discretion-
ary regimen allowing any party who is, or may be, liable to a
defendant to be brought into a suit 57 to facilitate judicial econ-
omy and prevent multiple and circuitous actions where interre-
lated claims are present.
The ability to implead additional parties, whether foreign or
domestic, is qualified by numerous variables.58 In all cases, it de-
the sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state, and its limited exceptions were to be
strictly observed. Such a direct claim would be unlikely in any case where the nuclear
facility was of substantial United States origin.
See also infra notes 303-10 regarding international law norms and national law
remedies.
53. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
54. Under United States law, it is not necessary for defendants to have acted con-
currently to be jointly and severally liable. The rule would not likely differ in most other
jurisdictions. See generally materials cited supra note 49; see also infra note 320 regard-
ing law applicable to contribution and indemnity.
55. The bulk of discussion here is with reference to United States federal courts; a
suit would likely be removed to federal court if initially commenced in state court. In
any event, the procedures and requisites for impleader in most states of the United
States would not differ sharply from those in federal courts. See supra notes 36-37 and
accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 14, which governs interpleader, has a generous jurisprudence in-
terpreting it. The allowance of impleader is a matter of the court's discretion. See Farm-
ers and Merchants Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pulliam, 481 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1973);
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 439-40 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 1443.
In the event it is determined that suit is seriously complicated or otherwise con-
founded by interpleader, the power of the court to order separate trials of separate is-
sues, as allowed by FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), is an important means to meet whatever diffi-
culty might exist. See Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 62, 71-72 (3d Cir.
1971); Lankford v. Ryder Truck Sys., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 430 (D.S.C. 1967).
58. For instance, in determining whether to allow impleader, the court may consider
the inconvenience to a third party, which may be a significant factor when foreign par-
ties are involved. However, a great showing of inconvenience will be required. United
States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); Lone Star
Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954); F & D, Inc. v.
O'Hara & Kendall Aviation, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Tex. 1982). A court should apply
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pends on the ability of the named defendant to make a prima
facie showing59 of its own right of recovery against the third
party defendant.6 0 Moreover, it is well established that foreign
parties may be brought in only when the requisite minimum
contacts exist to support personal jurisdiction." This presents a
hindrance where the third party defendants neither transact
business in the United States 2 nor are otherwise legally
present.63
the impleader rules in accordance with their purpose and avoid defeating them by nar-
row or technical interpretations. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Jupiter Dev., 91 F.R.D. 110
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
59. Recall that the liberal provisions of Rule 14 allow impleader if the third party
"is, or may be" liable. FED. R. Civ. P. 14, See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60. Thus, it would not be possible to implead another defendant who is liable to
plaintiffs only, without a substantive right in favor of the impleading defendant. See
Parr v. Great Lakes Express Co., 484 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1973); Millard v. Municipal
Sewer Auth., 442 F.2d 539, 541 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whita-
ker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972) (prevents collusion to reach defendant who could
not be sued otherwise; no ancillary jurisdiction to hear claim against third party in such
case).
However, as long as the claim arises out of the same aggregate set of facts, the third
party claimant can assert a different basis of liability. See American Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1956); Pitcavage v. Mastercraft Boat
Co., 632 F. Supp. 842 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
The question of the existence of such right of relief against the third party is a
substantive matter, to be resolved under choice of law rules generally governing liability
in the case. See Colton v. Swain, 527oF.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975); General Dynamics Corp. v.
Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965); Ragusa v. City of Streator, 95 F.R.D. 527 (N.D. Ill.
1982). See also infra notes 211-30 and accompanying text regarding choice of applicable
law.
61. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); James
Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1971); Doebler v. Stadium
Prod., Ltd., 91 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1981); WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 1445.
In a diversity action, questions of personal jurisdiction are determined in accordance
with the law of the state where the court sits. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320
F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 1075. However, the jurisprudence of
the United States concerning sufficiency of minimum contacts has evolved into a de
facto federal standard, because it is seen as a matter of due process under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
See also infra text accompanying notes 81-93 regarding in personam jurisdiction in
the context of foreign governments and instrumentalities.
If the liability allocation techniques argued for in this article are implemented or are
likely to be, then foreign defendants will wish to intervene in order to ensure their inter-
ests are duly guarded.
62. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412 (1984);
Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., 727 F.2d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 1984). But see also infra
notes 81-93, 288-91 and accompanying text.
63. See also infra notes 81-93, 288-91 and accompanying text.
The conduct of business by a foreign corporation through a subsidiary is not suffi-
cient in itself to subject the parent to the jurisdiction of a state. Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
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The United States defendant(s) might, of course, bring sep-
arate suits elsewhere seeking indemnity from others considered
liable. But consider the difficulties that appear even at first
blush: Any lawsuit based upon nuclear injury is certain to be
unequalled in factual complexity; 4  even if another forum
promises satisfactory resolution of the intricacies involved, the
spectre of inconsistent results looms, as well as the giant task of
re-establishing the case in a distant and perhaps inhospitable si-
tus. 65 Thus, for United States parties who may be liable for nu-
clear-related damages, a serious quandary is posed - they could
be held accountable for injuries suffered by a multitude of vic-
tims, while other responsible participants remain beyond
reach.6
If a court determines that the United States is the proper
forum,67 then it is in the interests of all United States parties,
and of judicial economy and coherence of result, that impleader
of third parties be allowed to the limits of due process.6 8 The
Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). But see later decisions distinguishing Cannon,
e.g., Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868 (D.S.C. 1979).
Attempts to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction must now apparently comply with due
process standards of minimum contacts. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). But
no sooner was Shaffer handed down than distinctions began to emerge. See, e.g., In-
termeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978) (attachment of
property can supply substantial part of necessary contacts).
64. See also infra text accompanying notes 340-48.
65. The barrier preventing a foreign defendant from being brought into the initial
action in the United States, lack of personal jurisdiction, will preclude issues litigated in
that action from being accorded res judicata effect in a foreign court.
66. For suggested solutions, see infra notes 381-410, 431-39 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 95-144 and accompanying text regarding forum selection and
forum non conveniens.
If the lawsuit is referred to a foreign court, and the United States defendant(s) wish
to avoid multiple suits and conflicting results, they must implead additional parties lia-
ble under the procedure of that forum. That foreign forum will probably not allow as
much flexibility as a United States forum. Moreover, not even all United States parties
may be amenable to suit in a given overseas court system.
If a party is not brought into the foreign court, then a separate suit against it will be
the only remaining option. But impleader will not be allowed in the United States in an
action to enforce a foreign judgment where the proposed third party was not present and
involved in the foreign proceedings. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
68. In this connection, the distinction between "general" jurisdiction, which allows a
cause of action not related to contacts in the forum, and "specific" or "limited" jurisdic-
tion, involving only suits arising therefrom, should be borne in mind. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
If a foreign defendant's activities are not so pervasive as to subject him or her to
general jurisdiction, a court may still assert specific jurisdiction for actions related
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court should examine very carefully the involvement of foreign
parties - taking into account the processes whereby agreements
were made6 and how United States assistance in nuclear devel-
opment was obtained7 0 - to determine whether sufficient con-
tacts or availments have occurred to render these parties amena-
ble to suit in the United States.7 Only thus is it possible to
achieve a just and definitive resolution in one proceeding.
3. Governmental Defendants
The development of technology has historically been condu-
cive to governmental participation, welcomed as a necessary and
proper expedient; this is true of nuclear energy. Accordingly, it
is expected that governments will be sought to be held responsi-
ble for loss compensation.72 In the context of civil damages pro-
thereto. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413; Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimburse-
ment Fund, 784 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1985). The controlling test for such jurisdiction
seems to be whether a defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court on
the basis of its operations in the forum state. Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
69. In the contractual context, where a relationship is established that continues
beyond an isolated transaction, the foreign party receives notice from the contract and
the course of dealing that it might be subject to suit in an alien forum. If the party is
unable to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction will be fundamentally unfair, due
process standards will be met. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985).
70. See supra notes 24-30.
71. Limited or specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires an act or
some transaction by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities in the forum, invoking the benefits and protections of that forum's laws. In such
a case, the cause of action must arise out of the activity, and the exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Haisten, 784 F.2d at
1395. However, the act need not physically take place within the forum to be a sufficient
contact. Id. at 1397.
A program as large and multifaceted as the design, location and construction of a
nuclear facility should be considered by definition more than merely occasional or casual
association. The sheer size and complexity of the undertaking, and the necessary involve-
ment of central governments at both ends make it virtually certain that both continuous
contacts and extensive availment will be present in most, if not all, instances.
See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text concerning United States nuclear ex-
ports and assistance.
72. See infra notes 247-310 and accompanying text regarding governmental bases of
liability.
It should be noted that to varying degrees, depending on their resources and gov-
erning philosophies, governments may be expected to provide aid and victim compensa-
tion through the political processes. Indeed, in the United States, the Price-Anderson
Act, [hereinafter Price-Anderson] discussed infra notes 183-209 and accompanying text,
appears to obligate Congress to take action with respect to a domestic nuclear power
accident causing damages in excess of the liability limitation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)
(1988).
1992] NUCLEAR CIVIL LIABILITY 517
ceedings, government liability will be asserted when other de-
fendants attempt to shift liability, as well as when direct suits
are commenced against government authorities. The principal
issue in this connection is government amenability to suit.
The United States Government may be sued only in actions
involving both a specific grant of jurisdiction and (with limited
exceptions inapplicable here) a corresponding waiver of sover-
eign immunity.73 Although there are differing procedural circum-
stances in which the United States might be a party defendant,4
in each case the court will be called upon a priori to determine
substantively whether a claim may be asserted against it.7 5 Be-
cause there are no statutes specifically creating jurisdiction over
suits against the United States in the context of an accident at a
nuclear facility76 - and the grants of jurisdiction against private
However, there are at least three reasons why this expectation is problematic. First,
the sheer complexity of attempting to quantify and allocate compensation portends in-
complete legislative decision-making and unacceptable delay. Second, injured parties
may be unwilling to rely solely on fickle government largesse, especially absent an estab-
lished responsible regimen. Third, the government itself will require a means in any
event to allocate a share to other parties in order to defray the enormous resource
burden.
In addition, non-governmental or international relief organizations seem to distin-
guish disasters of the type considered here from act-of-God catastrophes such as earth-
quakes and hurricanes. In the wake of the Bhopal tragedy, there was virtually no aid
furnished by any such organization, the expectation apparently being that the Indian
Government and the legal system would afford relief to the victims. Anyway, such orga-
nizations often find their resource pools drained by natural disasters.
73. The judicial power of the United States extends to all controversies to which the
United States is a party. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. But sovereign immunity, unless
waived, operates as a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction even if jurisdiction is oth-
erwise created. Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 619 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds 456 U.S. 728 (1982).
74. As, for instance, in a suit based upon diversity of citizenship, see supra note 37,
in which the United States is joined as a third-party defendant; such joinder will not
defeat diversity if the United States is not an indispensable party defendant. TM Sys-
tems, Inc. v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 481, 485 (D. Conn. 1979).
A suit brought in state court, if not removed by another defendant, see supra note
37, would be removable to federal court by the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
75. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Depending upon how the complaint
is crafted, issues regarding claims against the United States may be raised early on by
motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12. However, lack of subject matter juris-
diction may be raised at any time.
If the immunity of the United States from suit is considered "jurisdictional" it may
be raised in like manner. However, because of the extensive fact-finding which may be
needed with regard to such immunity (see infra text accompanying notes 265-71), it will
in many cases operate for practical purposes an affirmative defense. See Blessing v.
United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
76. Cf. The Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of
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defendants appear unsuitable" -suit must be maintained on
the basis of the Federal Tort Claims Act.7 ' The difficulties that
exist regarding the immunity of the United States from liability
will arise in that setting.79
Related to suits against the United States Government is
the possibility that suit could be brought seeking damages
against the government's employees in their individual capacity
for violation of the protected rights of plaintiffs under applicable
United States law.80 Absent indemnity obligations, the difficul-
ties of satisfying any judgment obtained are obvious.
Foreign governmental defendants, as will be seen,"' may
Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2212 (1988), which makes the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), applicable to suits
arising out of nuclear weapons testing. The United States Government is the only per-
missible defendant in such suits.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1988), which allows for judicial
review of orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, cannot be read to provide a
private right of action for damages.
77. The United States is not a citizen of any state for purposes of diversity of citi-
zenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See Koppers Co. v. Garling &
Langlais, 594 F.2d 1094, 1097 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979). And even if federal question jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) applied, it does not avoid immunity
in suits for damages, and a separate ground for action would need to be set forth. Garcia
v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 1982).
78. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that United States district courts
shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money diumages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 265-71.
80. Such suits, sometimes known as "constitutional tort" suits, seek redress for vio-
lations of the Constitution or United States laws. This was first expressly validated in
the landmark Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), and is a parallel and contemporary cause of action to that allowed
against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(6)
(1988 & Supp. II 1990), but without the often insuperable obstacle of sovereign immu-
nity. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Jurisdiction exists by virtue of the federal
question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946), or civil rights legislation such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
These bases of liability and related questions of immunity are further discussed in-
fra text accompanying notes 248-87.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 288-302. See also supra text accompanying
notes 4-6, 30.
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also be considered legally responsible in part or in whole for the
damage resulting from a nuclear power disaster. If so, whether
they or their instrumentalities s2 can be made parties to suits in
United States courts8 3 will depend on the requirements and al-
lowances of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of the United
States (FSIA).84 The FSIA bewilderingly collapses immunity
82. In addition to jurisdictional and immunity problems discussed in the ensuing
notes and accompanying text, suits against (or counterclaims by) a foreign government
present a problem where separate state-ordained instrumentalities are concerned. Exam-
ples of these difficulties may be found in, inter alia, C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Han-
dlu Zagraniczengao "Rolimpex" [1978] 2 All E.R. 1043 (H.L.). See also HARRY STREET,
GOVERNMENT LIABIUTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 28-36 (1953).
A court should not allow a state to assert a claim while evading its own responsibil-
ity on the basis that a separate entity (such as a utility company or authority) is the
operator of the facility, particularly where an activity such as nuclear power utilization,
which is so closely a governmental function, is concerned. On the other hand, comity and
sound legal and international relations principles counsel against too readily disregarding
entity separateness under the laws of a sister nation. A suggestion for addressing this
problem is found in Ronald D. Lee, Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign States for Acts of
their Instrumentalities: A Model for Attributing Liability, 94 YALE L.J. 394 (1984).
Under the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
452 (1987), claims may be asserted against a state in a United States court on the basis
of the acts of an instrumentality under "special circumstances"; cf. the Supreme Court's
particularized approach in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 11 (1983).
83. Under the traditional international law view, immunity is required to be af-
forded a foreign state in the courts of a state, and whether to do so is not discretionary. 2
D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 843 (2d ed. 1970); Francis Deik, Organs of States
in their External Relations: Immunities and Privileges of State and Organs of the
State, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (Sorensen ed. 1968).
During the twentieth century, states have by and large come to recognize a theory of
"restrictive sovereign immunity," holding that states are not immune with respect to
activities of the type that might be carried on by private persons. GAMAL MOURSI BADR,
STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEw 61 (1984); CHRISTOPH H.
SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 44 (1988); Stefan A. Riesen-
feld, Sovereign Immunity in Perspective, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1986).
This is also the law of the United States, as codified in the FSIA, and the RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1987). It may be
said that the Restatement serves as a reference point for resolving issues of substantive
immunity clouded by the FSIA.
84. The FSIA was passed in 1976, as portions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441,
1602-11 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). It creates, in effect, federal question-based jurisdiction
where a foreign state is the defendant and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, where the
foreign state is the plaintiff. See also supra note 37. It is "a comprehensive set of legal
standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state."
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). See also infra note
86 and accompanying text.
For explanations of the workings of the FSIA, see Mary K. Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Mark B. Feldman, For-
eign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts 1976-1986, 19 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 19 (1986); Melissa L. Werthan et al., Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign Govern-
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into jurisdiction at initial inquiry; however, it is clear that even
if jurisdiction exists, substantive immunity still must be over-
come.8 5 With general immunity from suit as its point of depar-
ture, 6 the FSIA sets forth transactional exceptions, 7 none of
which likely applies to cases of the type herein considered. 88
However, if a foreign government were a plaintiff, a situation
which may arise in the context of a massive nuclear accident,89
or otherwise was allowed to intervene, that government would be
amenable to counterclaim. 0 Indeed, counterclaims may be the
sole jurisdictional basis.91
In addition, if a foreign state can be held amenable to suit
in the United States, in personam jurisdiction requirements
must again be met, as in the case of a private defendant.92
Where the ground is counterclaim, the nation would ipso facto
have sufficiently availed itself of the laws of the United States to
meet jurisdictional standards and the matter is expressly pro-
vided for by the FSIA in any event. But whether sufficient con-
tacts otherwise exist in the setting of a foreign nuclear facility
cannot be predicted, there being no cases nor positive law provi-
ments: A Comprehensive Review of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 119 (1986).
An exhaustive discussion of the FSIA, and the jurisprudence that has evolved since
its enactment, may be found in JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (1988).
85. See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text regarding substantive immunity
under municipal laws and the act of state doctrine.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) provides immunity from suit for a foreign state by the
courts of the United States, subject to international agreement and certain statutory
exceptions.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) offers a possible exception in cases in
which the foreign government has executed an "Agreement for Cooperation" concerning
nuclear energy (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988)) with the United States containing
an express waiver of immunity.
In addition, of course, the foreign government could otherwise explicitly waive im-
munity in order to participate in the suit.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988), applicable in any suit brought by a foreign state or in
which it intervenes.
See, however, infra notes 293-309 regarding substantive immunity under national
laws and act of state doctrine.
91. See supra note 52 regarding the Supreme Court's recent explication in Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
92. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981), and authorities discussed therein; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. II
1990). Cf. supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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sions applicable. 93
Thus, governmental susceptibility to suit for its role in
events leading to nuclear disaster may turn upon the grounds of
the claims asserted. In the case of the United States, at the ju-
risdictional stage a cause of action must fit within its statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity; a claim against a foreign state
may be brought if an exception under the FSIA can be shown to
apply. The presence of governmental defendants may also have
a significant impact on the ultimate liability of other parties.
94
B. Forum and Jurisdiction
1. Considerations for Litigants
Without an effective international legal regimen to allocate
adjudicatory authority with respect to nuclear accident claims,
litigants may choose whichever court offers the greatest hope of
adequate redress.95 Due to the gravity of injuries and far-reach-
ing consequences thereof, victims of nuclear power accidents will
be especially intent upon achieving the optimal situs. 96 Where
the United States or its citizens are implicated, the optimal situs
will likely be the United States.
Divergent popular attitudes, both with respect to nuclear
energy in general and to the particular case, will play a part in
the forum to be selected. It is a fair supposition that a certain
93. A government seeking United States commercial or governmental assistance in
the development of nuclear power will in all probability have negotiated extensively with
both United States authorities and one or more companies. Moreover, it will likely have
signed an "Agreement for Cooperation" with the United States in order to obtain nu-
clear material, may have received financial aid and almost certainly will get technical aid
from the United States. See supra note 26 and infra note 253.
This pattern of activity ought to be at least as appropriate to render the government
susceptible to personal jurisdiction in the United States as that in Texas Trading, 647
F.2d at 311 (in which the banking and commercial activities of the Nigerian Government
were adequate). Of course, substantive immunity must still be met and overcome.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 311-37.
95. Some plaintiffs may be bound by forum selection clauses in applicable agree-
ments. See infra text accompanying notes 145-51 for special problems this may present.
96. The limits of judicial jurisdiction will vary with the municipal laws of nations
and international conflicts of laws principles. As regards the United States, the parame-
ters are included, where appropriate, in the next section regarding parties.
Of course, a defendant, or group of defendants, cannot be sued just anywhere. This
writing has as one of its foundational assumptions that there exists a sufficient connec-
tion that the United States is among the fora the plaintiff may select.
Discussion of the array of views among other nations regarding such jurisdiction,
except as noted specifically herein, is beyond the scope of this essay. See also infra notes
303-10 regarding international law norms and municipal law remedies.
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generalized public disapprobation of the nuclear industry as well
as the people's generosity, fairness, and sense of justice may be
regarded as auspicious for suits in the United States."7 Where
the assessment of damages awards is concerned, differing tradi-
tions and standards of living are known to have a marked ef-
fect; 8 injured parties may expect to fare as well in this respect
in United States courts as any others. In addition, since no over-
riding unified regimen otherwise applies, United States proce-
dure offers the greatest hope that a damage award may be justly
allocated among plaintiffs. 9
An additional influence upon advisors to injured persons
will be the selection of a forum to influence the choice of law.100
This may be of use in regard to substantive as well as procedural
matters.101 In the latter category are factors that, although tacti-
cal, may be determinative of the result. The first and most obvi-
ous is the availability of jury trials in civil actions in the United
States. 102 Almost as important in a case involving mass injury is
97. For instance, pressure from anti-nuclear groups caused the canceling of 100
projects in the United States alone since the mid-1970s. Meeks, supra note 3, at 116.
98. See Norbert Pelzer, Current Problems of Nuclear Liability Law in the Post-
Chernobyl Period, ENERGEWIRTSCHAFTLICHE TAGESFRAGEN (January 1987), translated in
39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 66, 71 (June 1987) [hereinafter Pelzer]; Harvard Law School and
Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL PROTECTION
AGAINST NUCLEAR RISK 6 (1959) [hereinafter HARVARD STUDY].
99. The concern here is how to spread the monetary award. Would the first to sue
receive all the funds available and others go uncompensated? This could be especially
troublesome if punitive damages were obtained, even if the court is careful to limit them
based upon the defendant's available assets. The best solution for all concerned may be
the class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, in which the court would have the discretionary
power to distribute the funds (together, it may be imagined, with a United States bank-
ruptcy court). The class action model does not address the question of compensating
latent injury which may be undiscovered until long after other issues in the case are
resolved. See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
Where the Price-Anderson Act, which governs injuries caused within the United
States or pursuant to contract, is applicable, the foregoing problem is greatly simplified;
there is a finite fund due to liability limitations, and the court has the power to hold and
apportion it among injured parties. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(o) (1988). See infra notes 191-96
and accompanying text.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 222-27.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 222-27. Under the traditional view, "sub-
stantive" law is the subject of choice of law analysis, while "procedural" matters are
always supposed to be governed by the law of the forum. See also infra notes 210-15 and
accompanying text.
102. In general, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution preserves the right to
jury trial in "suits at common law," U.S. CONST. amend. VII, and this right has tradition-
ally been given a broad reading in United States courts. However, under the FTCA, trial
by jury is not allowed in suits against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988). In a
suit in which the United States is one of several defendants, the court apparently may
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the availability of contingent fee arrangements with counsel.' 3
The plaintiffs will also be influenced by factors such as the
recognition and enforceability of a judgment once obtained,104
the perception that United States courts possess greater exper-
tise and better procedural devices for dealing with cases involv-
ing mass injury, l05 enhanced ability to implead additional par-
ties defendant,'0O and suit in the locale where jurisdiction may
be most readily asserted over a governmental defendant.0 7 Fi-
nally, it bears noting that injured parties may wish to commence
action in the United States for another quite important strategic
reason: In the event United States courts are ultimately not
deemed the proper forum, important advantages vis 6 vis one or
more defendants may nevertheless be achieved if a suit is condi-
tionally dismissed.'
2. Forum Non Conveniens
Nearly every suit in which foreign events or persons are in-
volved will necessitate consideration of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.'09 In the case of an international nuclear acci-
divide the issues of liability to be tried and allow jury trial on those not concerned with
the United States. See Barron v. United States, 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981); Collins v.
General Motors Corp., 101 F.R.D. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
See also infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text regarding choice of law.
103. Jury trials in civil actions and contingency fee arrangements are generally not
available in most foreign jurisdictions. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 262
n.18 (1981).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 411-30.
105. Examples of this include the class action, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (and
corresponding state court procedures), devices for consolidation like the federal Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and broad-ranging discovery procedures under the
Federal Rules.
106. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 133-44 concerning conditions to dismissal
based on forum non conveniens.
109. There is no established rule or framework for the use of forum non conveniens
in international litigation in general, except as it may be applied by courts in the United
States.
In this passage, reference is to forum non conveniens as it applies to the choice
between a United States and foreign tribunal, and not between courts within the United
States. Domestically, the doctrine has been in large part codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1988). In diversity suits by alien plaintiffs in federal court, the defendant's residence
would be the proper venue, and if domestic and alien defendants are present, venue
would be proper in any district in which it is correct as to the non-aliens. See generally
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Indus., 406
U.S. 706 (1972); R.C.A. Records v. Hanks, 548 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The FSIA, supra note 84, contains no applicable venue provision, except that suits
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dent, a defendant might choose to attempt transfer of the litiga-
tion outside the United States. 110
The parameters of forum non conveniens in the jurispru-
dence of the United States figure significantly in its application
here."" Thus, it is established that where plaintiffs are foreigi,
their choice of the forum is not entitled to the same analytic
weight as if they were United States citizens or residents."12
Similarly, less favorable law or laws affecting recovery of dam-
ages will not prevent dismissal if a foreign court is clearly more
appropriate."13
The threshold determinant of forum non conveniens is the
adequacy of the alternative forum." 4 Preliminarily, the defend-
against a foreign state or political subdivision may be brought in the District of Colum-
bia. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (1988). There is no express indication as yet where venue may lie
against a foreign governmental instrumentality other than the state itself.
110. This was the disposition of the lawsuits in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd in
part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 116-19, 132-44 and accompanying
text.
The most likely transfer would be to courts where the incident occurred, although in
certain cases a country where harm was suffered could be more suitable (as in the event
of significant transfrontier injury); in either case, it would have to be established that
sufficient grounds existed for the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction. United States de-
fendants would need to consider this and a host of other legal and extra-legal variables
in preparing to urge forum non conveniens and determine not only which outside forum,
if any, is advantageous, but also which meets the criteria considered below.
In Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, it was recognized that use of the doctrine amounted to
"reverse forum-shopping." Nonetheless, the Court held that if dismissal was otherwise
appropriate, it is immaterial that it may have been motivated by a desire for a more
favorable forum. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.19 (1981).
111. The application of the doctririe to dismiss in favor of another court system is
optional, and rests upon the court's synthesis of a great number of competing considera-
tions. The leading recent Supreme Court case, Piper Aircraft, held:
The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and pri-
vate interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its
decision deserves substantial deference.
Id. at 257.
112. Id. at 256; In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1982),
aff'd sub nom. Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984). The
presence of a small number of domestic plaintiffs would not vary the application of this
principle. See Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1982), afl'd sub
nom. Cheng v. Boeing Co., 701 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983).
113. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 250.
114. Id. at 254; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506 (1947).
The existence of an alternative forum is a foundational element of the prima facie
showing required of the moving defendant. Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325
(9th Cir. 1984).
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ant must, of course, be amenable to suit there."' In addition,
where transfer outside the United States is sought, courts have
conducted particularized inquiries into the ability of the foreign
tribunal to afford adequate redress, weighing such variables as
systemic procedural capacities," 6 the sophistication of pertinent
tort laws,"1 the availability of juries and contingent fee arrange-
ments, 1 8 possible non-enforcement of judgments by the courts
of one or the other countries, 19 the existence of a cognizable
cause of action not otherwise barred by law,12 0 and the ability to
implead potential third-party defendants.' 2' Another factor
which should be taken into account is the capacity of the courts
to afford redress against the government of the forum.122
115. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. This requirement is sometimes met by the
defendant's offer to consent to the jurisdiction of the foreign court when it moves for
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
116. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd in part 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (dic-
tum). In that case, the argument was raised that the United States District Court should
retain the case because of the expertise of United States tribunals in dealing with com-
plex matters arising out of mass disasters. Id. at 847-52.
Whether and how this "experience level" will henceforth rank remains yet to be
seen. However, it is undeniable that in the current era, the United States system is rap-
idly approaching veteran status. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d
Cir. 1986); Michigan Chem. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th
Cir. 1984); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417
(10th Cir. 1987) (radiation fallout from weapons testing programs); Wehner v. Syntex
Corp., 107 F.R.D. 248 (E.D. Mo. 1985); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433
(M.D. Pa. 1980) (nuclear accident). See also Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident
Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REv. 1143 (1983); Patrick D. McTernan, Com-
ment, Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REv. 383 (1977).
117. Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 849; In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd sub nom. Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727
F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984).
118. Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 851.
119. Id. at 852; In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in
Dec. 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1987).
120. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. at 1133.
121. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Texaco,
Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 453 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Whyham v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 96 F.R.D. 557 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
See also supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text regarding impleader of third
party defendants.
122. Thus, if a defendant were seeking third party recovery from the government of
the country in which the nuclear accident occurred, the workings of sovereign immunity
and independence of the courts and judiciary would be pivotal as regards the adequacy
of that forum. In a suit in which one United States party claimed such a right and an-
other did not, the latter might be the forum non conveniens movant, and the former
would presumably oppose the motion.
It has been held that, notwithstanding Congressional intent to subject foreign states
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Beyond the initial inquiry as to the adequacy of an alterna-
tive forum, the traditional tools of comparison in forum non con-
veniens cases are generally cast in terms of "interest" analysis,
and are quite suitable to cases concerning mass injury from nu-
clear disaster. "Private" interests are generally those which are
of aid to the parties in the litigation,123 while "public interest"
factors are those which concern the forum state in having, or not
having, the dispute tried in its courts. 124 The latter highlight the
court's exacting deliberative task, beneath the magnifying glass
of world observance. 125
Both private and public interest factors will vary according
and instrumentalities to suit under the FSIA to the outer limits of due process, the same
standards for forum non conveniens are to be applied as in actions against private per-
sons. Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d
Cir. 1985); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
However, in a circumstance such as in the first preceding paragraph, the motion
should be denied if the effect would be to leave remediless the party with rights against
the foreign government.
123. In the watershed opinion in the forward movement of the doctrine, the Su-
preme Court summarized "private interest" factors as follows: (1) access to sources of
proof; (2) availability of compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses; (3) costs of
obtaining attendance of witnesses; (4) the possibility of a view of the locus delicti, if
appropriate; (5) enforceability of a judgment once obtained; (6) "all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive." Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
These factors converge with the elements considered above as to adequacy of the
foreign tribunal.
124. In Gulf Oil, the Court identified the following "public interest" factors: (1) ad-
ministrative difficulties from congested litigation; (2) jury duty being imposed upon a
community with no relation to the lawsuit; (3) interest in having localized controversies
decided at home; (4) conflicts of laws problems; and (5) application of foreign law. Id. at
508-09.
However, it is clear that the analysis is in reality quite particularized. As the Court
stated in Piper Aircraft: "'[E]ach case turns on its facts.' If central emphasis were
placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the
flexibility that makes it so valuable." Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249-50. For instance, in
In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the dispositive factor was the public interest in avoiding
a spate of products liability suits in United States courts where the only connection to
the United Stafes was initial product development and testing. 545 F. Supp. at 1145.
125. There are numerous "extra-legal" reasons that may be urged in favor of al-
lowing suit to proceed in a United States forum. These include, inter alia, a perceived
double standard (i.e., that defendants undoubtedly expect a lesser damage exposure
outside the United States), the notion that, in fairness, United States companies who
profit from overseas should afford injured persons the benefits of United States justice,
and the damage which may occur to the United States and its businesspeople if it is felt
that a different measure of care is being observed abroad with impunity from United
States judicial scrutiny.
These considerations will remain unarticulated to a great extent under traditional
judicial analysis; however, they will no doubt be extraordinarily influential in a case of
the type being considered here.
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to the gravamen of the wrong asserted against United States
parties. If faulty construction or supervision in operation is al-
legedly involved, then private factors such as access to sources of
proof and availability of witnesses- point toward the place of oc-
currence; on the other hand, an avowedly faulty design may
have its closest such connections to the United States. Or, the
case might involve combinations that are not so easily differenti-
ated. Moreover, any number of additional ingredients may be
present.12 6 In all events, a complex weighing and balancing will
be demanded at a very early stage of the litigation.
127
Public interest factors will be no less complex in such a case
and may indeed emerge paramount. 28 In a nuclear accident suit
in which the gravamen involves matters such as design defects,
construction flaws, or errors in supervising operations, there will
be a strong public interest in determining the design and opera-
tional safety of reactors of United States origin, and whether
known safety standards, if observed, would avert a similar catas-
trophe at home. That interest militates toward having these
questions determined in the forum best capable of adjudicating
mass claims, in which the expertise of scientific, public interest,
and regulatory groups is most readily available. The information
that is revealed during a trial might have an important bearing
126. For example, if a defendant against whom substantial liability is asserted has
most of its assets within the United States, and there is significant doubt as to whether a
judgment in a foreign court will meet United States standards for enforcement, a forum
outside the United States would obviously be less suitable.
.In addition, the amenability of necessary defendants, both private and governmen-
tal, to suit in one forum or another, and the substantive law of immunity, may influence
the positions taken on the subject of forum non conveniens by any or all parties.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
127. Note that a substantial amount of discovery may be required before it is possi-
ble to determine the court in which the matter is to proceed.
128. An overriding motif is that the level of governmental involvement, in the
United States and elsewhere, in the production and utilization of nuclear energy is
higher than in any other industrial activity. This fits the idea that public sector partici-
pation is called for in any field in which the potential for massive injury is present. Wit-
ness the testimony of the Chairman of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, before Con-
gress in the wake of Bhopal:
I think Bhopal has changed the world, never mind the United States or an
industry. Whatever your position was with regard to fail-safe catastrophic. ..
control or whatever it might be, all of this has to be reevaluated, not only from
the standpoint of the industry and the industry associations, but from the gov-
ernment itself.
Hazardous Air Pollutants: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1984).
The same could certainly be said of a nuclear disaster.
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on the development of domestic laws and standards regarding
nuclear power, and indeed the future of the industry.129 At the
same time, the interest of the nation, or nations, in which dam-
age and injury were suffered in having victims adequately com-
pensated1 30 is as compelling, in that whatever is left undone
must be accomplished by an already shock-ridden and
overburdened public sector.131 Thus the dividing line between
public and private interests is blurred in the nuclear accident
lawsuit setting. The foregoing considerations must be carefully
drawn and applied by a party in determining whether to seek
dismissal and transfer to a foreign forum, and by the court in
resolving this potentially critical issue.1 32
United States courts that have granted dismissal on the ba-
sis of forum non conveniens have imposed conditions on such
grant to help insure the adequacy of the overseas forum to af-
ford relief to plaintiffs.'3 3 Although the conditions may be of
more than one variety,134 the most common is agreement by the
moving defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.'3 6 Thus plaintiffs may achieve a significant advantage by
129. Of course, at this writing no new nuclear plants are being built in the United
States, but there are 111 operational facilities in the United States. See supra notes 3, 4.
New ones may be built as the gap widens between energy needs and alternate available
sources, especially in light of global warming. See supra note 3.
130. This public interest is well recognized in United States jurisprudence. See Mc-
Gee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Fiacco v. United Technolo-
gies Corp., 524 F. Supp. 858, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
131. This is in addition to the safety-related public interests outlined above in re-
gard to the United States.
132. In the wake of the Bhopal tragedy, the United States defendant was successful
in having the suit transferred to Indian courts. See discussion of Union Carbide case,
supra note 110. This strategic decision and the court's analysis, are understandable, but
different considerations regarding bases of liability and the desire to implead additional
parties might well lead to a different approach by the defendant.
In Louise Weinberg, Insights and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 307, 313-16 (1985), the author argues that although United States courts have
become increasingly inhospitable to foreign claimants, both public and private interests
support maintaining actions arising out of mass disasters involving United States de-
fendants in United States courts.
133. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
134. One example is the defendant's agreement to produce certain records in the
foreign court. Ali v. Offshore Co., 753 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1985).
In In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1982), a case involv-
ing foreign plaintiffs against an American manufacturer and others, defendants agreed,
inter alia, to concede liability, waive any limitations defense, waive any limitation of
liability under treaties relating to civilian aviation, guarantee payment of judgment, and
thereby obtain a dismissal "without prejudice" in favor of a Saudi Arabian court.
135. See, e.g., Bailey v. Dolphin Int'l Inc., 697 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1983);
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commencing a suit in the United States, since personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant may be guaranteed (and other concessions
exacted as well) even if the matter is left ultimately to a foreign
court. However, conditions to forum non conveniens dismissal
must be limited in fairness to the parties litigant."' 6 In a case
such as a multi-party transnational nuclear disaster suit, a
United States court may be called upon to exercise considerable
creativity in crafting such conditions to justly maximize judicial
economy and efficiency, and avoid multiple actions and conflict-
ing adjudicative results. Thus, moving parties, including those
impleaded, should be required to forego objections to jurisdic-
tion in the foreign court. A foreign1 3 governmental entity or in-
strumentality urging forum non conveniens dismissal ought to
be willing to waive immunity in the alternative forum, as should
any private defendant that might derivatively enjoy such immu-
nity. 1 38 It may also be suitable to require consent to discovery or
production of certain evidence, procedural concessions, agree-
ment to the application of substantive laws, or a combination of
these. Additionally, although it would appear to be improper to
condition dismissal upon a blanket agreement to honor any
judgment rendered,3 9 the court might exercise its discretion to
require a defendant to not resist enforcement of an award on
specified grounds, 40 including: the fact that a foreign govern-
Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978).
136. In Union Carbide, the United States District Court conditioned dismissal
upon: (1) the defendant's agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian court and
waiver of defenses based upon limitations; (2) defendant's agreement to satisfy a judg-
ment rendered against it so long as minimum due process requirements were met; (3)
defendant's being subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842,
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev'd in part 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Executive Com-
mittee Members v. Union of India, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed as to the latter two conditions,
on the basis that (2) above was misleading and less useful than existing laws regarding
enforcement of foreign judgments, and (3) would place the defendant in an unequal posi-
tion regarding its duty to comply with discovery. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant
Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1987).
137. The United States Government, if a defendant, is unlikely to urge transfer of
the action to a court system beyond its borders, or to submit to the jurisdiction of any
such tribunal. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. If liability is asserted
against the United States, a transfer outside the United States would inevitably mean at
least one additional suit.
138. See infra notes 313-19 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140. Because such a situation will most likely come into play when enforcement of a
judgment is attempted in the United States, many of these grounds are taken from the
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ment is among the plaintiffs in its own courts;141 the alleged fail-
ure to join indispensable parties; 4 2 asserted repugnancy of a
cause of action to public policy; procedures claimed to be inade-
quate or prejudicial; 4 3 and protestations otherwise inconsistent
with a forum non conveniens motion.144
3. Forum Selection in Agreements
In the course of arranging for participation by a United
States company in the building of a nuclear facility in a foreign
country, the parties may have included in their agreement a
clause stipulating to confer jurisdiction on a given court.'" Such
clauses have come to be regarded favorably by United States 4 0
UNIF. FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1962) in
force in numerous states. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5301-5309 (McKinney
1978), and are exemplary of the grounds that are often recognized.
141. As in Union Carbide, in which the defendant was undeterred by that fact from
seeking forum non conveniens transfer. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd in part, 809 F.2d
195 (2d Cir. 1987).
142. Such indispensible parties would, presumably, be beyond reach in the foreign
forum. See also infra notes 329-37 and accompanying text regarding compulsory joinder
in United States courts.
143. An example of this might be a "representative suit" by the government on be-
half of its citizens, which is not recognized in United States practice. See supra note 45
and accompanying text.
144. These would include inconvenience or inadequacy of legal process in the for-
eign forum and the like. Agreements concerning choice of forum might also be taken into
account. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
145. Such a forum selection clause may even prorogate jurisdiction in favor of a
court otherwise unconnected with the transaction concerned, as was the case in the lead-
ing Supreme Court decision, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). In
such an instance, the forum selection clause would be the sole jurisdictional ground.
It is well established that contractual clauses may also bind the parties to arbitral
tribunals in the event of dispute. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). The
same considerations would apply as to a forum selection clause.
146. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. Although The Bremen was an admiralty case,
forum selection clauses have come to be applied in a wide variety of cases. See In re
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 482 cmt. 5 (1987); James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in
International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1 (1977).
Cf. N.Y. GEN. OSLIG. LAW §§ 5-1401 to 5-1402 (McKinney 1984); Model Choice of
Forum Act (adopted in a few states), reprinted in 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 292 (1969).
The effect to begiven forum selection clauses is a matter for the discretion of the.
court. Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (in-
volving the laws of the United States and Great Britain); Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco
Energy Co., 673 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1982).
It seems that an interest analysis will be required to determine whether the enforce-
ability of such clauses will be determined according to the law of the forum (i.e., United
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and foreign 147 courts and authorities, usually in the context of
commercial disputes. They will not, however, be given effect if
there exists a compelling reason to refuse to do so. 148 In the set-
ting of a lawsuit following a transnational nuclear disaster, there
will be many different kinds and classes of parties seeking re-
dress, few of whom will have been parties to forum selection
clauses; accordingly, their rights will in no way be affected.1 49
Thus, the clauses may possibly be invoked if there is a dispute
involving the exercise of jurisdiction over third party suppliers
or actors sought to be impleaded, 5 e or as an additional factor to
be weighed, in making a forum non conveniens determination . 5'
However, at the same time, where resolution of third party
States federal law in United States courts) or the applicable law, where different. See
Farmland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrot Commodities, 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1986); General
Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986); AVC Neder-
land v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
147. See generally DETLEV F, VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BusiNEss PROBLEMS 189-91
(1986).
148. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 15 (fraud or overreaching, or other effective
deprivation of day in court); id. at 15 (unreasonable or against strong public policy);
Rockwell Int'l Sys. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983) (effective alternate
forum unavailable in Iranian courts); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres,
741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d
721 (4th Cir. 1981) (contract of adhesion).
149. See Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs., Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975);
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980).
150. Forum selection clauses have been enforced in the context of complaints for
liability. See Gordonsville Indus. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. Va.
1982); Staco Energy Prods. Co. v. Driver-Harris Co,, 509 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D. Ohio 1981);
Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd, 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (subject to reasonableness);
Pascalides v. Irwin Yacht Sales N., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 298 (D.R.I. 1988). This has been so
even where the defendant would have difficulty getting jurisdiction over a foreign de-
fendant in the alternate forum, or the third-party defendant would be forced to litigate
in multiple fora. Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Clinton v.
Janger, 583 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1984). But see Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d
1325 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a clause was not applicable to all disputes which
might arise, even between the contracting parties).
See also supra notes 55-63 regarding impleader of third parties.
151. Forum selection clauses will probably be given effect only as to parties to agree-
ments or closely related persons and entities; accordingly, this use has an obvious overlap
with that discussed in the preceding note and accompanying text.
Such clauses have often been considered together with forum non conveniens princi-
ples generally. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed sub nom., The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359
U.S. 180 (1959) (the case whose view of forum selection clauses was rejected later in The
Bremen); Diatronics, Inc. v. Elbit Computers, Ltd., 649 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Clinton v. Janger, 583 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
See also supra notes 109-44 and accompanying text regarding forum non conveniens
generally.
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claims by United States defendants would be facilitated, and the
interests of justice and economy served, a court should decline
to enforce a clause that would arbitrarily remove a portion of
claims in a nuclear accident suit to a distant forum and require
duplicative and conflicting proceedings.
4. Suits and Judgments in Multiple Fora
There is no international regimen that operates to require
consolidation of nuclear third party liability suits into a single
forum.152 Even if an incident occurred in a country whose laws
restrict suit to a single forum,53 if responsibility is asserted
against a United States concern, multiple suits would be
likely.'54 Therefore, in the wake of a massive nuclear accident
having international implications in which one or more United
States entities are sought to be held liable,'155 suits may be com-
menced concurrently in courts both within and outside the
United States.15 1 Quite apart from the burdens associated with
152. Although there are some treaties that would limit the commencement of litiga-
tion to a specified location, they are, for reasons of limited reach or limited applicability,
or both, not pertinent to occurrences in many parts of the world. The United States is
not party to any of these treaties. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 169-81, 234-37 and accompanying text regarding multinational
conventions and national law systems which implement or reflect them.
154. An example would be if liability were based upon negligent facility construction
or design. In such case, suit might be commenced properly in the courts of the country of
occurrence. See infra notes 288-91. However, as discussed supra notes 126-29 and ac-
companying text, some or all plaintiffs could also bring actions in the United States
under United States law, on the theory that a wrongful act occurred here. The applica-
tion of United States law would mean that no restriction of forum to the country of
occurrence would be effective anyway. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
This problem was recognized early on in HARVARD STUDY, supra note 98, at 11, and can-
not be forestalled without a worldwide liability system.
155. See supra notes 7-31 and accompanying text.
156. Various courts might assert jurisdiction, based on the domicile of the defend-
ant, the commission of a tortious act within the forum, the place for performance where
a contractual claim is involved, nationality, or perhaps even service of summons within
the jurisdiction. See generally ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 3
(4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter LEFLAR]; ALBERT A. EHRZENWEIG & ERIK JAYME, PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW §§ 163, 179 (1973); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, supra note 35, § 20; P.M.
NORTH & J.J. FAwcETT, CHESHIRE & NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 183-91 (11th
ed. 1987). The extent to which international judgment enforcement standards are met
will obviously vary with the basis for jurisdiction.
It is also important to note that multiples of the foregoing may be involved, as, for
example, where damage is caused in more than one country, or persons responsible for
the design, construction, and operation of the facility have different places of residence,
or some claims are based upon contract and others in tort. See supra notes 7-31, 55-57,
81 and accompanying text.
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defending in several separate actions, 51 it is all but certain that
the end result would be conflicting adjudications5 8 and multiple
judgment awards.159
There are two means whereby problems of multiple suits
and judgments may be met. The first is a rule of "international
lis pendens,"''6 whereby a United States court might dismiss a
suit if there is another suit pending in another jurisdiction con-
cerning the same subject matter.' 6 ' Before doing so, the court
An interesting special problem would arise if a French plaintiff or defendant were
involved. According to Article 15, French Civil Code, a French national has the preroga-
tive to be sued in France, and under Article 14 to sue anyone in a French court, regard-
less of the cause of action. C. civ. art. 15 (Fr.); C. civ. art. 14 (Fr.). And this "exorbitant"
jurisdiction is by no means limited to France. British courts have jurisdiction over jointly
liable defendants who would not otherwise be reachable if sued alone, as in an action for
a tort committed abroad, and service of summons outside the jurisdiction is allowed
under Order 11.1(1)(c) of the United Kingdom Rules of the Supreme Court. See PETER
KAYE, CIvIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION 636, 1233 (1987).
157. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text and infra notes 158-59 and ac-
companying text.
158. The basic principles of common law res judicata are the same whether judg-
ment is rendered in the United States or a foreign court, so long as the court is part of
an actually functioning government observing civilized norms. LEFLAR, supra note 156, §
84. As a matter of international comity, United States courts owe deference to the deci-
sions of foreign courts, so long as they have competent jurisdiction, and the laws and
policy of the United States and the rights of its citizens are not being violated. See
Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICt OF LAws § 98 cmt. c (1971).
Res judicata may prevent the raising of issues not litigated in the foreign court,
where a proceeding has been stayed during its pendency by a United States court. See
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1987).
159. For example, plaintiffs in separate countries' courts may not understand the
notion that they must be turned away from asserting their claims because other plaintiffs
have obtained and enforced another judgment and there can be no "multiple recovery."
A court may be loath, or at least at a loss, to apply the principle when recognition and
enforcement of a judgment is sought.
Moreover, if judgment awards are inconsistent, as they may well be given the com-
plexities and uncertainties inherent in the subject, such inconsistency raises a number of
questions regarding which is to be enforced and to what extent.
See also infra notes 415-30 and accompanying text regarding enforcement of foreign
judgments in the United States.
160. The use of international lis pendens has recently been urged, following a series
of suits in which seven judgments were rendered, four in the United States and three in
Japan, arising out of a single relatively simple set of occurrences. See Sawaki, Battle of
Lawsuits: Lis Pendens in International Relations, 23 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 17 (1979-
80).
161. Courts in the United States have inherent discretionary power to stay or dis-
miss actions pending resolution of suits in foreign tribunals concerning the same subject
matter. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v.
Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1498
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The factors bearing on the propriety of doing so include a United States
interest in determining the matter in a United States court, judicial efficiency, fairness
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should ascertain whether jurisdictional and other requisites for
judgment enforcement in the United States are met.16 2 Addi-
tionally, such dismissal should not be taken too easily in a suit
involving a great number of parties, complex issues, and enor-
mous losses and liabilities.163 Nevertheless, when the alternatives
are considered, the concept may be a way to avoid the worst of
the dilemmas presented.16 4
The second means to address problems of multiple suits and
judgments is more narrow in application, but may be quite use-
ful where it can be brought to bear. If the accident occurs in a
and prejudice, and international cooperation. See Ingersoll Milling Mach., 833 F.2d at
685-86; I.J.A., Inc. v. Marine Holdings, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 197, 198 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Considerations of international comity also play an important role. See Cunard Steam-
ship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Servs. A.B., 773 F.2d 452, 456-60 (2d Cir. 1985); Cornfeld,
471 F. Supp. at 1262; Ronar, Inc. v. Michael Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
Whether to apply the principle is a matter of United States federal law in a United
States court. Ingersoll Milling Mach., 833 F.2d at 697; Faherty v. Fender, 572 F. Supp.
142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
There is some reference to "concurrent jurisdiction" between the United States and
a foreign tribunal, as in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
926 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dictum). This "concurrent jurisdiction" is limited in that a dismis-
sal or stay in favor of a pending foreign action is without prejudice, may be conditional,
and will not prevent a court from hearing the case if certain conditions are not met. See
Ingersoll Milling Mach., 833 F.2d at 685; Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211,
218-20 (5th Cir. 1984).
162. Otherwise, there really would be no conflict of judgments insofar as the United
States is concerned, and it would only be just to allow plaintiffs to proceed to obtain an
award which can be enforced in this country. See Ingersoll Milling Mach., 833 F.2d at
691-92.
163. Merely to dismiss in favor of another court that has the power to render a
judgment which would be recognized in the United States would not address the issues
of personal jurisdiction, ability to implead third parties, and possible immunity which
would face United States defendants. In addition, such a dismissal would not resolve the
private or public interests involved in determining whether the suit should be heard in
the United States. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. In Landis, 299 U.S. at
255, the Court stated: "Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be com-
pelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the
rights of both." The pendency of an action in another court, and the ability of the court
to resolve as many outstanding ingredients of controversy as possible, would be another
factor the court may wish to consider in connection with a forum non conveniens motion.
See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
164. It has also been held that United States courts have the power to enjoin parties
from pursuing litigation elsewhere, so long as the threshold requirements, that the same
parties be involved and the United States lawsuit will be dispositive of the matter, are
met. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927; Seattle Totems Hockey Club Inc. v. National
Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
These requirements are sufficiently stringent to restrict this device to an extremely lim-
ited sphere of applicability.
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nation possessing a liability system restricting suits to a single
forum,I" a United States court could simply utilize choice of law
principles to avoid the difficulties presented.1 66 Under this ap-
proach, even if the operative event were alleged to occur in the
United States, the court might determine that the law of the
country of occurrence ought to apply; thereunder, suit could
only be commenced in its courts. As will be discussed herein,167
this may be done consistently with the principled application of
choice of law tenets.16 8
C. Applicable Law
As preceding passages have repeated, there is no integrated
legal regimen that will govern international liability for a mas-
sive nuclear accident abroad in which United States persons or
entities are defendants. Choosing the correct law to adjust the
rights of the parties will be a crucial ingredient of the process.
1. International Liability Systems
In recognition of the anticipated strains upon the private
international law system were it ever applied to a multinational
nuclear disaster, systematic and worthy efforts were made to
deal with the third party liability problem during the era of the
upstart of "atomic" energy. e These endeavors took the form of
carefully-drawn multilateral treaties that attempted to confront
the most serious issues perceived present. " ' The legal structures
165. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text regarding such systems.
166. See infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text regarding the various considera-
tions applicable to choice of law.
167. See infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text regarding the various considera-
tions applicable to choice of law.
168. If foreign law is applied, however, the ability to assert liability against the
United States Government would be seriously in doubt. See infra notes 266-67 and ac-
companying text.
169. There were two groups assuming parallel responsibilities in the area of interna-
tional nuclear energy development: The Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA), consisting mostly of industrial-
ized nations in Europe, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established
through sub-organs of the United Nations that sought to serve the needs of developing
countries.
Although no single comprehensive analytic study has apparently been published,
overview and general information can be obtained from the following sources: OECD/
NEA, NUCLEAR LEGISLATIONS: THIRD PARTY LIABIITY (1990); IAEA, INTERNATIONAL CON-
VENTIONS ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (1976).
170. The treaties of general application are: The Paris Convention on Third Party
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established thereby have certain essential characteristics in com-
mon, 171 and when given effect by national implementing legisla-
tion172 might represent very useful steps toward resolving the
bulk of the issues raised herein: for a number of reasons they
unfortunately do not.
Principal among the explanations why the international
treaty regimens will not resolve the difficulties"73 is the simple
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (as amended by
1964 Protocol), (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968), reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082
(1R61) [hereinafter Paris Convention], amended by the Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358 (as amended by 1964 Protocol) (entered into force
Dec. 4, 1974) [hereinafter Brussels 1963 Convention]; and the Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265 (entered into force
Nov. 12, 1977), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
There are also several international agreements of particularized application con-
cerning liability to third parties, such as the Brussels Convention on Liability of Opera-
tors of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter Brussels 1962 Convention]; the Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the
Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, Dec. 17, 1971, reprinted in 6 BENEDICT
ON ADMIRALTY Doc. No. 1-5 (7th ed. 1990) (entered into force July 15, 1975) [hereinafter
Brussels 1971 Convention]; and two recent pacts drawn in the wake of the Chernobyl
accident - the Vienna Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26,
1986, and the Vienna Convention on Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiolog-
ical Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, IAEA Doc. GC (SPL.1)/2, Annex III (entered into force
Feb. 26, 1987), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986). See generally IAEA, International
Treaties Relating to Nuclear Controls and Disarmament (1975); and OECD, NUCLEAR
LAW BULL., which began publication in 1967 and is printed quarterly.
In addition, there are numerous bilateral agreements between various nations (usu-
ally OECD members) providing for mutual assistance and adjustment of rights and lia-
bilities, and, of course, the large number of agreements relating to the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons and materials.
171. Basically, all liability is "channeled" to a single entity, called the "operator,"
who is required to maintain a certain level of financial security. The operator is strictly
liable, with virtually no defenses; however, such liability is limited both as to time and
amount. A single court, normally located in the jurisdiction where the incident causing
damage occurred, is competent to hear and adjudicate all claims, with obligatory enforce-
ment of its judgment. As regards those who might be liable over to the operator, called
"suppliers," the operator has recourse against them only for willful acts or omissions, or
to the extent expressly so provided by contract.
172. The nations that are parties to the Paris Convention and the Vienna Conven-
tion have adopted various laws to implement the treaties, and in some instances provide
liability coverage greater in amount or broader in scope than the terms of the agreements
would require. An example is the statute of the Federal Republic of Germany, Act on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Protection against its Hazards (Atomic Energy Act)
as amended Aug.1, 1985, BGB1.I, 781, reprinted in 36 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 3 (Supp. 1985)
[hereinafter Act on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy].
There may well be increased pressure toward uniformity of impldmenting legislation
among parties to the Paris Convention following economic unification of the European
Economic Community beginning in 1992.
173. There are particulars which might be developed regarding lacunae and incon-
sistencies in coverage of the treaties and laws under discussion. But it is again unneces-
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fact that they are nowhere near universal, or even widespread, in
application. "4 The number of nations that are parties and have
such laws is a fraction of the number of those nations possessing
and operating nuclear facilities,'17  and does not include the
United States.17 6 Moreover, the treaties, while not identically
so,1"7 are both territorial and reciprocal in application, 78 as are
the respective national laws.179 In addition, the treaties and laws
exclude from coverage the important subject of damage to the
nuclear facility itself,180 as well as incidents arising from hostile
sary for the purpose of this writing to go beyond the broad overview. A useful beginning
critical discussion, however, is found in Pelzer, supra note 98, at 66; see also Symposium
on Nuclear Third Party Liability, 34 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 34 (1984).
174. Although these treaties are indisputably impressive in intellectual achievement
and praiseworthy in effort, it can readily be seen that the treaties will only be truly
effective if applicable everywhere, or nearly everywhere, on a largely unconditional basis.
Thus, for example, because the former U.S.S.R. is not a party, claims arising from
Chernobyl must be asserted under private law, and would be subject to all the vagaries
of litigation, not the least of which is the dubious enforceability of a judgment rendered
in a court outside the Soviet Union. See 38 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 21 (1986); see also Pelzer,
supra note 98, at 66.
175. Fourteen nations (all European, plus Turkey) are party to the Paris Conven-
tion, and ten to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, which amended the Paris
Convention.
There are ten parties to the Vienna Convention, the most recent' of which, Peru,
ratified it in 1980. Although Argentina, an important nuclear power, is among them, the
remaining nations have either no facilities or nascent programs of nuclear energy devel-
opment. See supra note 170.
There are a handful of nations who have signed one or the other of the Conventions
without ratification (including some original parties), and two, Spain and the United
Kingdom, who have ratified the Paris Convention but also signed the Vienna.
176. Ironically, the United States (and the former U.S.S.R., also not a party) played
important roles in the development of the Vienna Convention. See Edward J. Cavers,
Nuclear Energy, Tort Liability and Financial Protection, in NUCLEAR ENERGY, PU3LIC
POLICY AND THE LAW 72 (Bloustein ed., 1964).
The United States, as an associate member of the OECD, also participated in the
initial drafting of the Paris Convention. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 98, at 81.
177. The Vienna Convention, unlike the Paris Convention, contains no comprehen-
sive statement on the question or issue of its territorial scope.
178. Not only does this stand to reason, but the explicit terms of the Paris Conven-
tion, supra note 170, expressly so provide.
179. Here again there are variations among the member states' legislation. Germany
appears to stand alone in covering damages outside the territory of a contracting state on
other than a fully reciprocal basis. Act on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, supra note
172, at 25, 32.
180. This "site damage," while perhaps a less dramatic harm than that to innocent
third parties, will be at least an equally substantial ingredient in the litigation following
a nuclear accident. Indeed, insurance coverage being maintained with respect to it far
exceeds the limitations on liability under national laws for injury to third persons. NRC!
DOE Reports to Congress on Price-Anderson Act Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,
33 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 21 (1984) [hereinafter NRC/DOE Reports].
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acts or force majeure.181
The United States, like some other nations not party to the
multilateral treaties, 18 2 has its own legislative scheme governing
third party liability for nuclear accident damages - The Price-
Anderson Act (Price-Anderson). 83 In general, it provides for an
overall comprehensive indemnification and liability system,
designed to adjust the tension between the desire for develop-
ment of a nuclear industry and the need to insure availability of
sufficient resources to compensate injured persons in the event
of a nuclear power accident.8 4 Thereunder, operators of nuclear
181. These exclusions appear to be holdovers from traditional fault-based notions of
liability, and are not consistent with the logic of victim compensation or procedural sim-
plification; indeed, they are only facially congruent with the notion of liability allocation.
These problems also suggest the need for additional efforts to improve the international
liability system.
Of course, it might be argued that no United States concern would be liable in
events such as these. However, this too facile response glosses over issues of foreseeabil-
ity and causation; see infra notes 339-80 and accompanying text.
182. An example is Japan, a quite significant user of nuclear energy whose move-
ment in the field is outstripping that of the United States. Since 1978, while orders for
65 plants were cancelled in the United States, 23 reactors have been started there; Japan
also outspends the United States by five times on research and development for 'ad-
vanced reactors, and is said to be building a lead in construction and operating tech-
niques. See Matthew L. Wald, Japan Now Ahead in Nuclear Power, Too, N.Y. TiMEs,
Feb. 27, 1990, at D1.
Japan has national liability legislation similar to that of the United States. See the
explanation of Japanese law contained in 9 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 2 (Supp. 1972).
183. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
Price-Anderson's arrangement makes for a baffling initial reading, due no doubt to
its desultory history. It would therefore be useful to consult one or more of the writings
that synthesize the Act in order to gain an overview. They include NRCIDOE Reports,
supra note 180; Marc R. Staenberg, Financial and Legal Implications of the Three Mile
Island Accident, 24 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 65, 65-67 (1980); John V. Buffington, The Price-
Anderson Act: Underwriting the Ultimate Tort, 87 DICK. L. REV. 679 (1983); John F.
McNett, Nuclear Indemnity for Government Contractors Under the Price-Anderson
Act, 14 PuB. CONT. L.J. 40 (1983); Vincent F. Chiappetta, United States Nuclear Energy
Policy After Pacific Gas and Silkwood, 1985 ARiz. ST. L.J. 79, 80-85; David M. Rocchio,
Note, The Price-Anderson Act: Allocation of the Extraordinary Risk of Nuclear Gener-
ated Electricity: A Model Punitive Damage Provision, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 521
(1987).
Also useful are discussions in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); and In re Three
Mile Island Litig., 605 F. Supp. 778 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
184. The constitutionality of the limitation of liability was upheld in Duke Power,
438 U.S. at 83. Therein, the Court summarized the motivation behind Price-Anderson:
"As we read the Act and its legislative history, it is clear that Congress' purpose was to
remove the economic impediments in order to stimulate the private development of elec-
tric energy by nuclear power while simultaneously providing the public compensation in
the event of a catastrophic nuclear incident." Id. Both of these purposes may be ques-
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facilities are required to maintain "financial protection" for po-
tential injured third parties, i8 5 beyond which the government is
authorized to indemnify those operators from further expo-
sure.18 6 The foregoing measures apply to a "nuclear incident,"
which is rather broadly defined to include any happening lead-
ing to injury.187 In deference to our federal system, state law
remedies are to be utilized,8 8 except in the event of an "ex-
traordinary nuclear occurrence," which would include most cata-
strophic mishaps; 89 in such an event, the application of state
law is substantially modified in an effort to achieve some uni-
formity of treatment for injured plaintiffs. 190 Under Price-An-
derson, the liability of an operator is limited to a set sum or the
tioned on different levels. Many have contended that the nuclear industry should not be
subsidized. Others have argued that it should be discouraged, or entirely dismantled. It
has also been argued that the amounts of liability limitation contemplated by Price-
Anderson are inadequate. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text and infra Aote
191; see also summary of contentions of opposing groups in NRC/DOE Reports, supra
note 180, at 421.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a), (b) (1988). This may take the form of self-insurance, with
appropriate guaranty, or private insurance. The original minimum required was $60 mil-
lion, but much greater amounts are now actually commercially available.
In addition, by a 1966 amendment, a secondary layer of "retrospective premium"
insurance of up to $5 million was authorized to be required of an operator. Id. at §
2210(b). This amount is secured by pledge or surety, is payable by each and every nu-
clear operator upon demand in the event of an accident, and is in its way a revolutionary
development in tort, in that it assesses damages for participation in an industry without
any causal connection to the operator.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1988). Because the amount of primary and secondary "in-
surance" available has, since 1982, exceeded the limit of liability under the Act, no pub-
lic funds are, in theory, presently committed. In re Three Mile Island, 605 F. Supp. at
784 n.6.
187. The exact definition, including certain qualifiers, is found at 42 U.S.C. §
2014(q) (1988).
188. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-52; see also S. REP. No. 296,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9, 22 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1803-29.
189. See definition at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1988).
190. This was added to Price-Anderson by amendment in 1966, out of concern that
the variables of legal liability among the states would lead to unacceptably inconsistent
treatment depending on where suit was brought, and to multiple actions. See generally
S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201,
3201-29.
The amendment requires a waiver of most state law defenses in each indemnity
agreement, so that usually all an injured plaintiff must prove in the event of an ex-
traordinary nuclear occurrence (ENO) would be damage and causation. See also infra
notes 339-51 and accompanying text. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1988). Among the defenses are
those based upon statutes of limitation, with a new limitation of three years from discov-
ery, or 20 years from occurrence. Id. In addition, actions are to be consolidated in a
single United States District Court. Id.
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financial protection required, 191 whichever is greater, and the
court is directed to establish priorities among classes of claims
and claimants if the damages exceed that limit.192 Congressional
action is contemplated in the latter event.1 9 3 Price-Anderson
provides indemnity coverage and protection to all persons who
may be liable'9 in the event of a nuclear incident in the United
States, 95 and in general is not limited to certain causes of dam-
age. 9 ' The authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to enter into indemnity agreements expired on 1 August
198711 and has not yet been renewed, but the operation of the
Act with respect to existing nuclear facilities should not be af-
fected.' Thus it may be seen that Price-Anderson, if inade-
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1988). The maximum, $560 million, is the same as when
Price-Anderson was enacted in 1957, and is now exceeded by the required financial pro-
tection, although the upper limit of the latter is only $635 million. See supra note 185.
In evaluating these limitations upon liability, the estimated costs of cleanup of
Chernobyl should be borne in mind (see supra note 13). It is also noteworthy for com-
parison purposes that following the wreck of the supertanker Exxon Valdez, the Exxon
Corporation agreed in settlement to pay over $500 million to the state of Alaska for
environmental damage.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(o) (1988).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (1988) provides that "[iun the event of a nuclear incident
involving damages in excess of the [aggregate limit] of public liability. . . the Congress
will thoroughly review the particular incident.., and will... take whatever action is
determined to be necessary. . . to provide full and prompt compensation to the public
for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude."
By comparison, the Brussels 1962 Convention mandates government intervention
and payment of additional funds in excess of operators' liability limits. See supra note
170.
194. This is provided by the definition of "person indemnified" at 42 U.S.C. §
2014(t) (1988). A benefit, without real additional cost, is thereby conferred upon manu-
facturers, suppliers and contractors, foreign and domestic.
Compare the limitation and channeling of liability to operators under the multilat-
eral conventions, supra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 199-209 and accompanying text regarding the limited applica-
bility of Price-Anderson to accidents outside the United States.
196. Thus, Price-Anderson contains no exclusion for damage willfully caused, or as
part of a conflict or insurrection. However, it does not appear to deal with a situation
involving stolen nuclear materials. See Nuclear Reg. Commission, Staff Study Concern-
ing Financial Protection Against Potential Harm Caused by Sabotage or Theft of Nu-
clear Materials, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 8631, Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 455-524 (1975).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)(1)(A) (1988).
198. It is intended that the indemnity agreements in existence will remain in place
for the duration of the licenses issued to the operators concerned. S. REP. No. 454, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2251, 2256. Because there are no
construction permits pending at the present time, this will not have immediate impact;
whether future plant proposals may be afforded Price-Anderson protection remains to be
seen.
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quate in coverage and tortuous in expression, represents a means
whereby the complexities herein discussed might be addressed.
However, it is even less likely to apply to a nuclear power acci-
dent outside the United States than the multinational
conventions.
Price-Anderson's coverage with regard to overseas nuclear
accidents is severely circumscribed,'99 and probably not germane
to an accident in a foreign country in which one or more United
States suppliers, or the United States itself, are implicated. Al-
though an export license requires insurance or other financial
protection in amounts specified by the NRC,00 the indemnity of
the United States Government, and all the provisions of Price-
Anderson that depend upon an indemnity agreement,20 1 are lim-
ited by the definition of "nuclear incident."202 This definition
excludes nearly all happenings outside the United States.03 And
The other provisions of the act are not affected, and insofar as they refer to indem-
nity agreements, would continue to apply to existing ones.
199. As initially enacted, Price-Anderson contained no such limitations upon cover-
age for transboundary incidents; they were added in the Amendments of 1961. For illu-
minating information regarding the rationale, see S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2251, 2258; see also legislative history of the 1961
Amendments, Atomic Energy Act, Pub. L. 87-206, § 15, 75 Stat. 475, reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2591, 2591-2604 [hereinafter 1961 Amendments].
Although not expressly stated, the change was seemingly due in large part to fear of
encouraging suits against suppliers in the United States with an effective government
guarantee of recovery in excess of $500 million, as well as the risk of reducing incentives
for foreign governments to participate or negotiate in the event of disaster. In other
words, it was better to leave the matter unaddressed than to open American courts in
the absence of a worldwide liability system.
Additional explanatory and background data may be obtained from McNett, supra
note 183, at 55.
200. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(a) and (b), 2133 (1988).
201. These includes, by their terms, virtually all other provisions of Price-Anderson,
including, inter alia, limitation of liability provisions.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1988). Therein, it is recognized that such an incident
might cause damage in more than one country, but apart from the exceptional circum-
stances mentioned in the following note, the section specifies the situs must be within
the United States.
One interesting possibility which might be explored by a United States party sought
to be held liable is the following: If the asserted basis of liability is a design or manufac-
turing defect, it might be argued that the "occurrence" occurred within the United
States, and caused injury outside the United States, which the statute could be read to
contemplate. Id. However, in view of the legislative history, it does not seem that design
or manufacture is included within the class of "occurrence" intended to be covered. See
also infra note 209 and accompanying text regarding the ability of United States legisla-
tion to limit rights of recovery for incidents occurring in other nations.
203. The only exceptions are for very limited purposes not involved here, namely,
events concerning the nuclear ship U.S.S. Savannah and those involving materials
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for incidents to which it does apply, the amount of indemnity
and corresponding limits of liability are greatly reduced.20 4 In
addition, a smaller class of persons is covered by Price-Ander-
son, 205 and there is to be no provision in any indemnity agree-
ment for waiver of defenses. 206 The overseas coverage of Price-
Anderson is limited to an extremely narrow range of licensed ac-
tivities,2 7 and to operations pursuant to contracts with the
United States itself;20" it does not reach exports of facilities or
materials by private companies, even if licensed by the govern-
ment, nor activities within the territory of another nation.0 9
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate that - because of
the limited applicability of ratione materiae and of ratione per-
sonae of international systems, and because the laws of the
United States are equally restrictive - there is no structured
liability regimen applicable to a mass nuclear disaster occurring
outside the United States, in which United States actors are in-
volved. Thus parties are left to the uncertainties and difficulties
of private adjudicative remedies and the conflict of laws rules. 10
2. Choice of Law
The determination of the law to be applied in a nuclear dis-
aster suit will be no less complex, and no less momentous, a task
than choice of forum.21' The court must perform a careful analy-
owned by, or used under, contract with the United States.
204. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(d)(5) and (e)(4) (1988) provide a maximum of $100 million,
instead of the $500 million with respect to domestic occurrences.
205. Only contractors, subcontractors, suppliers and other persons connected with
United States Government contracts are covered, unlike the broad coverage for domestic
accidents which extends to anyone who might be liable. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t) (1988).
206. 10 C.F.R. § 140.91 (1991). Compare waiver of defenses for domestic occur-
rences, supra note 190.
207. These include ocean shipments outside United States territorial limits, and ac-
tivities outside the United States but specially licensed by the NRC. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q)
(1988). See also supra note 202.
208. See supra note 205.
209. There is in addition, of course, the serious doubt whether laws of the United
States could be a barrier to or limit upon enforcement of rights arising out of a disaster
in a foreign land. In addition to ordinary choice of law principles which might point
toward the law of the place of the occurrence, the fact that persons not citizens or resi-
dents could thus have their rights impaired would be an overwhelming policy argument
in favor of the law of the place.
210. Outside the United States, conflicts of laws rules are sometimes called "private
international law," and the terms may generally be used interchangeably insofar as they
deal with international matters. See HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCOLES, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 5 (1964).
211. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text regarding choice of forum.
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sis leading to a choice of law that will do justice and allow the
resulting adjudication to be given the most complete effect. To
do so may require reworking traditional rules212 toward a more
expansive approach that takes into account the vital interests of
the several jurisdictions that may have a concern in the mat-
ter.2 13 In a case as multifaceted as one involving an international
nuclear disaster, the better configuration will be that which
avoids potentially distortive distinctions such as those between
substantive and procedural laws,2 4 and admits of the possibility
212. Traditional conflict of laws rules were, if simpler, rather arbitrarily based upon
territoriality. See JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), and
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 610 (1934). Where a tort was concerned, all
"substantive" matters were deemed governed by lex loci delictus. LEFLAR, supra note
156, § 86. This rigid rule led to procrustean characterizations and other fictive designs by
courts to achieve justice, and became so unworkable that United States courts by and
large have eschewed it. See Fowler V. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56
YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); a good summary is found in James E. Westbrook, A Survey and
Evaluation of Competing Choice of Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40
Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975).
Similarly, contract claims were to be governed by lex contractus. See ALBERT A.
EHRZENWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 66 (1967).
213. Modern flexible techniques include the "state's interest analysis" text, see
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); the "principles of preference" test, a model developed
in DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); and the best-known "most
significant relationship" test embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). These should offer sufficient flexibility to do the job at hand, and
properly applied, they will lead to essentially the same result. See LEFLAR, supra note
156, § 109.
For contract-based claims, the situation is equally multifaceted. Commentators have
come to recognize three tests most often: First, that matters concerning performance are
to be governed by the law of the place where the contract is to be performed, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 206-07 (1971) second, the rule of "party auton-
omy" affording primacy to the expressed or implied intent of the parties, LEFLAR, supra
note 156, § 415, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971); third, the
"center of gravity" (or "grouping of contacts" or "dominant contacts" or "most signifi-
cant relationship" test), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) (simi-
lar to § 145 regarding tort). See also LEFLAR, supra note 156, §§ 145-51.
214. The "substantive-procedural" dichotomy in conflicts of laws should be laid to
rest as shopworn and misleading. After all, the idea that procedural matters are always
governed by the law of the forum is merely an offshoot of traditional territorial rules.
LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 86; ALBERT A. EHRZENWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 114 (1962). The more pertinent inquiry, rather, weighs the respective legitimate
interests of the jurisdictions involved to determine which has the superior stake in hav-
ing its laws applied to a given element of the litigation. In LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 121,
it is suggested that the first question should be whether, in light of standard choice-
influencing considerations, the forum should apply its own law.
It has also been recommended that an "outcome-determinative" rule be used as an
alternative. Robert A. Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813 (1962). However, this would
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that certain matters ought to be controlled by the laws of one
place and other matters controlled by those of another.215
Litigation in the wake of a transnational nuclear mishap can
present choice of law complications as arduous as any found in
international dispute resolution. There are bound to be at least
two nations with solid interests in the laws to be applied,21e and
contracts to be considered as to some parties2. 17 Of particular
turn out to be equally arbitrary.
There are also matters which may be considered at once procedural and substantive.
A prime example is the important question of the ability of a defendant to implead
additional parties as third party defendants. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying
text. Perhaps the most heavily debated subject in this field is that of statutes of limita-
tions; under the conventional view they were considered procedural. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971); see also FDIC v. Peterson, 770 F.2d 141 (10th
Cir. 1985). However, recognition of their essential nature is now advancing. LEFLAR,
supra note 156, § 128. Cf. also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
215. This notion, sometimes referred to as "depecage," "scission," or "problem se-
lection," is considered a relatively new concept of conflicts law but actually has direct
precursors, such as the procedure-substance distinction, see supra note 214, and the dif-
ferentiation between laws governing validity and the performance of contracts. See LE-
FLAR, supra note 156, § 280; EHRZENWEIG, supra note 212, § 56. See also infra note 217
and accompanying text.
216. Like the interests in choice of forum, the interests in choice of law will be simi-
lar, but not identical. It may be presumed that countries where plaintiffs reside will be
most concerned with laws which maximize the compensation awarded victims (both in
amount and over time for latent injuries), and countries of origin of defendants will
merely wish for a just result. For an interesting, if wide-ranging, discussion of what some
interests might be in the context of a suit in the United States arising out of a foreign
disaster, see generally In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D.
Cal. 1975). In Weinberg, supra note 132, at 309-10, the author argues that the conduct of
operations within a country seems the peculiar concern of that country's law, and the
extraterritorial application of United States safety standards would be inappropriate.
The interests which governments may assert on behalf of their citizens will also be
relevant. See supra notes 42-47, 128-32 and accompanying text.
It has been held, however, that to apply different laws concerning recovery of dam-
ages with respect to different groups of plaintiffs violates constitutional requirements of
equal protection. In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 745-46.
217. The agreements would only apply to plaintiffs such as operators, other suppli-
ers, foreign governments and the like.
Choice of law provisions in agreements are enforced in courts of the United States
unless either the chosen jurisdiction has no substantial relation to the parties, or to give
effect to the agreements would violate the public policy of the forum. Zerman v. Ball, 735
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1984); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641
F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981). Because these agreements do not entail consent to a particular
forum, but rather only the application of its laws there should be no special obstacle to
applying them. See Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1988).
The agreements are generally considered to incorporate only matters deemed "substan-
tive" rather than "procedural," and thus another nuance will confront the court. See
FDIC v. Peterson, 770 F.2d at 142; Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 637 F.2d 680, 681-82
(9th Cir. 1981).
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concern will be the thorny issues of causation,218 foreseeabil-
ity,21 e and immunity.220 Because it is likely that a number of en-
tities will be called upon to share legal accountability, rules con-
cerning third party practice and liability will be of considerable
consequence.221
Depending on the circumstances, claimants may base their
selection of forum in part upon the desire to influence the choice
of law to be applied.222 Under traditional analysis, this would
seem especially likely to lead to the selection of a United States
court.223  Although there are variations among jurisdictions
218. See infra notes 339-51 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 352-80 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text regarding immunity from suit,
and infra notes 265-71, 292-99 and accompanying text regarding immunity from liability.
221. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
In the realm of third-party claims, some rights may be based upon doctrines of con-
tribution and/or indemnity while others may be contractual.
In some countries following the common law tradition, the right of liability may be
limited; the "common law allowed no contribution between joint or concurrent
tortfeasors," see R.W.M. DIAS & B.S. MARKESINIS, TORT LAW 435 (1984) [hereinafter
DIAS & MARKESINIS], and the courts of the United Kingdom have only recognized it since
the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935. See Pitts v. Hunt and
Another, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542. By contrast, under civil law, it was considered to follow
from the Roman lex aquilia that all persons who wrongfully cause damage should pay
the full penalty; under modern laws all are liable, and the wrongdoer who pays damages
may claim contribution. See F.H. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVI LAW 76 (1950). For
a recent and thorough discussion of United States law in this area, see WARREN FREED-
MAN, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: ALLOCATION OF RISK AND APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
39-65 (1987).
222. An example which is often cited to illustrate this technique is Hurtado v. Supe-
rior Court of Sacramento County, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974), in which by choosing a Cali-
fornia forum, a plaintiff was able to avoid Mexican limitations upon damages in an auto-
mobile accident case. Similarly, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981);
Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
In his dissent in The Bremen, Justice Douglas suggested that the forum selection
clause in the parties' agreement was an attempt to obtain the advantage of an exculpa-
tory clause because the British court would apply lex fori. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 24 (1972).
223. There is, of course, the understandable tendency for a tribunal to favor the
familiar laws of its own system. See LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 89; I.F.G. Baxter, Choice
of Law, 42 CAN. B. REV. 46 (1964). Moreover, plaintiffs may achieve some real advan-
tages in United States courts. Although measures of damages are both regarded as sub-
stantive and not controlled by lex fori, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
178 (1971); LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 126, the right to a jury trial, RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 129 (1971), and the issue of necessary or proper parties, id.
§ 125, are conventionally governed by lex fori.
An important initial consideration for any plaintiff in choosing a forum is the con-
flict of laws rules of the forum. In suits in United States courts, the law to be applied by
the court includes its conflicts of laws rules. See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner,
423 U.S. 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). But what if
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within and outside the United States concerning when a court
may consider itself bound to follow its own laws, 224 any deliber-
ate use of forum preference would have direct undesirable conse-
quences: Not only would the potential for distortive and mis-
leading devices 225 to avoid undesirable results be enhanced, but
principled international concerns are more likely to be ig-
nored. 22 s Nor is this merely a theoretical problem - any but the
most measured approach may have inimical effects upon the in-
ternational legal order, including loss of respect, or even retribu-
tive consequences, where decrees of United States courts are
concerned.2
The superior means to address choice of law problems in
nuclear disaster litigation will be for parties to show to the court
why a given matter228 should be governed by lex fori or the laws
conflicts rules require an interest or relational analysis leading to divergent laws? This
might be the case if plaintiffs and defendants are from a number of jurisdictions all of
whom assert an interest in the conflict. The result would seem logically to be inconsis-
tent theories of liability; would this violate equal protection requirements? See In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ca. 1975). Is the equal protec-
tion clause application itself dependent on choice of laws? It has been urged that a uni-
tary federal rule of conflict of laws be adopted where necessary to avoid the application
of inconsistent rules. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513-14 (1954); Susan J. Stabile, Note, Tort Remedies for
Servicemen Injured by Military Equipment: A Case for Federal Common Law, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 601 (1980). In In re Paris Air Crash, the only solution (after considera-
tion of the interests of the 36 jurisdictions involved) was to decide that California's con-
flicts rules pointed to the law of the forum, 399 F. Supp. at 742; to similar effect is In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam on April 4, 1975, 476 F. Supp. 521, 526-
29 (D.D.C. 1979). Perhaps the better solution can indeed be found in designating a single
controlling law on a given issue, the approach argued for herein.
224. LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 89; CURRIE, supra note 213, §§ 177, 183; EHRZENWEIO,
supra note 214, § 108 (1962).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122-423 (1971) contains an exten-
sive listing of matters which are, and are not, to be governed by lex fori.
For a good overall survey concerning choice of law rules in Eastern and Western
European countries, see C.G.J. Morse, Choice of Law In Tort: A Comparative Study, 32
Am. J. Comp. L. 51 (1984).
225. Examples include characterization, multiple rules for choice of law, or renvoi.
See EHRZENWEIG, supra note 214, § 108; Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 325-26 (1966).
226. This should include all relevant concerns, not only as sovereign entities, but as
repositories of justice. LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 107; Robert Kramer, Interests and Pol-
icy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 523 (1959).
227. This was the result of the doctrine, now discredited, of Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895). See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments, 65
HARv. L. REV. 1184, 1188 (1952).
228. An illustrative matter is attorney compensation. Although it might be brushed
aside as merely an "issue relating to judicial administration," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971), any participant in the process knows its true impor-
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of another nation with a greater interest, for the court to adopt a
flexible and creative approach229 using as many sets of laws as
needed to serve the legitimate interests involved, and for the
court's reasoning to be as open and explicit as possible."
tance. Defendants will argue strenuously that the "American rule" (which does not allow
attorney's fees to be recovered in general) ought to be applied, based upon their expecta-
tions and other reasons. Plaintiffs will on the other hand contend that a foreign jurisdic-
tion (which for this purpose we assume follows the "English Rule" and allows recovery)
should have its rules implemented, based upon its strong (and, it may fairly be said,
substantive) interest in having its victims' losses completely repaid. Contingency fee at-
torneys may occupy the ungainly position of arguing, in effect, that their agreements
prevent clients from being fully compensated if more fees are not court-awarded. This
does not, however, present any greater inconsistency than do ordinary contingency fee
arrangements in personal injury cases.
Another quite interesting issue is that of damages. That is, the rather liberal Ameri-
can allowance of punitive damages for malicious (or even "reckless") conduct will proba-
bly not operate unless United States substantive law is applied; the civil law does not
usually regard damages as other than compensatory. Pierre Catala & John Antony Weir,
Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, 37 TUL. L. REV. 573, 585-86 (1963) [hereinafter
Catala] and the British and common law systems allow exemplary damages only in very
limited circumstances, JOHN FREDERIC CLERK ET AL., CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS §§ 5-
36 to 5-39 (R.W.M. Dias et al. eds., 16th ed. 1989). But civil law does recognize "moral
damages" for nonpecuniary loss, and this is often referred to as a sort of surrogate for
exemplary damages. 2 MARCEL FERNAND PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIvIL LAW § 868A
(Trans. La. St. L. Inst. 1959); Edith Friedley, Moral Damages in Mexican Law: A Com-
parative Approach, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 235, 248-49 (1986).
229. For example, depending upon the nature of the harm alleged, the assertion
might be made that the wrong occurred in the United States (as in the case of the
wrongful design or manufacture of a facility or component - see, e.g., In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D. Ca. 1975)). Although the traditional
approach might point to the "place of wrong," the better decision would be one (not
necessarily inconsistent) based upon the interest of the United States or another nation
in having its laws applied. Under the rule set forth in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1934), when the interests are weighed the result should be the same
regardless of where a "wrong" is considered to have taken place.
This analysis would be useful to prevent circumvention of foreign laws that channel
liability to a nuclear operator and require suit to be brought in the place of occurrence,
as well as to avoid multiple actions.
230. The mere choice of the "better rule of law" can be criticized as merely a means
of choosing between the parties without saying so. See LEFLAR, supra note 156, § 107 and
citations contained therein. See also In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 763; Gordon
v. Eastern Air Lines, 391 F. Supp. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Although it is clear that a subject as multifarious as choice of law may be easily
manipulated for good or ill (which explains in part the attempts which have been made
to establish national and international systems as discussed supra notes 169-72 and ac-
companying text), a clear and definitive statement of the court's reasoning will go far
toward enhancing the respect afforded the judgment and its likelihood of being enforced,
as well as future decisions.
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D. Bases of Liability
There is little- doubt that liability will be established against
one or more parties involved in events leading to a nuclear acci-
dent, whether on traditional bases23' or pursuant to evolving
principles.23 2 The grounds of liability will be both a function and
a component2 33 of the important choice of law considerations
discussed in the preceding section.
1. National Law Systems
The selection of a foreign nation's law which implements or
follows the multinational treaty-based liability systems2 34 would
go far to limit the exposure of United States defendants, by
mandating that claims be primarily asserted against the facility
operator 235 and only in courts of the nation in which the incident
231. In most instances, a case may be constructed upon fault-based postulates of
liability, such as negligence. The most significant accidents, those at Windscale, Three
Mile Island, and Chernobyl, have all involved identifiable defects or operational errors
which could readily be traced to defalcations on the part of one or more persons. In
addition, there are established means for defining legal responsibility without the need to
attribute fault to a defendant. See infra notes 233, 235, 239 & 245.1 232. If and when the mass nuclear disaster occurs, it seems quite probable that new
ground will be broken where all facets of legal responsiblity are concerned, and liability
may be imposed upon any number of theories. One special problem will be that of as-
signing liability for damage and injury caused by the intentional acts of terrorists, sabo-
teurs or other such actors, which raises questions of foreseeability and proximate cause
on an unprecedented scale. See infra notes 339-80 and accompanying text.
233. Certain of the claims by and against United States defendants may be contrac-
tual in nature. In addition, it is also possible that other actions might be brought in
contract to avoid an undesired result under choice of law rules. See Morse, supra note
224, at 139. It is well known that foreign laws allow suits in contract for injuries United
States law would consider to have been tortiously inflicted. Additionally, torts are often
arranged under the law of "obligations" under many civil codes. See JOHN G. COLLIER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 192-95 (1987); 2 ALBERT VENN DICEY & JOHN HUMPHREY CARLILE
MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 934 (J.H.C. Morris ed., 1980); HENRIET L9ON MAZEAUD
& ANDRfI TUNC, TRAITE THi9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITIE CIVILE DLLIC-
TUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE, Chapter II, Section 1, § 2, nn. 145, 149, 190 & 207 (6th ed.
1965).
Of course, under national law systems imposing absolute liability against the opera-
tor, the theory of the suit would not matter. If, however, a theory were used to attempt
to persuade a court that United States law or some law other than lex loci delicti should
be applied, the outcome would depend upon the choice of law rules of the forum, see
supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text, but should not be influenced by variations in
stated theories of liability.
234. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 171.
Exposure of a United States company would not exist thereunder except as a third
party defendant based upon contract or intentional act (some nations also allow it for
gross negligence). And because liability is solely grounded upon recourse by the operator
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occurred.23 6 Although it is not certain that multiple litigation
may be completely forestalled thereby,23 7 this desirable arrange-
ment fits what the parties might or ought to have expected, and
undoubtedly reflects the legislative intent of the drafters of the
international conventions.
On the other hand, if the choice is a foreign law that does
not possess the structural and procedural attributes discussed
above,238 then the United States defendant may be subjected to
a system ill-suited to deal with the task before it. 2 9 This brings
and the operator's liability itself is limited, there is a built-in ceiling upon the exposure
of the supplier. In addition, unlike United States law, liabilitywould be completely ex-
cluded for the intentional acts of third parties. See also infra notes 370-71 and accompa-
nying text.
This is a quite reasonable arrangement, if one recognizes that the laws of the coun-
try are calculated to provide adequate victim compensation through financial protection
and/or government assistance, and that the agreement whereby the United States party
became involved presumably took into account the liability limitations in its pricing
structure.
236. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Although it is true that this might
subject the United States concern to suit in a foreign court, it enhances certainty and
avoids multiple suits, and as such can only be seen as a worthy attempt in aid of justice
and economy.
237. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text regarding suits against the op-
erator in the country of occurrence and also against the supplier in the United States.
238. See supra note 175 and accompanying text regarding the small number of
countries party to international liability arrangements with laws conforming thereto.
There are also a number of nations that have national legislation which to some
extent adopts the principles of the two Conventions without themselves being parties,
such as Mexico (Act of 1974 on Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage; see 15 Nu-
CLEAR L. BULL. 13 (1975)) and Chile (Nuclear Safety Act, Apr. 16, 1984, Act No. 18302,
see 34 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 13 (1984)). Many other countries either have no laws concern-
ing nuclear liability, or laws with few or no provisions that attempt to address the issues
posed herein.
239. No attempt is made herein to summarize exhaustively applicable foreign law.
There is little broad reference material that discursively surveys evolving global tort
principles, and the analyst will, of course, consult in detail any laws that might be uti-
lized under choice of law principles. Useful beginning materials, however, are the two-
volume KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony
Weir trans., 1977), and CHRISTOPHER MORSE, TORTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1978).
For fault-based principles of liability, see generally LAWSON, supra note 49; FLEM-
ING, supra note 49, at 1. With regard to liability without fault, in systems following the
common law rule of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity, the venerated Ry-
lands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868), would seem to operate. Interest-
ingly, the United Kingdom, home of Rylands, has not followed an across-the-board ap-
proach, but has assigned strict liability to certain activities, including nuclear energy, by
statute. See generally DIAS & MARKESINIS, supra note 221. Civil law countries have also
long allowed suits without the need to prove negligence of a defendant. See, e.g., C. civ.
art. 1384 of the French Civil Code (liability for things in one's possession or control),
whose evolution toward liability without fault is discussed in Catala, supra note 228, at
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with it the possibility of suits in a number of fora in which it
may not be possible to assert liability against a third party,
problems of proof and application of foreign law,240 and all the
other consequences and vagaries attendant upon multiple litiga-
tion and conflicting court judgments. 41
Finally, if United States law is chosen,242 the bases of liabil-
ity will in all likelihood be no less varied. Its national liability
scheme is of limited application where international incidents
are concerned,243 and the laws otherwise applicable to civil
suits244 are thus the substantive basis of liability. 24 As in most
598-614.
If the matter is viewed as liability for a defective product, as it may be against a
United States supplier, ever-developing doctrines of products liability may be brought
into action. For general references, see WARREN FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL MANUAL OF PRACTICE (1987); H. DUINTJER TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PROD-
ucT LIABLITY (1979).
240. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.
242. This is the case when, for instance, an act related to design or manufacturing is
asserted to have occurred in the United States or choice of law principles otherwise di-
rect the application of United States law. See supra notes 126, 129 and accompanying
text.
243. See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text regarding limited applicability
of Price-Anderson to occurrences outside the United States.
244. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. For instance, one important
case, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., was submitted to a jury on the alternative bases of
the Oklahoma law of negligence and strict liability in tort. 464 U.S. 238, 244 (1984).
Price-Anderson was inapplicable in Silkwood.
In most instances suit will be in federal court, based upon diversity of citizenship.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text. It has been expressly held that the enactment
of the Atomic Energy Act and Price-Anderson did not create a federal cause of action or
federal common law. Kiick v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1986).
245. Even if the federal legislative scheme were somehow applicable, it contemplates
minimal disturbance of state law where third party liability is concerned. The 1966
amendment to Price-Anderson, that was designed to facilitate establishing liability in
the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, merely modified state laws to provide
for "waivers of defenses," but otherwise purported to leave them intact. 42 U.S.C.
2210(n)(1) (1988). See discussions contained in S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201; see also In re Three Mile Island Litig., 605 F.
Supp. 778, 780 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Silkwood discussion supra note 244.
Under state law, traditional negligence principles may be used, as well as liability
without fault. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
at 677 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON]; 6 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS, ch. 19 (1988) [hereinafter SPEISER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
519, 520 (1965). For abnormally dangerous activities, the only limitation appears to be
that liability is confined to the harm which makes the activity dangerous. "Atomic en-
ergy" is cited as its example of an activity from which the risk of harm cannot be re-
moved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1965).
If the matter is viewed as one of products liability, the basis may be negligence,
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.01 (1987), or strict liability in
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other nations, the resolution of responsibility for overseas mass
nuclear disaster is a role likely far exceeding that contemplated
for existing national remedial laws. 46
2. Governmental Liability
The development and utilization of nuclear energy is an en-
terprise which by its very nature demands integral governmental
participation. Governmental responsibility was a principal focus
of the drafters of national laws regarding nuclear liability, even
though nothing like a comprehensive global regimen has been
achieved.
There is much room for debate concerning the role of the
state in victim compensation, and the proper relationship of the
public and private sectors where nuclear energy is concerned. In
certain systems and for prescribed circumstances, many of the
questions have been addressed by statute and treaty, as dis-
cussed above. But for the defendant which finds itself subjected
to mammoth damages exposure for its role in the development
of a nuclear facility outside the United States, and for the tribu-
nal which must sort through the issues involved, a significant
inquiry is this: In the absence of an express provision of law, but
in a realm in which public sector participation is central to the
tort, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (the modern paradigmatic expres-
sion). Modern risk allocation has extended virtual automatic responsibility to persons
creating a dangerous condition or instrumentality, and strict liability is an established
feature of the legal landscape in all states. SPEISER, supra, §§ 18.28, 18.29; FREEDMAN,
supra note 34, at 13.
246. Most persons would regard the development of nuclear energy and related is-
sues to be matters for federal pre-emption. They would, in addition to their national
import, seem clearly to be within the federal power to regulate commerce and foreign
relations. However, no "federalization" of the field has occurred. See supra notes 188-90
regarding application of state law remedies.
Although the Court pronounced in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), that the federal government
has pre-empted the field with regard to radiological safety standards of construction and
operation, in Silkwood, it reaffirmed the primacy of state law remedies (specifically ex-
emplary damages) and stated that no conflict existed between them and the federal regu-
latory system. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 246. United States Courts of Appeals have rejected
claims based on federal common law in Kiick, 784 F.2d at 494; Commonwealth v. Gen-
eral Pub. Util. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 605 F.
Supp. 778, 780 (M.D. Pa. 1985). To the same effect is Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698
S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986).
This dichotomization has been criticized for essentially creating conflicting dual fed-
eral and state regulatory regimes (one official and the other through the back door of
punitive damage awards), See Vincent F. Chiappetta, United States Nuclear Energy
Policy After Pacific Gas and Silkwood, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79 (1985).
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development of the industry and its benefits to the people, to
what extent and upon what basis2 47 ought the government be
held to account?
a. United States Government
In addition to considerations of foreign relations,24 it is
possible to suggest a number of policy reasons why the United
States Government ought to share responsibility in the event of
an international nuclear mishap involving facilities, components,
or materials furnished by United States suppliers.249 The first of
these is the sweeping and consistent pattern of aid 250 and pro-
motional support2"' that has been provided to the nuclear export
247. Choice of law is discussed supra notes 210-30 and accompanying text.
See also infra note 266 regarding specific statutory choice of law rules for the liabil-
ity of the United States.
248. These would include, inter alia, matters related to nuclear non-proliferation
and the United States' interest in remaining a reliable supplier of nuclear equipment,
technology, and materials in pursuit of its policies. See, e.g., Letter from Claiborne Pell,
Senator of Rhode Island, to NRC (Nov. 9, 1979) concerning accidents to exported facili-
ties and components. See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1378 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter NRDC]; Linder, Note,
supra note 25, at 488-89; see also infra note 251 regarding United States nonprolifera-
tion policy and nuclear export industry.
249. This would be apart from the limited, direct obligation of the United States to
indemnify in connection with nuclear activities undertaken pursuant to the government's
contracts. See supra notes 205-07; 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) (1988).
250. Not surprisingly, the nuclear industry as a whole has been the recipient of
abundant direct federal payments; for 1979, the total was a staggering $37.6 billion. See
Energy Info. Admin., FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR POWER: REACTOR DESIGN AND THE
FUEL CYCLE (1981). The fiscal 1990 budget contained a legislative proposal to establish a
government corporation for uranium enrichment, with initial funding of $300 million,
plus $353 million for research and development of nuclear fission, and $349 million for
fusion; research and development assumed 50% private cost sharing. OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIscAL YEAR 1990, at 5-
36 (1989).
Price-Anderson itself, with its indemnity and limitation of liability provisions, is a
quite significant, if indirect, subsidy. Among Price-Anderson's principal purposes was to
encourage the development of the industry. See NRC/DOE Reports, supra note 180, at
21.
Specifically with regard to exports, among the leading vehicles of support for the
industry is the U.S. Export-Import Bank. In the 1970's, 80% of the power reactors sup-
plied by United States concerns (which were 70% of all those in operation or on order
worldwide) were financed by this Bank. Ann Crittendon, Surge in Nuclear Exports
Spurs Drive for Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1975, at 1; see also generally Staff of
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Facts on Nuclear
Proliferation: A Handbook 198 (Comm. Print 1975); George D. Applebaum, Comment,
Controlling the Environmental Hazards of International Development, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
321, 342 (1975-76).
251. Encouragement of the nuclear industry, both domestic and export-oriented, has
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industry as a matter of government policy. 252 Second is the in-
long been an important ingredient of national economic development. For example, in
1958 the United States signed a comprehensive "Agreement for Cooperation" with the
European Atomic Energy Community, providing for credit and contributions to research
and development leading to the establishment of nuclear facilities in Europe. Agreement
for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Nov. 8, 1958, U.S.-Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), T.I.A.S. No. 10, at 75. In the Energy Reor-
ganization Act of 1974, the declaration of policy and purpose includes the intent to "in-
crease the productivity of the national economy and strengthen its position in regard to
international trade," and priority for "export market potential." Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891
(1976)); see also LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 6.04 [hereinafter
JAYSON].
The Presidential pronouncement of United States policy regarding the extraterrito-
rial application of the National Enviromental Policy Act contains an express exclusion
for most nuclear export activities. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2-5(v)) (Supp. I1 1979). This exclusion was an accommodation to
the needs of the nuclear export industry. See John L. Sullivan, Note, The Export Ex-
emption of Executive Order 12,114 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Role in
Export Licensing, 6 ASILS INT'L L.J. 43, 62 (1982).
It is also clear, if paradoxical at first blush, that non-proliferation policy depends
upon a strong export industry: if the United States is -not a ready and reliable supplier,
purchasers will turn to sellers who have fewer requirements for safety, lesser standards
of production, and/or looser export controls. See Statement, supra note 5, at 769; S. REP.
No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERVICE, LEGIS-
LATIvE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978 550, at 781 (principal
among purposes of the Act was to enable United States business to get benefits from
foreign nuclear sales, and promote employment and aid balance of payments).
As the domestic market has softened, pressure to rely on exports has increased. See
Robert Boardman & James F. Keely, Nuclear Export Policies and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime, in NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WORLD POLITICS 3 (Robert Boardman &
James F. Keely eds., 1983). When the Government of the Philippines expressed interest
in a United States reactor in 1971, the State Department instructed the Embassy in
Manila to give "all possible encouragement" to the purchase, and the funds were pro-
vided by Export-Import Bank. Remarks of Charles Warren, Chairman of United States
Council on Environmental Quality, A Look Before We Leap: Applying NEDA to U.S.
Actions Abroad, Address given at the 3rd Annual Conference, Nat'l Ass'n of Environ-
mental Professionals, Arlington, Va. (Feb. 8, 1978), in Nicholas C. Yost, American Gov-
ernmental Responsibility for the Environmental Effects of Actions Abroad, 43 ALB. L.
REV. 528, 532-34 (1979) The reactor was completed, but has not yet been activated.
It has also been charged that the United States is now producing plutonium greatly
in excess of its foreseeable domestic needs. See Matthew L. Wald, Need for Bombs, Jobs,
Safety Affect Fate of Plutonium Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1988, at C7.
252. Just as the United States is far from the single largest source, it is certainly not
the only nation to pursue such a policy. Indeed, the United States may be the partici-
pant overtaken by its more voracious competitors as it attempts to behave responsibly.
See Bertrand Barr6, France's Pragmatic Approach to Non-Proliferation, in THE Nu-
CLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NONPROLIFERATION: INTERNATIONAL POLICY CHOICES, 67 (H. Jones et
al., eds. 1985); Randy J. Rydell, Navigating the Archipelago: Nonproliferation Orienta-
tions of Emerging Suppliers, id. at 105; Erwin H~ickel, The Politics of Nuclear Exports
in West Germany, in NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WORLD POLITICS 62 (Robert Boardman &
James F. Keely eds., 1983) [hereinafter Hickel]; Nuclear Plan By Britain, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1988, at D7 (following privatization of nuclear industry, UK Government seeks
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tertwining of nuclear exports with the structure of the federal
regulatory system.2 5 Third, the express legislative acknowledg-
ment of the United States Government's facilitative role in the
domestic development and utilization of nuclear energy 5 4 sug-
gests the existence of an international obligation as well. 255
Beyond these policy-based arguments, there are bases of
governmental liability25 0 under United States law.257 Where a
increased participation by United States contractors and suppliers, promising less re-
strictive regulations than in United States); The Vancouver Sun, in which an official is
quoted, concerning the sale by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (a government corpora-
tion) of a CANDU reactor to Turkey, and declined to answer the question of public
liability for damages in the event of an overseas accident as "too hypothetical." Margaret
Munro, CANDU Plan Questioned, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 23, 1985, at A16.
The foregoing illustrate the systemic irrationality of a global, market-oriented com-
petition-driven market in dangerous products. A worldwide regulatory regimen is called
for.
253. An "Agreement for Cooperation," which is a bilateral treaty between the
United States and the recipient nation setting forth rights and responsibilities concern-
ing the latter's development of nuclear energy with United States materials and technol-
ogy, is required as the basic framework for nuclear exports. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1988).
In addition, the export itself is subject to i comprehensive regulatory scheme. The
system entails governmental involvement both widespread and deep, and involves deci-
sion-making at the highest levels. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See also
JAYSON, supra note 251, at § 6.04[2]; Linder, Note, supra note 25, at 488-89.
For regulations outlining the detailed involvement of the NRC and DOE, as well as
the State Department and Office of the President, in export determinations, see 10
C.F.R. § 110 (1988).
254. This role extends to both licensing matters, 42 U.S.C §§ 2073(a), 2093(a), 2111,
2131, 2133 (1988); 10 C.F.R. 50.1 (1992), 100.1 (1992), and civil liability matters, supra
notes 25, 183-209, 251 and accompanying text.
255. This argument has been developed in an OECD/NEA Study, Compensation for
Nuclear Damage in the OECD Member Countries, 20 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 50, 67-70 (1977)
[hereinafter Compensation for Nuclear Damage].
If the government is to be held to any responsibility at all concerning its role in
nuclear energy development, it may be difficult to justify the dual approach that exists
with respect to domestic and offshore occurrences. See also supra notes 199-209 and
accompanying text.
Price-Anderson is inapplicable to foreign nuclear disasters, except insofar as United
States Government contract activities are involved, and even then the indemnification
and liability limitation figures are much lower. See also supra notes 199-209 and accom-
panying text. In NRDC, both the NRC and the court were clearly more concerned with
the hazards of the proposed nuclear facility in the Philippines to American military per-
sonnel stationed nearby than risks to the Filipino people themselves. NRDC, 647 F.2d
1345, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983) for additional argu-
ments in favor of extending governmental tort liability.
256. No treatment of governmental liability may be undertaken without concur-
rently addressing governmental immunity, with which it is integrally linked. There are
specific rules limiting the liability of the United States Government, apart from its gen-
eral waiver of immunity under the FTCA; see infra notes 262, 265-71 and accompanying
text. For most other nations' governments, public sector liability and immunity may be
considered two sides of the same coin.
257. As far as the liability, if any, of the Government of the United States is con-
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wrongful or negligent act2 5s on the part of the employees of an
agency of the United States2 59 is present in the context of an
overseas nuclear mishap,8 0 plaintiffs or other defendants will
wish to include the United States in the litigation.21' In order to
cerned, United States law must be applied. Under the FTCA, the applicable law is that
of the place where the act or omission occurked. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988 & Supp. II
1990). Because the FTCA contains an exclusion for claims arising outside the United
States, there will be no claim unless it is considered to have arisen in this country. Con-
versely, for foreign law to apply, the claim would almost certainly have arisen abroad as
well, and no waiver of immunity would operate to allow suit. This is a logical conse-
quence of the policy underlying the exclusion from the FTCA - not to have actions
against the United States Government decided with reference to foreign laws. Id.
The law contemplated under the foregoing rules is that of the state of occurrence.
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1962); Broudy v. United States, 722 F.2d 566,
569 (9th Cir. 1983).
258. The primary framework for discussion herein will be tort liability, since in con-
tractual arrangements between a company and the United States, indemnity and liabil-
ity limitation under Price-Anderson will likely apply to most matters, even though the
accident occurred outside the United States.
Additional obstacles exist to others casting a claim in terms of contract. Under the
Tucker Act governing contract suits against the government, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988 &
Supp. 111990), such action must be brought in the Court of Claims and cannot be com-
bined with other District Court actions, and no party other than the United States can
be joined. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941). Additionally, the Tucker Act
will not entertain agreements "implied in law," Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States,
444 U.S. 460, 465 n.5 (1980), nor derived from statutes and regulations unless they ex-
pressly authorize a damages award. Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service,
619 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 728 (1981). Also, the
Court of Claims has refused to hear cases brought in contract but essentially sounding in
tort, Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d 1189 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Bibbs v. United States, 206
Ct. Cl. 896, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975), and Tucker Act suits must be founded on
contract in the sense of a meeting of minds. Hargrove v. United States, Cl. Ct. 228
(1982).
259. The United States Government is liable for the acts of the officers and employ-
ees of any federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). In addition, the
United States is to be the named party, and not the agency, absent an express statutory
directive to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). However, absent its
own negligence, the United States will not be responsible for the torts of its contractors.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976);
Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 526 (1973). Finally, no finding of any non-delegable
duty will be allowed. Bramer v. United States, 595 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979).
260. Claims related to nuclear weapons testing are not included. They are the sub-
ject of their own separate liability regimen. See In re Consolidated United States Atmo-
spheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 1985); JAYsoN, supra note 251, §
6.05a.
261. Litigation is not the only avenue that might be followed, particularly where
sympathetic or attractive circumstances are present. Authority exists for the settlement
of claims by any agency of the United States Government, which would presumably in-
clude nuclear-related demands. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2677, 2679 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The
claim may be settled without limitation as to amount subject to the approval of the
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impose legal responsibility, there must be a showing of negli-
gence or other similar ground2 62 of culpability under the applica-
ble law;2 3 if that law would hold a private person responsible,
the United States can be liable.264
Before passing on to the bases of United States liability, it
is necessary to note that there are principles of sovereign immu-
nity under United States law that may apply.2 5 One is with re-
Attorney General for payments in excess of $25,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2675 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990). There does not appear to be any limitation upon this statute with regard
to claims arising outside the United States. See JAYSON, supra note 251, § 6.04[1][b].
Suit could also be brought against the United States Government pursuant to a pri-
vate bill. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1 PRIVATE
CLAIMS ACTS AND CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCES (Comm. Print 1968) (statement of Col.
Marion T. Bennett, Air Force Reserve). This too might be a useful solution in the right
case, but not one to be relied upon in lawmaking.
262. The United States Government cannot be held strictly liable, whether in con-
nection with an assertedly ultrahazardous activity or otherwise. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S.
797 (1972), reaffirming the traditional rule in Dalehite v. United States, 364 U.S. 15
(1953). This limitation was held to be the rule with respect to nuclear weapons detona-
tion. Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955), afl'd, 253
F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957). It follows, a fortiori that this limitation would apply to nuclear
power accidents as well. Price-Anderson allows domestic claims, by contrast, to be based
on any applicable state law theory, including strict liability in tort. See Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 469 U.S. 238 (1989). This is not altogether inconsistent once it is
remembered that the government there is indemnifying private defendants.
263. It will be recalled that in diversity actions the law of the state in which the
court is located, including its choice of law provisions, will be applied. See supra notes
48, 61 & 247. Recall also that unless United States law is used, no federal government
liability- exists. See supra notes 77-78 and infra notes 265-66.
Suits brought pursuant to the FTCA are governed in all respects by state law. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6
(1962); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-69 (1955); Broudy v. United States, 722 F.2d 566, 575 (9th
Cir. 1983).
264. Rayonier, 352 U.S. 315 (allowing forest fire to start and failing to exercise due
care in extinguishing); Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1986) (failure to
depict known obstruction on aeronautical chart); Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d
1016 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure to warn of radiation injury danger once discovered); McKay
v. United States, 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (negligent operation of nuclear
weapons facility causing radiation danger to nearby persons and property); Loge v.
United States, 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981) (dictum) (failure to require tests of vaccine);
Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979) (failure to change safety standards in
light of information known).
The Supreme Court has stated that the fact that state law chooses to recognize a
novel or unprecedented theory of liability does not necessarily prevent the United States
from being held responsible. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319. See also infra notes 272-87 and
accompanying text regarding basis of duty giving rise to United States liability.
265. Governmental liability in the United States begins with a rule of absolute sov-
ereign immunity, with exceptions in the form of blanket statutory enactments or private
legislation. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981); United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584 (1941). The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), is designed to
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spect to claims arising in a foreign country;216 in order for the
United States to be held liable, it must be found that the wrong-
ful act or omission took place within its borders.26 7 The other
ground of immunity2 s applies to the performance of a "discre-
tionary function" by an agency of the government; 269 this has
consent to tort suits and to waive immunity with certain stated exceptions listed in 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (only a few of which are relevant to this writing). The exceptions must be
strictly observed. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); DeGirolano v.
United States, 518 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). It is also possible for the same grounds
for immunity to be asserted in suits against individual governmental officials. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); People of
Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1984).
266. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See also supra notes 229, 242 re-
garding this exception and the applicability of United States law.
This exception to the waiver of immunity focuses on the situs of the wrongful act,
Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1975), and is based on the policy against having claims against the public sector decided
by reference to the laws of another country. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221
(1949); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964). Cf. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (inapplicable to claims
arising outside jurisdiction of any country).
267. See supra notes 229, 242 & 266 and accompanying text.
Courts have allowed suit based upon findings that the occurrences forming the basis
of the cause of action took place in the United States, even if their operative effects may
have been abroad. See, e.g., Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979); In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ca. 1975).
268. There is also an exception for "the execution of a statute or regulation," found
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1965), the same section as the "discretionary function" exception
discussed infra note 269. This exception basically bars testing the legality of statutes and
regulations by tort action. The two are distinct but often difficult to separate in practice.
This exception is said to apply wherever the governing statute or regulation contem-
plates the making of rules or ad hoc decisions. First Nat'l Bank of Albuquerque v.
United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1965). This exception applies to the performance or non-
performance of a discretionary duty, whether or not the discretion is abused. As will be
seen below, it also applies in cases where negligence is alleged (in order to prevent evis-
cerating the proviso by rhetorical device). See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1945).
The exception involves examining the very nature of governmental conduct. See
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In that decision, regarded as the seminal
one in applying the statute, the distinction between discretionary and "operational" de-
cision-making was articulated; although this has continued to be paid lip service, it has
been criticized and a later Supreme Court case focused on the discretionary nature of the
conduct rather than the level of the person engaged in it (scarcely any more helpful). See
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S.
797 (1984). In its most recent pronouncement, the Court relied on the presence of an
element of "judgment or choice" as the defining criterion. Berkovitz v. United States,
486 U.S. 531 (1988).
It is clear that the exception actually involves balancing the need to shield the dis-
cretionary nature of some government activity against the purposes to be served by the
FTCA. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808; J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515
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the potential to present a significant obstacle to a claim in the
present context, 70 and will require a court to carefully distin-
guish between the protected exercise of discretion and a culpa-
ble failure to fulfill a function made mandatory by circumstance,
required procedure, or public policy. 7
1
F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976). As regards the law to be
applied on the point, the court is not bound to follow state law rules, as it would be with
regard to a finding of duty. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 194, 198 (2d
Cir. 1987); Mitchell v. United States, 787 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986).
270. The promulgation of regulations and issuance of licenses are generally consid-
ered within the discretionary function exception. Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774
(2d Cir. 1969); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 810. However, the issuance of a license in
violation of safety standards, or without determining compliance with safety standards,
is not considered within the discretionary function exception. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 541-
42.
The discretionary function rule has been given broad application in cases involving
domestic nuclear policy. In Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1987), the court considered an injury arising from testing activi-
ties. The court held that the Atomic Energy Commission (whose functions are now di.
vided between the NRC and the DOE), in planning and conducting monitoring and in.
formation programs was protected by the exception, whether or not it was negligent in
failing to warn, and regardless of the level at which the activity was performed. The
court seemed to emphasize the availability of administrative remedies. Id. at 1424. And
in General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1228 (1985), an action by owners of the Three Mile Island Plant alleging gov.
ernment failure to warn of equipment defects causing damage, the claims were barred by
the exception, including those for negligent approval of design and construction plans, as
well as the determination of what was necessary or significant from the standpoint of
health or safety. Id.
271. Notwithstanding the expansive approach in General Pub. Utils,, it is unlikely
that every decision involving choice by officials will be immune from scrutiny. All of the
reported decisions, including the recent Berkovitz case, reveal that there is still a line to
be drawn between policy decisions and wrongful implementation, in whatever terms it
may be expressed. Other recent cases in which this has been done include: Drake Towing
Co. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co., 765 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1985); Payton v. United
States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982); Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979);
Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 610 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1979)(dictum); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
It also appears that the application of discretionary function immunity will depend
upon the type of statute or regulation concerned. In the case of nuclear export licensing,
the statutes are in the main broadly directive, and the regulations general, due no doubt
to the highly technical nature of the subject. See 10 C.F.R. § 110.1 (1992). It will proba-
bly be necessary to look beyond published guidelines to the procedures and rules
adopted internally by the NRC and DOE, and then to determine whether the standards
therein set forth were followed, and whether the conduct complained of otherwise should
fit the exception.
In any event, a full evidentiary hearing should be held, after discovery, in order to
determine the availability of the "discretionary function" as an affirmative defense,
Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1952); Moffitt v. United States, 430 F.
Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Desert Beach Corp. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.
Cal. 1955); see also JOHN STEADMAN ET AL., LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
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Assuming barriers of immunity can be overcome, the princi-
pal determinant in connection with the United States Govern-
ment would be the existence of a duty that may be actionable. 2
Against such a duty, officials may be expected to argue that op-
erating and maintaining the safety of a facility and materials is
the charge of the recipient country's government,2 87 and that in-
suring proper design and adequate fabrication is the task of the
private manufacturer. 4 Such officials may also argue that sepa-
ration of powers and foreign policy considerations militate
against any judicial finding of official responsibility.27 5 However,
none of the foregoing contentions can usefully be taken to con-
clusion,27 6 and all of them beg the question of whether or not
§§ 13.107.4 to 13.107.5 (1983) [hereinafter STEADMAN].
272. Duty is primary among the elements of actionable negligence in United States
law, the others being breach of duty, causation and damage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 281-82 (1965); KEETON, supra note 245, at 356. In Laird v. Nelms, the Court
stated: "In the vast majority of cases in the law of torts, liability is, predicated on a
breach of some legal duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, whether that duty involves
exercising reasonable care in one's activities or refraining from certain activities alto-
gether." 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
273. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
647 F.2d 1345, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1981) the court determined that the safety and local envi-
ronmental impact of a foreign (United States-supplied) nuclear facility would "turn sub-
stantially" on its ongoing operation and management, matters beyond the knowledge or
control of the United States.
274. This argument of the government was endorsed by the Supreme Court, in the
context of airplane design, in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandese (Varig Airlines) et al., 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
275. Thus, the conduct by the United States of its foreign nuclear policy may be
contended to be a "political question" insulated from judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Japan
Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Lori F. Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REv. 483, 534
(1987).
It might also be argued that the United States Government ought not be held to any
measure of responsibility because it cannot apply its standards of nuclear safety extra-
territorially without impermissibly infringing the sovereignty of the recipient nation.
Ronald J. Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1105, 1106 (1978). This was a factor in the decision that an enviromental impact
determination by the NRC was not required for an export sale to the Philippines.
NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1356; cf. Harry H. Almond, The Extraterritorial Reach of United
States Regulatory Authority over the Environmental Impacts of its Activities, 44 ALB.
L. REV. 739 (1980).
276. As Judge Robinson noted in NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1379 (Robinson, J., concur-
ring), problems inherent in a poorly designed facility or flawed component cannot be
overcome solely by good maintenance. The United States should not abdicate its respon-
sibility to take at least some measures to determine whether discernable design or pro-
duction flaws exist. Id., citing In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 631, 666 (1980)
(Bradford, Comm'r, dissenting).
Such a duty on the part of the government may be constructed by analogy to those
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there is a duty; the essential issue persists - allocation of legal
accountability among various parties.2 " The requirement re-
mains to determine upon what grounds, if any, the United
States should be included; it is possible to enumerate at least
three.
The first duty of the United States could be to prevent or
warn of defects in nuclear technology or components, or pro-
posed utilization risks, that become known or ought to be dis-
covered during review of export applications by the NRC or
some other relevant agency.2 78 This theory places the United
found in the cases cited supra note 264; see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
United States, 638 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (60% of causal negligence attributable
to EPA for failure to direct contractor to take certain steps once it undertook responsi-
bility for cleanup of toxic waste site).
It has likewise been recognized that the presence of a political determination is not a
talismanic shield against all liability. In McKay v. United States, the court stated:
It is true that there are political aspects present in, for example, making the
decision to manufacture nuclear components, but this does not reach beyond
the actual decision for purposes of making it a political question. Nor does it
rule out all possible remedies which are available to people who are either
physically or materially hurt. Thus the political question theory and the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine do not ordinarily prevent individual tort recoveries
(citations omitted).
McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1983).
Of course, the McKay opinion involved acts of the United States through contrac-
tors, as did United States Fidelity, but the issue of whether a duty exists is basically the
same where the government is integrally involved in the activity concerned. See supra
notes 253, 264 and accompanying text.
The matter of extraterritorial imposition of United States safety standards is a fo-
rensic red herring. No question of it exists apart from the issue of the foreign govern-
ment's obligations and liabilities. See infra notes 288-302 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
278. Such a duty has been urged by a number of analysts and commentators. In his
dissent in In re Westinghouse Electric Corp., 11 N.R.C. at 667-68, Commissioner Brad-
ford argued strenuously that the United States should be placed alongside the exporter
in legal obligation because of the requirement of government approval. This position was
highlighted in Judge Robinson's opinion in NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1379 n.2 (Robinson, J.,
concurring). See also Sullivan, Note, supra note 251, and Linder, Note, supra note 25, at
477. In that case, the NRC, with knowledge of the potential threats posed by the pro-
posed location of the reactor on a geologically unstable site, voted 3-2 to allow the sale,
and the Court of Appeals, also by split vote, upheld the determination on the ground
that no environmental impact study was statutorily mandated on the part of the NRC.
NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1351, 1370. One may speculate whether culpability might ipso facto
arise from the sale of a hugely dangerous instrumentality whose safety of utilization is
the subject of such cbntroversy among the selling parties.
Other reported decisions have recognized duties arising from closely analogous situa-
tions. In Broudy v. United States, 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983), it was stated that the
United States could be held responsible for failure to monitor and warn of radiation
danger to a serviceman where knowledge of the hazard was acquired after he left the
military. To similar effect is Aretz v. United States, 604 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1979), regard-
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States Government in a position similar to that of the manufac-
turer or exporter itself, in recognition of its responsibilities in
the licensing and approval process. 79 Although arguably just
and consistent with state law, such a duty may encounter a
claim of immunity for the exercise of discretionary judgment in
inspection and review; such a contention should not, however, be
allowed to nullify the underlying duty.28 0
A second foundation on which a United States Government
duty could rest is the disparity in expertise, relative to evaluat-
ing the risks associated with nuclear energy, that will usually ex-
ist between it and recipient nations.2 8' This is supported empiri-
cally by the lack of relevant proficiency 28 2  in developing
ing safety-related information acquired by a government agency that failed subsequently
to alter its instructions for handling. And although liability was denied, it was recognized
in In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 204, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1987), that prior
knowledge and failure to warn might be a basis of official liability.
279. See supra note 253.
Industrialized nations have been accused of foisting onto lesser-developed countries
all manner of subpar products in order to create markets. Both Congress and the NRC
are aware of this problem in the context of nuclear facilities and technology, according to
citations in NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1345, 1379-80 n.92.
According to a staff memorandum quoted in a statement of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Sierra Club and Union of Concerned Scientists, in In re Westinghouse,
11 N.R.C. 631, the NRC has had knowledge that United States manufacturers often did
not furnish information adequately to foreign purchasers, and attempted design innova-
tions first in foreign reactors.
After the Three Mile incident, a commission appointed by the Phillipine Govern-
ment concluded the reactor designed to be licensed and sold to it was not safe, but was
based on "an old design plagued with unresolved safety issues." See NRDC, 647 F.2d at
1383 n.133.
280. See supra note 269 and accompanying text regarding "discretionary function"
exception to waiver of immunity.
The NRC has thus far consistently refused to include foreign environmental, health
or safety impacts among its considerations in export licensing, based upon the policy
formulation of the executive branch referenced supra note 251. See citations contained
in concurring opinion of Robinson, J. in NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1345, 1362; see also Sullivan,
Note supra note 251; Linder, Note, supra note 25, at 477. It is doubtful this is the vari-
ety of "discretion" the drafters of the FTCA meant to insulate from review.
281. Accidental risk may increase, given the financial inability of lesser-developed
countries to properly maintain or repair nuclear facilities.
282. In addition to lacking experience in general, lesser developed countries have
regulatory resources that are inadequate to meet the problems of nuclear safety regula-
tion. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1370, 1380; Sullivan, supra note 251, at 59.
An example from the sale at issue in NRDC, is reported in Nicholas C. Yost, Ameri-
can Governmental Responsibility for the Environmental Effects of Actions Abroad, 43
ALB. L. REv. 528, 534 (1979), in which it is recounted that the Philippines requested the
"loan of an expert" from the NRC to perform a two-week study, and were informed that
a comparable application in the United States requires six man-years of work. The
United States Geological Survey subsequently refused to certify the work of a commis-
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countries, who nevertheless are eager to obtain the perceived
benefits of the technology.28 It resembles products liability no-
tions of risk allocation that hold that the party to a transaction
possessing superior know-how is in the best position to guard
against, or at least inform of, product hazards. 84
Thirdly, international law may be said to impose obligations
which give rise to an additional basis of duty on the part of the
United States Government.28 5
Although the critical task of allocating legal accountability
remains, the foregoing concepts could form a valid basis for
United States Government responsibility. In some respects, it
may seem unsettling that liability of the United States is defined
by public policy arguments and state and international law con-
cepts still to be fully developed.28 8 It is likewise far from clear to
what extent legislative undertakings ought to form the basis of
responsibilities28 ' to persons and governments abroad. But these
sion appointed by the Filipino Government to study the likelihood of damage from seis-
mic activity at the site. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1383.
283. See generally WARREN FREEDMAN, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1986);
H. DUINTJER TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY (1979). See also supra notes 6
and 282.
284. As mentioned supra note 262 and accompanying text, the United States Gov-
ernment cannot be held strictly liable in tort. However, liability for defective products
may also be grounded upon negligence. United States v. Carroll Towing Co,, 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947); see also supra note 245. The government is not, of course, the actual
vendor, so the parallel is not complete; however, if the government is found to have a
duty it has breached causing injury, it is unimportant whether the right of action is
called "products liability."
285. These obligations are discussed separately infra notes 303-10 and accompany-
ing text.
In the United States, it has always been recognized that the law of nations is part of
domestic law, subject to overriding constitutional requirement or federal legislation. See,
e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see generally THOMAS M. FRANCK &
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 96 (1987).
286. Recall the statement in Rayonier that liability of the United States may admit
of novel concepts of duty and responsibility. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
315 (1957).
287. The differing shadings of government liability under federal statutes and regu-
lations are illustrated by the approaches taken in two decisions involving domestic in-
jury, both involving federal agencies' allegedly having failed to control the distribution of
substances which turned out to cause harm. In Schindler v. United States, 661 F.2d 552
(6th Cir. 1981), involving granting of a license to a private company to produce a vaccine,
the court (citing numerous other federal cases), determined that regulatory statutes
would be relevant to the duty of government in defining the "scope of the undertaking of
the United States and the plaintiff's right to rely thereon." 661 F.2d at 560 n.28, 561
n.29. However, in Baer v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ohio 1980), the court
cites numerous opinions for the proposition that "the [FTCA] was not designed to re-
dress breaches of federal statutory duties . . . ." 511 F. Supp. at 96. But the opinion
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are the instruments with which one must probe for a just solu-
tion in the absence of a workable global accountability
arrangement.
b. Foreign Governments
Many of the same considerations treated in the preceding
subsection will apply to the foreign nation or nations involved in
an international nuclear power accident. Any determination of
liability will necessarily include the .governments of these
countries.
There are policy reasons for this as persuasive as those con-
cerning the United States.28 § First and perhaps foremost, the de-
velopment and utilization of their nuclear energy compatabilities
are no less a matter of governmental concern in other nations
than in the United States.8 9 In addition, the foreign state is
charged with fulfilling obligations to its people that are inherent
in the concept of nationhood, including at minimum the supervi-
sion and safe operation of the facility,290 the protection of the
populace from the effects of terrorism or other hostile activity,291
and minimizing loss and injury in the event of disaster.
Nevertheless, the question of grounds of liability returns,
and there are legal obstacles to be cleared. Although a foreign
country may be held liable in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private person under United States law,292 this is cir-
goes on to hedge, acknowledging "precedents which have addressed the issue have uni-
formly recognized that allegations of negligence in the enforcement of federal statutes or
regulations are actionable under [FTCA] where the conduct in question results in a vio-
lation of a corresponding duty imposed by applicable state law." Id. at 97.
288. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
289. See Hickel, supra note 252; Ashok Kapur, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Prolifera-
tion and National Security: Views from the South, in NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WORLD
POLICY 163 (Robert Boardman & James F. Keely eds., 1983); see also supra note 252
regarding other governments' promotion of nuclear industries.
290. See Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 255, at 67; see also supra
notes 72, 81 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, and infra notes 375-80 and ac-
companying text.
It is the position of the IAEA, as reported in GAO REPORT 1985, supra note 6, at 16
& 19, that the ultimate responsibility for safety devolves upon the government where the
nuclear facility is located.
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). RESTATEMENT (THmID) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 207 (1987) states that foreign governments may be held vicariously
liable for the acts of their political subdivisions or instrumentalities as a matter of sub-
stantive law.
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cumscribed by immunity concepts.293 Moreover, although most
foreign jurisdictions 9 4 allow liability to be imposed both upon
the public sector 295 and for official acts,29 6 by virtue thereof a
293. The immunity of a foreign state from suit is the point of departure under the
FSIA. See supra note 86. The only readily applicable exception is a counterclaim if the
foreign government brings suit or intervenes. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying
text. See also infra note 298 and accompanying text.
294. It should be borne in mind that as to nations whose laws have been enacted
pursuant to the multilateral treaties or those that have adopted liability schemes pat-
terned after them, all liability is to be "channeled" to the facility operator, and some
provision is expressly made for governmental liability once the limits of the operator's
liability is surpassed. See supra note 171. In the event such law controls, there would
also be no question of United States liability, and no United States concern would be
held responsible except to the operator based on contract or willful wrong. See supra
note 171.
295. This should not, of course, apply to nations with laws that channel liability to
operators and have structured liability systems. See supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
No attempt is made herein at a survey of foreign law, and summaries are provided
only. It is even more difficult to synthesize government liability concepts than private
vicarious liability, because of the many differences among public law systems of nations.
In general, however, it may be said that common law countries have largely banished
previous concepts of non-liability by statute, and their governments may be held liable
for breaches of official duty. See STREET, supra note 82, at ch. II; Jeremy McBride, Dam-
ages as a Remedy for Wrongful Administrative Action, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 323 (1979);
Constance Whippman, Comment, The Liability of Public Authorities - A Retreat from
Anns?, 1986 J. Bus. L. 404; Gynla Ebrsi, Private and Governmental Liability for the
Torts of Employees and Organs, XI INr'L ENC. COMP. L. TORTS ch. 4, 85 (1975); see also
S.H. Bailey & M.J. Bowman, The Policy-Operational Dichotomy - A Cuckoo in the
Nest, 45 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 430 (1986).
Civil law countries mostly allow official entities to be held responsible upon the same
grounds as private individuals or concerns, and include violation of official duties as a
basis. E~irsi, supra, at 83; STREET, supra note 82, at 13; Council of Europe, The Liability
of the State and Regional and Local Authorities for Damage Caused by Their Agents
and Administrative Services, Proceedings of the Ninth Colloquy on European Law, Le-
gal Affairs (1981); PAN AMERICAN UNION, THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN THE FIELD OF Nu-
CLEAR ENERGY 11 (1961).
For a survey of various nations' laws, see generally MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE, LIABIL-
ITY OF THE STATE FOR ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF ITS ORGANS (Hermann Mosler ed., 1967); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451, n. 1 (1987).
296. Some common law and commonwealth countries distinguish between proprie-
tary and governmental functions, maintaining official immunity for the latter. The de-
grees are variable, but the most notable example is India, where the law provides for
governmental immunity for acts committed in the exercise of "sovereign power" even if
an agent has acted negligently. Ebrsi, supra note 295, at 93-94.
Latin American nations also have observed the proprietary-governmental distinction
in the past, but it has been eroded to near extinction in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
Ersi, supra note 295, at 104. In European countries, immunity concepts appear also to
be well on the way to desuetude. For a country-by-country discussion see Edrsi, supra
note 295, at 104.
It has been said that for all practical purposes, under the internal legal order of most
countries, the state is not considered immune in its own courts. BADR, supra note 83, at
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significant obstacle ironically appears in United States courts:
The "Act of State" doctrine may thwart judicial inquiry into the
official acts of a foreign government, as a matter of United
States law and foreign policy. 297 This could include such things
as supervision or operation of a nuclear facility, security mea-
sures taken, and the like. Unless an exception is found or formu-
lated,298 bases of liability might go unexamined. However, it
78. Indeed, western concepts of sovereign immunity have generally been regarded as
alien to most systems. BADR, supra note 83, at 78.
297. Under the classical epigrammatic formulation, "[t]he courts of one country will
not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); for a complete discussion, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987).
Although the act of state doctrine has ordinarily been applied to expropriation of
American capital, it has often been employed in other contexts. See, e.g., Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occiden-
tal Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984);
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court affirmed a refusal to apply it in the context of alleged
bribes paid to a foreign official in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990), a decision seemingly evincing an intent to limit the applica-
tion of the doctrine.
It could be said that the doctrine's foundational underpinnings, difficulties of apply-
ing foreign law and the potential for offense to another state, see Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 (1964), but see Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409-10,
seem pertinent to inquiries regarding operation of the nation's nuclear facilities and pro-
cedures undertaken to protect the health and welfare of its people.
The operation of the doctrine in a situation in which a plaintiff or counter-claimant
contends a foreign state is liable under its own law is further discussed in Clyde H.
Crockett, The Liability of Foreign States: The Role of Foreign Municipal Law, 11 N.C.
INT'L L. & COuM'L REG. 51 (1986).
298. A number of possible exemptions from the act of state doctrine suggest them-
selves, although obviously none have been considered in anything like the instant con-
text. For one, the rule has never been applied where a noncontroversial principle of cus-
tomary international law is alleged to have been violated. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 cmts. b and c (1987). This may
have been the reasoning underyling its rejection. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C.
1985); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
In a proper case, a "treaty exception" discussed in some decisions should apply to
situations involving an "agreement for cooperation," supra notes 26, 253, dealing with
responsibilities of the foreign government. Cf. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Gov-
ernment of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); Ramirez de Arellano v.
Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984); American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443
cmt. j (1987).
In somewhat the same manner as under the FSIA, an exception might also be found
if the foreign government brings an action in a United States court, by way of counter-
claim. In First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
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does not seem that an international nuclear accident, causing
massive losses and injury, in which the United States or United
States defendants are sought to be held liable, even approxi-
mately fits the contexts in which the doctrine has been or should
be employed. A court should, at a minimum, disregard it for.
purposes of allocation of responsibility among defendants.' 9
Apart from the foregoing difficulties, it is possible to base a
model for foreign government accountability upon three norma-
tive pillars. First, the foreign state may have contractual com-
mitments~which operate in favor of the United States, and per-
haps other defendants.300 Second, foreign state responsibility
under international law would at least equal that of the United
States."' Third, and most important, the obligations inherent in
(1972), the plurality held that the act of state doctrine did not preclude a setoff, not
exceeding the amount of relief sought by the foreign official plaintiff, where the State
Department had opined that the doctrine should not be applied, and there was no other
indication that adjudication would damage foreign relations. See also Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). But'see Empresa Cubana
Exportadora de Azucar v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
The foregoing cases suggest that there is some latitude to find reasons not to apply
the act of state doctrine, without doing violence to the orderly development of the law
and international relations.
299. After all, in merely apportioning fault the court is not expressly passing judg-
ment upon the actions of the government for purposes of rendering judgment or impos-
ing sanctions, but rather sizing up the extent to which its acts or omissions are responsi-
ble for the occurrence.
See infra notes 381-410 and accompanying text regarding comparative fault analysis
and apportionment of responsibility.
300. "Hold harmless" provisions between a foreign government and a United States
supplier would furnish such a basis if present. As part of any "Agreement for Coopera-
tion," for furnishing materials and technology, the recipient nation "must guarantee that
'adequate physical security' shall be maintained over exported material," 42 U.S.C. §
2153(a) (1988). Numerous such agreements contain indemnification clauses in favor of
the United States, and further statements that the receiving government is responsible
for material after delivery. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy, July 17, 1972, U.S.-Brazil, T.I.A.S. No. 23, Part 3, 7439, at 2477; but see
also Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Aug. 8, 1963,
T.I.A.S. No. 14, Part 2, 5446, at 1484 (acknowledging the "responsibility" of India for the
handling and use of materials, but containing no hold harmless or indemnity clause).
It would be a matter of interpretation whether these agreements would encompass
safety at nuclear facilities where the "material" presumably is being utilized, and
whether their terms are intended to benefit others than the United States Government.
301. See infr6 notes 303-10 and accompanying text.
The extent to which international law forms part of the domestic law of other na-
tions is beyond the scope of this writing. The subject is complicated by issues of consti-
tutional law in each country and, in some cases, relations among bodies politic in federal
systems.
However, in the majority of instances, as in the United States, see supra note 285,
customary international law has been incorporated into local law, but remains subject to
566
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nationhood should create a duty on the part of the government
to share the responsibilities of prevention and amelioration of
the effects of nuclear mishap.302 These considerations clearly
militate in favor of allowing a court to include the nation, or
nations, in which an incident occurred or injury was caused
among those required to share the burdens of recompense.
c. Emerging Theories of State Responsibility Under Inter-
national Law
Numerous developing constructs of state responsibility 03
under the law of nations30 4 provide a foundation upon which the
governmental liability discussed in the preceding sections may
be said to rest.305 In this framework, a foreign government would
overriding national legislation and judicial decisions of final authority. See generally
WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-14
(1964); D.W. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2d ed. 1976); IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-53 (2d ed.1973).
302. See also supra notes 72, 81-82 and accompanying text.
303. The writings that have attempted to collect and synthesize the various theories
include: Hartke, Note, supra note 13, at 324-31; GUnther Handl, International Transfer
of Hazardous Technology and Substances: Caveat Emptor or State Responsibility? The
Case of Bhopal, India, in 79 PROc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 303, 318 (1985) [hereinafter Handl,
International Transfer]; Linder, Note, supra note 25, at 488-92.
304. Here the reference is to public international law, which governs the relations of
nations inter se at the level of national political authority, as opposed to the workings of
private law solutions and remedies across national boundaries, sometimes called "private
international law," which furnishes the structure for the remainder of the discussion
herein. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 3 (3d ed. 1976); F.A. MANN,
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (1973). In a dispute before local courts, what is at
issue is not interstate relations, but relations between two or more subjects of private
rights and obligations, one of whom may be a state acting in a capacity that will subject
it to the tribunal's jurisdiction. See supra notes 265-71 and 293-99 and accompanying
text regarding state immunity.
305. Claims of nations against each other are normally asserted in international
tribunals. See supra note 40. This is to be compared to suits within the national courts
of a country, which are principally treated in this writing.
However, a foreign state has rights it may assert and it could do so in United States
tribunals. Absent treaty, international law does not itself require any particular reaction
with respect to violations of its precepts, and leaves nations free to make laws apply as
they consider appropriate. See 1 CHARLES CHENNEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 219, at
729 n.5 (2d ed. 1945); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 402, 702 and 906, cmt. b (1987). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) (Alien Tort
Claims Act); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); J.M. Lewis
Humphrey, Note, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims
Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 105 (1979). Of course, this is not to suggest that a suit
could be maintained without any connection to the United States; see supra notes 34-37,
42.
See also supra note 37 and accompanying text regarding jurisdiction in United
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also be entitled to assert a right to compensation for its losses
and injuries to its citizens against United States defendants. The
theories have developed from decisions of international tribu-
nals,30 works of international organizations,3 0 7 and the writings
of international law scholars.30 They may be asserted as an ad-
ditional basis for a finding of duty,09 or a separate ground of
States courts for suits in which foreign states are plaintiffs, supra notes 84-93 for juris-
diction over foreign states and instrumentalities, and supra notes 84-88 for immunity
from suit of same.
306. The best known of these is Trail Smelter, (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1949);
other leading decisions are the Corfu Channel case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9),
and the Nuclear Tests case, (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (June 22).
307. The most prominent is the Stockholm Declaration of the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14/Corr. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Principle 21 holds that states have "the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
Among the others are U.N. General Assembly Resolution 37/137 (December, 1982)
regarding Protection against Products Harmful to Health and Environment, and the In-
ternational Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in UNITED
NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSmITY 325 (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma
eds., 1987).
308. See, e.g. Gfinther Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Envi-
ronmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980); Luis Kutner, The
Control and Prevention of Transnational Pollution: A Case for World Habeus Eco-
logicus, 9 LAW. AM. 257 (1977).
The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601
(1987), specifies a duty on the part of a country from which environmental damage is
caused to another aggrieved nation, including access to its tribunals by the latter's
citizens.
309. State responsibility in international law has been declared susceptible of being
grounded upon negligence principles. See supra notes 232-35, 239-45 and accompanying
text. IAN BROWNLIE, 1 SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 30 (1983);
ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 131 (1983).
It has also been theorized that liability may be vicariously imposed on state govern-
ments, based upon acts of their agencies or nationals, even if unauthorized. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 357-58 (1966); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 207 (1987). The Barcelona
Traction case, (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), has been cited for an obligation on
the part of a state to regulate the conduct of its corporate citizens by Professor Handl in
his remarks to the American Society of International Law. See Handl, International
Transfer, supra note 303, at 321. These surpass the more traditional notions that re-
sponsibility may only be imposed for authorized actions of government instrumentalities.
See I HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 399-400 (1970).
State responsibility based on strict liability has also been suggested. See Ganther
Handl, Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law,
16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 57 (1985); SPRINGER, supra, at 132-33; JAMES BARROS & DOUG-
LAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 20 (1974). However, the
United States is immune under its law from being held strictly liable. See supra note 262
and accompanying text.
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liability.310
d. Effect of Government Responsibility on Liability of Pri-
vate Defendants
In the international development and utilization of nuclear
energy, where there is pervasive involvement of governments of
exporting and importing countries,31' an important issue will be
the extent to which such involvement 12 could operate to reduce
the liability of private defendants. This might operate in three
general ways: First, to absolve private parties of liability, in
whole or in part, by way of defense; second, to allow them to
obtain contribution or otherwise to allocate a portion of liability
to governmental defendants; third, to assist the private parties
in avoiding multiple or inconsistent adjudications.
The mechanisms whereby private defendants might be re-
lieved altogether of liability because of public sector involve-
ment may be generically called "derivative immunity.313" They
include rather narrow defenses based on adherence to contract
specifications, 31 4 and legal justifications grounded on the idea
310. See generally Handl, International Transfer, supra note 303, at 57; Linder,
Note, supra note 25, at 488-93.
Additional theories may be expected to emerge as international law evolves. One
suggestion provides that insofar as nuclear technology transfers permit or abet nuclear
utilization, they violate jus cogens (peremptory rules of law) and are perforce the basis
of state responsibility. See Walter T. Gangl, Note, The Jus Cogens Dimension of Nu-
clear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63 (1980).
However, the United States has been reluctant to recognize an obligation under in-
ternational law with respect to the effects of domestic actions beyond its boundaries. See
Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions: An Execu-
tive Order Ordains a National Policy, 3 HAIv. ENvTL. L. REv. 136, 152 (1979).
311. See supra notes 5-6, 22-31, 81, 248-55 & 288-300 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text regarding liability of United
States Government and supra notes 288-300 and accompanying text regarding that of
foreign governments.
313. This term, a bit of umbrella shorthand, is borrowed from Pratt v. Hercules,
Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1982), but does not denote any widely-accepted nomen-
clature. Pratt involved the availability of governmental immunity to a private defendant
that had no contract with the government (being a second-tier subcontractor), and fol-
lowed no specifications beyond general regulations. Id. at 796.
Ordinarily, there is no immunity for private concerns under United States law, even
if their activities are closely government-related. Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502
F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974). Indeed, even though some private concerns are created by the
federal government for a specific purpose, or are officially constituted governmental
agencies, they will not be insulated from suit. Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Fin.
Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922); STEADMAN, supra note 271, § 16.121.
314. The "contract specification defense" applies to products manufactured to the
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that a private contractor should enjoy immunity by virtue of
having acted for the government.3 15 If the "government con-
tract" formulation of the latter notion were to benefit a United
States supplier, it would be only in the limited realm of applica-
tion of United States law"'6 to the design or construction of a
order and specifications of another party, whether governmental or private. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 404 cmt. a, 389 cmt. e (1965). It is based upon negligence
principles, and insulates the contractor from liability unless specifications are so obvi-
ously defective that a reasonably competent contractor would realize the product is un-
safe. KEETON, supra note 245, at 646-81. See also Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
778 F.2d 736, 739 (11th Cir. 1985); Raymond A. Pelletier, Jr., Note, Liability of a Manu-
facturer for Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1025
(1982). The manufacturer is held to as high a standard as the designer if it possesses
special knowledge or expertise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289(b) and cmt. m
(1965). Thus, the defense applies only when the contractor is not negligent.
315. This is the "government contract" defense, which holds that a private contrac-
tor is not liable for damage caused by necessary incidents to work performed under con-
tract with a governmental body. The seminal decision is Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr.
Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). It has always been recognized that immunity must not be al-
lowed for negligence in performing the work. Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Dubois Elec.
Co., 253 U.S. 212 (1920); Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295
F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961). The same is true for actions not authorized by the contract.
Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21. The policy is that the contractor should not have to shoulder
the entire liability burden while at the same time producing in accordance with govern-
ment specifications. See generally Jeanne Bynum, Note, The Government Contract De-
fense: An Overview, 27 How. L.J. 275 (1984).
The defense has burgeoned in the area of defective design cases involving military
products. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); In re Agent Or-
ange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming formulation of doctrine at
506 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd, 635 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1985) and 534 F. Supp,
1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985); McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983). However, it has also been applied to a
number of products for civilian use. Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir.
1986); Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985); In re All Maine
Asbestos Litig., 575 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Maine 1983), afl'd in part, 772 F.2d 1023 (1st Cir.
1985).
The apparent theoretical basis of the defense is an extension of the immunity of the
government with respect to military products and otherwise, under the "discretionary
function" exception to the FTCA, supra notes 268-69. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); McKay, 704 F.2d at 448; Boruski, 803 F.2d at 1430;
Burgess, 772 F.2d at 846.
The recent Boyle case made clear that the law to be applied with respect to the
defense is federal common law. The elements, although variously stated, may be fairly
said to be three: (1) preparation (or at least approval) by the government of reasonably
precise specifications; (2) manufacture in accordance with those specifications; (3) at
least equal knowledge on the part of the government of the risks associated with the
product. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
316. See supra notes 211-30 regarding choice of law.
Although the matter is not exactly settled, it seems analytically necessary that the
government itself be immune with respect to the activity in order for the contractor to
be shielded. See Jonathan Glasser, Note, The Government Contractor Defense: Is Sover-
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nuclear facility or component pursuant to contract with a for-
eign government.3 17 However, there is a less circumscribed im-
puted immunity following from agency principles, which should
be much more useful.318 If the facts and law will otherwise per-
mit, neither derivative immunity application should be objec-
tionable as a matter of policy.319
eign Immunity a Prerequisite?, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 495 (1986). As discussed supra notes
292-96, foreign concepts of governmental immunity are in general much more limited
than in the United States; in any case, the defense does not seem to be one which is
much recognized in foreign law systems.
317. The defense would be unnecessary in case of manufacture under contract with
the United States Government, because the indemnity and limitation of liability provi-
sions of Price-Anderson would operate. It will be recalled that manufacture or supply
pursuant to contract with the United States is the only area in which Price-Anderson is
applicable to incidents occurring in foreign countries. See supra note 205-08 and accom-
panying text.
As regards foreign governments, there is the quite real possibility, made more likely
where the purchaser lacks expertise and regulatory sophistication, that the specifications
may only nominally be those of the government, and their true origin lies wholly, or
nearly so, with the contractor. The extent of such contractor involvement which is con-
sistent with the government contract defense has not been legally resolved (and would
doubtless depend upon the circumstances), but some involvement may be permitted.
Schoenborn v. Boeing Co., 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082
(1986); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afl'd, 755 F.2d
352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985).
318. The private defendant would be regarded as the agent of the United States or a
foreign government for this purpose. A discussion of such derivative immunity may be
found in Mark K. Sales, Note, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective
Cloak of Sovereign Immunity After McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR
L. REV. 181 (1985).
Under such a reading, it might be possible for a supplier to obtain the benefit of
governmental immunity by making reference to the "Agreement for Cooperation" be-
tween the United States and the recipient nation, which forms the legal framework for
the export of materials, facilities, and technology, to demonstrate that the governments
themselves are the bargaining parties and the private concerns are but their agents.
The following are passages from a typical agreement:
With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is under-
stood that arrangements may be made between either party or authorized per-
sons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the
other party for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials . . . and
for the performance of services with respect thereto.
It is understood that the [NRC] may transfer to a person or persons under the
jurisdiction of the government of the United States of America such of its re-
sponsibilities under this Agreement. . . as the Commission deems desirable.
Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Concerning Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy, July 17, 1972, U.S.-Braz., 23 U.S.T. 2477 (entered into force Sept. 20,
1972). Similar treaties may be found in United States Department of State, TREATES IN
FORCE (1987).
319. The rationales most often cited in support of this kind of defense bear most
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A second way in which public sector legal responsibility will
bear upon the exposure of other defendants is in regard to con-
tribution3 20  or other loss apportionment among parties held
jointly liable for a nuclear accident. 21 As a general proposition,
readily upon military applications. These rationales include preventing second-guessing
of military decisions through tort suits, encouraging contractors to work closely with offi-
cials, and avoiding the passing on of liability costs in an area where the government
would not otherwise be liable. See McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50. Although such concerns
may not apply in shifting liability to a foreign government for its nuclear energy pro-
gram, the broader justification that a contractor should not bear responsibility for doing
a government's bidding remains.
Of course, compensation of the injured victims is the factor which ought to override
all others. But this does not remove the issue of, who should bear a share, and what
share, of the burden. In United States cases involving the government contractor defense
in the setting of defective products causing injury, there has almost always been an alter-
native means under federal law for the injured parties to be compensated (such as the
Veterans' Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-363 (1988), the Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1988), or the National Swine Flu Immunization Pro-
gram, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (repealed 1978)). With regard to the overseas
development of nuclear energy, there would seem to be nothing repugnant about shifting
all or part of the onus of compensation to the government that embarked upon the pro-
gram. The fact that the government itself may be a plaintiff does not alter this. See
supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
320. As discussed supra note 221, contribution among joint tortfeasors is now an
established feature among legal systems worldwide.
Contribution is to be distinguished from "indemnity," which shifts the entire burden
of liability from one defendant to another. Such liability shifting occurs only if the sec-
ond party is deemed primarily liable to such an extent as to excuse the "passive" or
"secondary" fault of the first party. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States,
846 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1988); In re All Asbestos Cases, 603 F. Supp. 599 (D. Haw. 1984);
FRIEDMANN, supra note 301, at 41. Indemnity may, of course, also be based upon
contract.
As to the choice of law governing issues of contribution and indemnity, United
States courts have tended to treat the matters as part of the law applicable to the merits
of the claim. See LEFLAR, supra note 156, at 442 THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §. 221 (1971) states that these issues should be treated according to the
most significant relationship like other choice of law matters, although the view has been
expressed that as matters "primarily of remedy" they should be governed by lex fori.
Albert A. Ehrzenweig, Restitution in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason vs. the Re-
statement Second, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1298 (1961). The former view seems superior, in
view of the multifaceted choice of law tasks facing the court and the significance of the
conflicting interests present. Civil law countries will apply rules governing the wrong, 2
ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 275 (1958). On the other
hand, the United Kingdom and jurisdictions following its processes will treat the matter
as contractual (i.e., as quasi-contract) and apply the law of obligations. 2 DICEY & MOR-
RIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1407-08 (Lawrence Collins ed., 11th ed. 1987). Properly
done, these should not lead to inconsistent results.
321. Once contribution among jointly liable parties entered the common law, the
proportion of liability was initially determined on a per capita basis. See also supra note
221. Now, however, in jurisdictions having comparative fault, contribution will be linked
to causation in fact to define proportionate liability shares. See Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
817 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1987); Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d 152,
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the United States and other governments may be made the sub-
ject of contribution claims. 22 However, there remain the special
obstacles of governmental immunity from suit3 23 or from liabil-
ity,32 4 and the Act of State doctrine 25 The more efficacious ap-
proach would be the allocation of liability under comparative
fault, thereby bypassing the limitations upon contribution and
indemnity; thus, the recovery for plaintiffs would in any case be
reduced by the proportion of fault of an official party, even
though the latter is beyond reach because of lack of jurisdiction
or immunity.32 6
An important third effect of governmental responsibility
upon that of private defendants may be to relieve them, in sig-
327 thnificant measure, from the risks and burdens resulting from
159 n.9 (3d Cir. 1982); Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205, 229 (9th Cir. 1979).
See also infra notes 381-410 and accompanying text.
322. Contribution and indemnity may be had against the United States Govern-
ment, and it may be brought in as a third party defendant for such purpose under the
FTCA if it has not been named by plaintiffs. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,
460 U.S. 190 (1983); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); In re All
Maine Asbestos Litig., 581 F. Supp. 963, 975 (D. Me. 1984). This is true even if two
modes of trial - one jury and one non-jury - are required. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 556;
STEADMAN, supra note 271, at 284; but see infra note 324. In accordance with accepted
choice of law principles, contribution against the United States in diversity suits is gov-
erned by the applicable state law. United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d
487 (5th Cir. 1972); In re General Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 602 F. Supp. 497 (D. Conn.
1984).
As referenced supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text, notions of sovereign im-
munity are much less influential under foreign law, and a government may be expected,
all other things being equal, to bear its share of legal responsibility as any other
defendant.
323. Contribution or indemnity claims must be asserted against foreign governments
or instrumentalities, regardless of applicable law, consistently with the FSIA. See supra
notes 85-91 and accompanying text, in which the limited circumstances under which this
may be done are outlined.
324. Contribution may be had from the United States Government only where the
plaintiffs have a right of recovery against it. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
495 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir. 1974); Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87 (9th Cir.
1960). If the United States is substantively immune from liability, no right of contribu-
tion or indemnity may be enforced against it. Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487
(10th Cir. 1983); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. United States, 511 F.2d 159 (5th Cir.
1975).
325. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
326. See infra notes 381-410 and accompanying text regarding liability apportion-
ment and comparative fault. Of course, the foreign government or instrumentality may
seek to intervene in order to protect its interests, and perhaps in order to see justice
completely done.
327. This qualifier is because the doctrine to be discussed is one of United States
law and, as shortly will be seen, of uncertain application outside courts of the United
States.
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suits and judgments in multiple fora3 28 by the requirements of
mandatory joinder. Under United States procedure, 20 certain
classes of parties are to be joined if feasible; 3 0 the action may
not be allowed to proceed against the other parties if the court
determines, due to seriously prejudicial effects,331 that it would
be unjust to do so. 33 2 This could be employed in suits arising
from nuclear disaster in which foreign governments or instru-
328. See supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.
329. Federal civil procedure is discussed here, because it is highly probable that nu-
clear disaster suits will be brought, or wind up in, federal court. See supra notes 34-38
and accompanying text.
In addition, however well or poorly it fits principles of choice of laws, the rule ap-
pears to have been that mandatory joinder of parties is considered "procedural" and, in
any event, to be governed by lex fori in United States courts. Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 (1968); 7 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CivIL 2D § 1603 (1986). The rules discussed in this
section are subject to the provisions of Federal Rule 23 regarding class actions. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 19(d).
330. Under FED. R. Cw. P. 19(a), the "persons to be joined if feasible" include those
in whose absence complete relief cannot be afforded, or those with such an interest in the
subject of the action that its adjudication in their absence would be gravely prejudicial to
tht interests of present or absent parties. Id.
The general policy is to allow courts to afford complete relief, and to avoid multiple
or repeated suits. Evergreen Park Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. v. American Equi-
table Assurance Co., 417 F.2d 1113, 1115 (7th Cir. 1969); International Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs Local 103 v. Irmscher & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 394, 397 (N.D. Ind. 1973);
WRIGHT, supra note 329, § 1604.
331. Prejudice to those before the court includes the risk of double, multiple or oth-
erwise inconsistent obligations to outside parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Haas v. Jefferson
Nat'l Bank of Miami Beach, 442 F.2d 394, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1971); Ayers v. Ackerman,
324 F. Supp. 814, 817 (D.S.C. 1971). It has been specifically stated to include the risk of
sole responsibility for a shared liability. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 390
U.S. at 110.
The factors the court is to consider are set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). They
include, inter alia, prejudice to present and/or absent parties arising from a judgment
that may be rendered, whether such prejudice may be avoided, and whether plaintiffs
will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. FED. R. Civ. P.
19(b).
None of these factors, nor any combination, is an automatic ground for dismissal.
Rather, they are to be weighed on a case-by-case basis. Kaplan v. International Alliance
of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1975); Lynch v. Sperry
Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); WRIGHT, supra note 329, § 1608.
Prejudice to an absent party has been held to arise from res judicata that would
seriously affect its rights. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 518
F.2d 292, 295-96 (10th Cir. 1975). Additionally, res judicata is not strictly required
where that would be the practical effect. WRIGHT, supra note 329, § 1608.
332. These parties are usually denominated "indispensable." However, the analysis
does not use indispensability as its starting point - rather, the court considers whether
the action should, in equity and good conscience, be dismissed or allowed to continue in
their absence, upon a review of all of the circumstances. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 390 U.S. at 125; WRIGHT, supra note 329, § 1607.
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mentalities3 33 are partly liable14 but cannot be reached under
governing law,335 or in which the United States Government may
be considered wholly or partially accountable, 36 but is shielded
by immunity.3 7
The impact of a determination of governmental responsibil-
ity upon international nuclear liability of private defendants is
as multifaceted as other aspects of the private law approaches to
the problem. Regardless of the bases of official responsibility,
substantive and jurisdictional immunity may stand as obstacles
to the imposition of liability. The foregoing are means that may
be brought to bear to place the rightful portion of the burden
upon the public sector.
E. Other Defense Issues
In addition to the protections discussed in the preceding
section that exist by virtue of governmental involvement in
transnational nuclear development, other more traditional mat-
ters of defense merit mention.38
1. Causation in Fact
There is no facet of the law of tort that is more elemental,
333. The idea developed in this paragraph might also be applied to foreign private
defendants, although in most instances where they may be liable, there would be a basis
for jurisdiction over them in United States courts. See supra notes 69-71 and accompa-
nying text.
334. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
Dismissal was ordered in Liman v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 309 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), where a foreign defendant was beyond the reach of the court, but was essential to
a proper adjudication, and an adequate remedy existed in the form of a suit pending
overseas. Although the defendant in Liman was not a government or official instrumen-
tality, there is no reason why the same joinder rules should not operate, for example,
with regard to an absent foreign government which cannot be reached under the FSIA.
The Court in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
109 (1968), pronounced that mandatory joinder rules might be employed in actions
where necessary parties were not subject to jurisdiction. See also WRIGHT, supra note
329, § 1607.
336. See supra notes 248-87 and accompanying text regarding liability of the United
States.
337. Courts have dismissed actions where the United States Government was
deemed an indispensable party by virtue of its shared responsibility for an occurrence,
but was not amenable to suit. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371
(1945); Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S.
232 (1973).
338. Liability apportionment on the basis of comparative fault will be discussed sep-
arately infra notes 381-410 and accompanying text.
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and more often taken for granted in legal analysis, than the re-
quirement of causation in fact.33 9 In the case of injury to people
and the environment arising from the radiation release of a nu-
clear plant disaster, commentators have observed that causation
in fact poses one of the prime tests of any system that would
attempt redress.34 °
Conclusive proof is usually practically impossible,34 1 espe-
cially with regard to the latent, delayed pathologic injuries that
may be expected in the wake of a nuclear accident.342 Thus, as-
sessment based on well-founded assumptions must be done, with
traditional methodologies thereby supplanted. The question of
causation in fact has not been actually confronted in any of the
legal orders, national343 or international,344 which attempt to
339. For a helpful comprehensive discussion, see Richard W. Wright, Causation in
Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985). For application to environmental risks and toxic
torts, see also Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis
to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation,
35 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1983); Ora F. Harris Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation
Element: Is There Any Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909 (1986).
340. See generally Norbert Pelzer, Current Problems of Nuclear Liability Law in
the Post-Chernobyl Period, ENERGEWIRTSCHAFTLIcE TAGESFRAGEN (January 1987), in 39
NUCLEAR L. BULL. 66 (OECD Secretariat trans., 1987); Berthold Moser, Proof of Damage
from Ionizing Radiation, OSTERREICHISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG No. 3 (February 1986), re-
printed in 38 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 70 (1986); John V. Buffington, The Price-Anderson Act:
Underwriting the Ultimate Tort, 87 DICK. L. REV. 679 (1983); NRC/DOE Reports, supra
note 180.
341. Proof is difficult in this and other areas, such as litigation involving nuclear
weapons testing, Agent Orange, and other toxic damage; see infra notes 342-52 and ac-
companying text.
. The principal culprits are those of indeterminate and indeterminable causes. That
is, similar injuries can be caused (albeit less severely) by non-nuclear causes and from
radiation from other than nuclear sources, such as medical treatment and even the sun.
See Pelzer, supra note 340. This is especially true of cancer, which is among the most
prevalent types of harm likely to result; see also MERCK MANUAL, supra note 17, at ch.
257.
342. See Moser, supra note 340. See also MERCK MANUAL, supra note 17; Windscale
Accident: 24-Year Perspective, 120 Sci. NEWS 152 (Sept. 5, 1981).
343. See supra notes 182-209, 234-46 and accompanying text. See also Jeffrey C.
Bodie, Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside Price-Anderson, 6
ENVTL. L. 859, 859-63 (1976). There has, however, been legislation introduced in Con-
gress in the occupational field that would modify burdens of proof with presumptions of
causality, or create probabilistic methods of demonstration based upon data such as De-
partment of Health and Human Services "radioepidemological tables" to correlate radia-
tion dosages with the probability of cancer.
Elsewhere, there have been judge-made modifications to causation requirements in
Austria and Germany, requiring only that a link between radiation injury and disease
not be excluded, and holding that asserted contributing causes can only be considered if
approximately equal in importance. See Moser, supra note 340. In addition, a lone legis-
lative attempt to tackle the issue has been made in Austria, where the Atomhaftp-
576
1992] NUCLEAR CIVIL LIABILITY
govern nuclear third party liability. This failure to confront is
due, it may be supposed, to the novel and complicated problems
posed.
A fitting and competent treatment of causation in litigation
involving nuclear damage will require some means of easing the
requirements of proof of origin of injury. This is not a methodol-
ogy unknown to tort law, and there are models which may be
adapted to the task. The more familiar techniques are those con-
cerning multiple defendants; 45 in that category traditions of
joint and several liability3 4 have been aptly supplanted by pre-
sumption and burden-shifting constructs.347
flichtgesetz (Nuclear Liability Act) provides that in case of injury from nuclear energy
used for peaceful purposes, a set of presumptions will be allowed, based upon certain
factual scenarios, and rebuttable on the basis of probability. Moser, supra note 340, at
79-81.
344. Under the international treaties, see supra notes 170-81 and accompanying
text, there is no uniform set of guidelines, and the issue is left to the individual courts.
Thus a national of a country with accepted forensic degrees of radiation exposure may be
subject to having causation issues resolved under differing criteria of the state in which
the occurrence took place. See Pelzer, supra note 340, at 69. Intermittently, there have
been talks under way within the IAEA, World Health Organization, European Commu-
nity, and OECD with the aim of fixing internationally-agreed "intervention levels." Pel-
zer, supra note 340, at 69.
345. In the instant case, multiple defendants include states, operators, suppliers, in-
surers, and perhaps others. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
346. See generally KEETON, supra note 245, §§ 41, 52.
Recognizing the potential for disproportionality inherent in the joint and several
method, courts began to create techniques whereby apportionment among defendants
might be attempted without undue prejudice to plaintiffs. The early benchmark applica-
tions usually noted are Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948) and Ybarra v. Spangard,
154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944), in which the burden was shifted to the alleged tortfeasors to
divide responsibility among themselves, once a related injury had been shown.
347. The approach in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948), was further refined
in such cases as Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980), in which responsibility was placed upon multiple manufacturers, many of whom
had no connection in fact to the occurrence, but as to which the plaintiff was unable to
distinguish. The defendants thus bore liability based upon a market share among those
who could not exculpate themselves and were before the court. 607 P.2d at 937. The use
of presumptions to augment proof has surfaced in at least one foreign radiation injury
case; see Judgment of Feb. 10, 1966, Cass. Soc., Dame Majori v. Commissariat a l'Energie
Atomique (Fr.).
A further model with potential for future application establishes causation based
upon statistical evidence of increased risk, apportions responsibility among defendants
according to the percentage of harm thus attributed to a defendant's activity, and uses
class actions to achieve collectivized damages awards for administration and distribution.
See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984); see generally PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTER IN THE COURTS (1987) for a discussion of
the approaches that might have been taken to the issue in the Agent Orange litigation.
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Causation in fact with respect to multiple or indeterminate
plaintiffs is a further complication, due to the prospect of mass
tort injury on a heretofore unenvisioned scale, 348 and the more
confounding because of the deviation from orthodox modes it
seems to require. 49 The most serviceable approach in the in-
stant context will permit statistical rather than specific evidence
of causation,350 and a ratable sharing of damage award among
injured plaintiffs. 351 The probable case, which will involve multi-
ple defendants, multiple and indeterminate plaintiffs, and multi-
ple potential causes, portends complexity and administration
tasks on ani unprecedented scale. While not beyond the capacity
of courts using modern analytic and data management tech-
niques, these requirements are also an eloquent argument for an
institutionalized global compensatory system.
2. Legal Causation and Forseeability
An area almost certain to be the subject of controversy in
any dispute concerning a nuclear energy mishap will be whether
a given defendant ought to be held liable for an occurrence -
the notion legal systems have named "legal cause" or "proxi-
mate causation. 3 5 2 This concept, sine qua non to responsibility
for any tort or delict, is not really a matter of causation except
in the precursory sense, but rather reflects a policy limiting lia-
bility.3 53 Although they are expressed in circumlocutory terms35 4
348. One of the first examples was the difficulty of demonstrating that any of the
plaintiffs in the Agent Orange litigation were actually injured by the herbicide, due to
the variety of claimed illnesses which might have been due to numerous other causes.
See SCHUCK, supra note 347, at 185, 271.
349. That is, it is one thing to say there has been an identified person harmed by
the act of a discrete grouping of tortfeasors and thus public policy requires the latter to
adjust among themselves the onus of recompense, but it is quite another to say numer-
ous causes (including perhaps even natural ones) may have contributed to injuries to a
large and perhaps incompletely-defined assemblage of persons and to require the par-
tially responsible wrongdoers to bear the same onus.
At least one worthy effort has been made at systematic analysis of the problem. See
Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REv. 881 (1982), for an instructive in-depth treatment.
350. See Delgado, supra note 349, at 884-899; Rosenberg, supra note 347, at 881-87,
for a discussion of drawbacks, advocating a "public law" proportional-based recovery.
351. Such an apportionment model is a key ingredient of the theoretical proposals
thus far advanced, see, e.g. Delgado, supra note 349, at 900, and has been given practical
application in the Agent Orange settlement. See ScHucK, supra note 347, at 45.
352. See KEETON, supra note 245, § 41; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
(1965) (discussing the idea specifically as it relates to abnormally dangerous activities).
353. KEETON, supra note 245, § 41 at 263.
354. Among the constructs under which legal or proximate cause has been articu-
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and have eluded concise formulation or even coherent applica-
tion,355 legal and proximate cause are solidly recognized in legal
systems worldwide. 56
The working proximate cause doctrine has numerous facets,
two of which merit separate mention in the setting of a transna-
tional nuclear accident. The first is foreseeability, 57 because it is
a serviceable analytic device to limit responsibility for unusually
hazardous activities. Where liability is imposed without fault
due to the nature of the operation, the solution usually is to
limit it to harm within the risk of the enterprise; 358 this question
again amounts to legal policy,3 59 and bears directly on other legal
lated, the two most prominent appear to be duty and foreseeability, but it appears the
conventional wisdom is that most expressive attempts end up at the same destination.
355. In the United States, it is not certain whether proximate causation should be
viewed as a question for resolution by the court or the trier of fact. Although Professor
Keeton, supra note 245, § 41, concludes that the dominant persuasion in United States
courts favors submission to the jury due to reasonable differences of opinion as to for-
seeability and reasonableness, opposing views have been asserted vigorously in LEON
GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 122-27 (1927); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL
CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 49-60 (1963).
356. Despite equivalency theories of liability following from responsibility in
solidum under the civil law, see supra note 49, legal cause is used as a means of liability
limitation, as in the United States, based upon implicit policy considerations more nor-
mative than causal. See 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARA-
TIVE LAW 295-96 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987); I.F.H. LAWSON & B.S. MARKESINIS,
ToRTious LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND Civn. LAW 118-
19 (1982) [hereinafter LAWSON & MARKESINIs]; A.M. Honor6, Causation and Remoteness
of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW "TORTS" ch. 7
(1971).
Concerning the common law outside the United States, see generally JOHN G. FLEM-
ING, LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1983); RODNEY A. PERCY, CHARLESWORTH & PERCY ON NEGLI-
GENCE (7th ed. 1983); CLERK, supra note 228.
The multinational treaties concerning civil liability also recognize the concept by
their exclusions for incidents arising from certain stated events, such as armed conflict,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection, or grave natural disasters of an exceptional charac-
ter. These are found in the Paris Convention, supra note 170, art. 9, the Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 170, art. IV and Brussels 1962 Convention, supra note 170, art. VIII.
357. See KEETON, supra note 245, § 42 at 279; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
435 (1965).
Foreseeability is considered as subsumed within the civil law notions of "adequate
cause" or "legal cause," to the same end. See LAWSON & MARKESINIS, supra note 356, at
121, 134; Honor6, supra note 356; ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 356.
As to the common law, see generally FLEMING, supra note 356, PERCY, supra note
356 and CLERK, supra note 228.
358. See H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 286 (2d ed. 1985);
CLERK, supra note 228, at 1207-08, regarding common law, and LAWSON & MARKESINIS,
supra note 356, at 143-44, concerning civil law.
359. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965), considering "legal cause,"
posits two "contrasting" theories: first, the scope of liability should extend no farther
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cause issues.3s With specific regard to nuclear power, the taxo-
nomic range of predictable harm is wide indeed,6 1 so unmixed
foreseeability is unlikely to stand as a meaningful defense.
The second, and more significant for present purposes, as-
pect of legal or proximate cause is supervening cause. 82 This
mechanism permits legal responsibility to be nullified even
though fault or other bases of liability might otherwise be attrib-
uted to a defendant.6 3 Supervening cause theory entails the
same analysis and considerations as other dimensions of legal or
proximate cause, but the most frequent inquiry concerns the ex-
pectedness of the event - if it can be anticipated, liability will
exist nevertheless. 36 4 The context of international nuclear inci-
than foreseeable risks, i.e., those by reason of which the actor's conduct is held to be
negligent, or second, to all direct consequences or those indirect consequences which are
foreseeable. A better illustration of the nebulousness of the normative noodling which
always occurs in this area could scarcely be drawn. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
431 (1965).
As to the common law outside the United States, see W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND
JOLOWICZ ON TORTS 447-48 (12th ed. 1984) [hereinafter ROGERS], and for the civil law see
LAWSON & MARKESINIS, supra note 356, at 119.
360. See infra notes 363-69 and accompanying text regarding supervening cause.
361. All systems seem to express the matter in terms of recognizing liability for risks
the tortfeasor's conduct makes more probable. See KEETON, supra note 245, at 273; LAW-
SON & MARKESINIS, supra note 356, at 121-23; FLEMING, supra note 356, at 199; CLERK,
supra note 228, at 521-24.
One author puts it thus regarding nuclear energy: "A choice of behavior requires
balancing the costs of safer action times the likelihood of a perceived danger against the
magnitude of potential injury; it follows that operators of nuclear plants are expected to
take the most stringent safety precautions as a matter of course, because even if the
likelihood of a mishap is slight, enormous damage is bound to be the result." Banks
McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of Responsibility and
Remoteness, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 286, 295 (1986).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1965) cites "atomic" energy is
an example of an activity from which the risk of harm cannot be removed by taking
precautions and the exercise of the utmost care.
362. Again, the terminology is multifarious; it is often said that an "intervening"
cause "supersedes" liability, thereby becoming a "supervening" cause, hence the
appellation.
363. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 245, at 29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
440 (1965); LAWSON & MARKESINIS, supra note 356, at 127-28; FLEMING, supra note 356,
at 192, for general explication of the various systems' approaches.
Supervening cause and its interpretation are a component of the liability regimen
established under multinational treaties with respect to third-party nuclear liability, as
discussed supra notes 169-72.
364. Examples might be recurring natural phenomena, predictable negligence of
others, or even interfering intentional or criminal acts one might reasonably anticipate,
See KEETON, supra note 245, at 303-05; FLEMING, supra note 356, at 199; LAWSON &
MARKESINIS, supra note 356, at 129. See also infra notes 369-75 regarding terrorism and
other intentional acts of third parties.
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dents suggests consideration of two specific subjects: governmen-
tal regulatory failure, and terrorism.
A defalcation on the part of the government in whose terri-
tory the nuclear installation is located would lead directly to the
question of supervening cause. It has often been recognized that
the prospect of such official malfeasance is far from remote, se5
and thus a court might well disallow the defense and hold a
manufacturer or supplier accountable notwithstanding. In such
an event, a United States defendant would desire in turn to
recoup some or all of its outlay by way of contribution or indem-
nity,36  but would -find it difficult to do so.367 The solution
needed to avoid this incomplete circle is to adjust liability
among those responsible, whether or not before the court. 68
The most portentous issues concerning intervening cause,
both as a theoretical and practical matter, concern nuclear ter-
rorism. 369 Not only will it pose difficult questions concerning al-
365. See supra note 282 and accompanying text regarding relative lack of expertise
of foreign officials in the area of nuclear energy management. Although the full extent
may never by known, it is widely considered that official bungling contributed to inferior
design in causing the Chernobyl accident. See Malcolm W. Browne, The 1986 Disaster at
Chernobyl: A Year Later, Lessons are Drawn, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1987, at 1.
There is also some question that governmental regulatory failure was in large part to
blame for the disaster at Bhopal, India in 1984, or at least the enormity of the injury and
suffering caused. See Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little has Happened in
India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 273, 277 (1985); Rajeev Dhavan, For
Whom? And For What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, id. at 295, 302-
03; Weinberg, supra note 132, at 316. See also Stuart Diamond, 1982 Inspection Says
Indian Plant Was Below U.S. Safety Standards, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12,' 1984, at Al.
366. The United States defendant might also be entitled to do so pursuant to an
indemnification clause in an agreement with the foreign government. See supra note 300
and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text regarding amenability to juris-
diction and substantive immunity of foreign governments. See also supra notes 297-99
and accompanying text regarding act of state doctrine.
Dhavan, supra note 365, at 303, and Galanter, supra note 365, at 286, report that
the Government of India asserted sovereign immunity in the form of "diplomatic privi-
lege" in connection with the tragedy at Bhopal.
368. See infra notes 381-410 and accompanying text regarding apportionment of lia-
bility and comparative fault.
In Weinberg, supra note 132, at 316, the author refers to the asserted impunity of
foreign governments from suit in United States courts in the case of international calam-
ities involving official regulatory malfeasance as "the problem of the empty chair," and
suggests apportionment of damages liability as the only workable solution. Application of
this theory under United States law is discussed in Leonard E. Eilbacher, Comparative
Fault and the Nonparty Tortfeasor, 17 IND. L. REv. 903 (1984).
369. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
Of course, "terrorism" defies concise delineation or definition. The term is employed
herein to refer broadly to the intentional violent acts of disaffected or renegade groups or
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location of responsibility, but it is likely to aggravate the juris-
dictional and choice of law complications of international
litigation. Because of the exclusion of intentional or hostile acts
causing nuclear incidents from the purview of international
agreements 30 and the laws of most nations, 371 lawsuits under
traditional rules may result regardless of where an incident oc-
curs, where terrorism is a cause.
At one level, whether a terrorist act precipitating a nuclear
accident absolves defendants of responsibility may be said to
rest upon foreseeability and the traditional legal or proximate
cause calculus.3 72 Thereunder, the type of attack would be rele-
vant,3 73 and arguments in favor of foreseeability might be force-
fully advanced: In addition to a manufacturer's arguable duty to
build so as to withstand some level of assault, the well-recog-
nized and much-discussed dangers involved make nuclear facili-
ties tempting targets. 74
But even if some such terrorist attacks might be "foresee-
individuals directed at nuclear energy facilities, and motivated either by political or non-
political goals.
370. The multinational treaties, drafted before an entirely different historical and
political backdrop from that of today, completely exclude from coverage liability for
damage caused by an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection. See the
Paris Convention, supra note 170, art. 9; Geneva Convention, supra note 170, art. IV.
371. Unlike the United States, see supra note 196 and accompanying text, most na-
tions patterning their laws after the multinational treaties have the same exclusions from
liability as set forth supra note 370. Exceptions are The Federal Republic of Germany
Atomic Energy Act VII (10) 1985, BGB1.I at 781, reprinted in 36 NUCLEAR L. BULL.'
Supp. at 3, (1985), and Switzerland Law on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, FF 12,
Vol. I, at 1171 (1983).
Similarly, nations whose laws do not necessarily follow the conventions provide like
restrictions. For example, Japan's Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Minpo, Law No.
147 of 1961, translated in 11 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 39, 43 (1973) provides an exclusion for
damages for injury caused by "serious social disturbance."
In addition, many countries have no laws whatever dealing with third party or civil
liability for nuclear accident injury. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 352-68 and accompanying text.
It would seem that intentionally hostile acts on any sort of powerful scale would
naturally be regarded as unforeseeable supervening causes. Cf. In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 646 F. Supp. 30 (D.D.C. 1986), holding that even if the United
States Government had breached some duty to the passengers of KAL Flight 007, the
action of the Soviet Air Defense Ministry was a superseding event which insulated it
from liability.
373. The idea here is that a relatively minor assault might be something for which a
manufacturer or designer could be held responsible, whereas an attack by a massive force
might not. This could be resolved perhaps through foreseeability analysis, or could be a
question of fault, i.e. whether a facility was negligently designed, or unreasonably
dangerous.
374. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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able," it seems fundamentally inequitable to impose liability in
most cases 5 upon outside suppliers, manufacturers and cooper-
ating states. Instead, legal responsibility should rest upon the
home government which chose the pursuit of nuclear energy.
The proper placement of burden suggests dual policy inquiries:
The first concerns the contours of United States public or pri-
vate liability; 7 ' the other examines the basis and extent of home
country official liability." As to the latter, while norms of inter-
national law appear to establish legal accountability so far as
they apply,"' significant doctrinal obstacles exist to doing so
under national laws379 in United States courts.8 '
F. Liability Apportionment and Comparative Fault
The issues in the preceding passages are so far unresolved
under existing apparatuses, and overlap so thoroughly from an
application standpoint, that they all require assistance in the
375. Obviously it is not unjust if the precipitating cause is something that ought to
have been guarded against in design and manufacture.
376. See supra notes 48-54, 248-85 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text regarding governmental de-
fendants.
378. Under international law, liability seems'settled as a matter of state responsibil-
ity, but this would operate only as to injuries and damage caused outside the borders of
the nation where the facility is located, and to aliens within its territory.
This also applies specifically to a state's liability for acts of persons and instrumen-
talities within its jurisdiction, which appears to arise from a duty of due diligence in
control of private persons. See 1 IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEI OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 161, 180 (1983); ALONA E. EVANS & JOHN F. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 567-70 (1978); Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L.
REV. 217, 221 (1977); but see also Hazem Attain, National Liberation Movements and
International Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSmIITY
35 (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
See also supra notes 303-10 regarding other theories of state responsibility under
international law.
379. Under municipal law elsewhere, governments are increasingly subject to private
law rules of liability. See, e.g., RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW 104 (1972). In addition, enact-
ments specifically concerning nuclear energy, where applicable, provide for shifting of
responsibility to the state under defined circumstances. See supra notes 234-37 and ac-
companying text. However, under United States law, no cases have expressly ruled on
the issue. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Note, The Responsibility of States for Private Acts of International Terrorism, 1 TEMP.
INT'L & Comp. L.J. 69 (1985).
380. It will be recalled that under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988), a counterclaim
may be the only means whereby jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign state or
official instrumentality in this context. Moreover, immunity and the federal "act of state
doctrine" may be at least comparable barriers. See also supra notes 265-71, 297-99 and
accompanying text.
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form of apportionment of responsibility among involved entities,
whether or not present before the court, through a comparative
fault approach.38 This simply means the allocation of liability
under laws382 which operate beyond contributory fault or contri-
bution and indemnity. 33
Under the comparative fault theory, both liability and re-
covery would be reduced by the proportion of fault of an in-
volved person or entity, even though the latter is insulated by
lack of jurisdiction3 84 or immunity.3 8 5 Although used in some
perhaps analogous contexts,386 this concept has not been directly
381. Some form of comparative fault system is in effect in the great majority of
states in the United States. KEETON, supra note 245, at 39.
There is considerable variation among the comparative fault (sometimes called
"comparative negligence") statutes among the states. In some, comparative rules have
altered joint and several liability. See Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir.
1987) (applying Lousiana law); Paul E. Swan, Note, Comparative Negligence: The Role
of the Absent Tortfeasor in Oklahoma, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 815 (1981). In others, joint and
several liability has remained unchanged. See Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205
(9th Cir. 1979) (applying California law).
At the same time, the problem of the absent defendant is also beginning to be ad-
dressed legislatively. In New York, the Civil Practice Law and Rules limit liability for
non-economic loss to an equitable share if a given defendant is not more than 50% lia-
ble, and allows the culpable conduct of a person not party to the action to be considered
unless the claimant proves that with due diligence the person could not be included; with
some significant exceptions, this applies also to claims for contribution and indemnity.
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1601, 1602 (McKinney's Supp. 1986).
It should be noted that this approach ties in well with legal causation analysis
which, after all, has as its driving logic the shifting of responsibility from one defendant
to another. See KEEToN, supra note 245, at 279.
382. The laws of the various states of the United States will be applied to allocation
of fault in diversity of citizenship actions. See Mullan v. United States, 797 F.2d 845, 848
(10th Cir. 1986); Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1979). But in
Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (10th Cir. 1983), the court refused to give
effect to the Kansas law of comparative fault, holding it "procedural" and "not outcome-
determinative" and thus not binding on federal courts. Under the choice of law princi-
ples discussed supra notes 211-30 and accompanying text, as well as the practice in this
and other circuits, this would appear questionable and unlikely to be followed.
As regards foreign law, in civil law jurisdictions it has uniformly been the practice to
apportion damages based upon proportion of fault. KEETON, supra note 245, at 435.
Many common law and commonwealth countries have adopted a similar rule by statute,
the bellwether of which was the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act,
1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 30, part II (Eng.). FLEMING, supra note 356, at 435; DIAs &
MARKESINIS, supra note 221, at 438-39.
383. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text regarding jursidiction over for-
eign governments and instrumentalities.
385. This issue will more likely arise if United States law is applied, because of the
limited character of sovereign immunity under the laws of most other countries. See
supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
386. The reported federal decisions involve not only immune defendants, but those
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applied to a mass disaster case;387 under prevailing interpreta-
tions the legal responsibility of an absent or immune actor must
be borne by the remaining defendants, and liability may still ex-
ceed culpability.
1. Contributory and Comparative Fault and the Responsible
Government
Defenses based upon the conduct of a plaintiff are, of
course, established in the law of the United States, 8s as well as
civil 389 and other common law390 systems; they apply not only to
negligence, delict and similar theories, but to liability without
fault as well.391 Where liability is asserted against United States
who are absent for other reasons, such as insolvency or bankruptcy, having settled with
plaintiffs, or failure of the requisite statutory notice to commence suit. The largest cate-
gory concerns employers immune from separate suit by virtue of workers' compensation
laws.
387. Due no doubt to the intricacies normally present and the relatively nascent
state of comparative fault law, the decisions applying it (particularly if cases involving
workers' compensation are separated out) have proceeded on narrow bases and treated
the subject gingerly. See, e.g., Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983)
(declining to apply state comparative fault law on "jurisdictional" and choice of law
grounds); Stearns v. Johns Manville, 770 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985) (unnecessary to resolve
issue of numerous absent defendants because comparative fault not applicable to strict
liability).
It has been held that judgments obtained by plaintiffs could be reduced by the fault
of an absent settling defendant. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir.
1990). But see Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1979). See also
generally Richard N. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault
Laws: An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REv. 343 (1980).
388. See supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text. Comparative fault has sup-
planted contributory negligence and its associated rules, to varying degrees, in most
states. See KEETON, supra note 245, at 477.
389. "Fault of the injured party" is a concept of long standing under civil codes; it is
broader than common-law contributory negligence, and includes not only contemporane-
ous .but also subsequent fault. But it also typically provides for allocation of damages
based on proportion of fault. KEETON, supra note 245, at 470; LAWSON & MARKESINIS,
supra note 356, at 364; Pierre Catala & John Antony Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in
Parallel, 39 TUL. L. REv. 701, 758 (1965).
390. The historic common law rule that required an incident to be the fault of one
party or the other, leading to contributory negligence and its accompanying corollaries,
has been modified nearly everywhere by legislation, such as the Law Reform (Contribu-
tory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo., 6, ch. 28 (Eng.) providing for adjustment in
recovery based upon proportionate degrees of fault. LAWSON & MARKEsINIs, supra note
356, at 74; ROGERS, supra note 359, at 150.
391. In the United States, most jurisdictions have allowed "comparative negligence"
to be applied to strict liability actions. KEETON, supra note 245, at 478. Civil law systems
generally apply the same apportionment calculus whether or not the defendant is
charged with fault. LAWSON & MARKESINIS, supra note 356, at 133. The scope of legal
excuse based upon the fault of plaintiff has been widened in recent years in common-law
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defendants 92 in the wake of a transnational nuclear incident
causing massive injury and losses, contributory fault would seem
to apply as a matter of course. And there is no reason why it
could not operate where a government itself is plaintiff," 3 or if
private plaintiffs are deemed partially at fault. 3 4 However, it
presents severe difficulties where it is most likely to be used -
against groups of individual foreign claimants whose own gov-
ernment should bear partial responsibility.395
The efficacy of contributory fault to shift responsibility, in
whole or part, to the government owning and operating the nu-
clear facility depends upon two questions: First, to what extent
ought the mistakes of that government reduce individual claims
on the part of its nationals?96 Second, what legal means may be
brought to bear in order to do so?
With respect to the first inquiry, despite the likelihood of
reduction in compensation to innocent injured persons, claims of
nationals of the operating country should not be allowed against
countries to encompass liability without fault. DIAS & MARKESINIS, supra note 221, at
364-66; ROGERS, supra note 359, at 446.
For a discussion in the products liability context, see generally FREEDMAN, supra
note 239.
392. This discussion posits, of course, that there is some basis for legal responsibility
on the part of one or more United States parties. If there is not, as for example when the
act or omission of a foreign party is regarded as the sole factual or legal cause, then there
would be no reason for the matter ever to arise.
393. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
394. It is assumed that hardly ever would an issue of individual plaintiffs' personal
negligence be present in the case of a disaster at a nuclear power plant causing wide-
spread injury. If it somehow were, it could affect the workings of comparative fault laws,
not only by reducing the recovery of plaintiffs, but also concerning whether the liability
of multiple defendants would otherwise be joint and several, and whether plaintiffs bear
a proportionate share of the fault that would otherwise be assigned to an absent or im-
mune defendant. See Austin v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 841 F.2d 1184 (1st Cir. 1988); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. i (1965); Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d
1176 (5th Cir. 1987); Swan, supra note 381, at 815, regarding law of Oklahoma. This
additional complexity is not wholly theoretical, however, as the present discussion will
demonstrate.
395. If the plaintiffs' government is deemed to share in the fault, then it seems con-
ceptually and morally correct to limit the government's own recovery. But it is trouble-
some to restrict redress to the extent the government is considered to sue on behalf of its
people, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Is it worse to allow a negligent
government to escape its share of culpability or to penalize its innocent citizens? Is it
possible to cut finely enough in order to avoid doing one or the other?
396. The problem is only apparently compounded when the claimant is not of the
nationality or otherwise under the control and protection of the responsible state; then,
no issue of the rectitude of imputation is present, and the matter becomes one simply of
assigning proportional liability to those responsible. In crude terms, it might be said that
the plaintiff is considered to have come to the risk.
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United States defendants to the extent their own government's
failures contributed to the disaster. This should operate not only
on claims by the government on behalf of its citizens,3 97 but also
their individual claims. In both cases, a government's recognized
responsibility for the protection and well-being of those within
its boundaries provides a legitimate basis to assign liability to it
for all injuries to its nationals and residents that may be traced
to fault on its part. This is so even though the losses are individ-
ualized and those persons are entirely blameless. There is simply
no reason why that government ought not bear its share of the
liability, regardless of the vehicle by which the claims are
brought. 9
The question becomes, then, what legal means exist to re-
duce the liability of United States defendants to reflect the pro-
portional culpability of foreign governments or their instrumen-
talities. 99 There would seem to be two general contributory
fault approaches - contribution and direct offset.
Contribution is one means whereby a party held liable to
satisfy a damages award might recover a share from another re-
sponsible party.400 However, its effectiveness against foreign gov-
ernments and official entities is doubtful, due to the jurisdic-
tional,4 °' immunity4°2 and judgment enforcement403 problems
397. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text regarding the doctrine of parens
patriae and the assertion by a government of the rights of its citizens thereunder.
If a parens patriae suit is brought by the government, and recovery is denied or
reduced, the effect on the well-being of the people is direct and palpable. Nevertheless,
the result is both logically correct and just, due to the "quasi-sovereign" nature of the
rights being asserted (i.e. those for which the government is responsible for the benefit of
all its nationals).
398. It will be recalled that in a proper case, the Government of the United States
might be held to account for injuries that are the consequences of the acts of its citizens
under principles of "state responsibility." See supra notes 303-10 and accompanying
text. In light of this, it would seem unjust for the government which owns the facility
and chose to embark upon the course of development of nuclear energy not to be made
responsible for its own errors.
399. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text regarding foreign private
defendants.
400. It will be recalled that multiple responsible parties will be held jointly and sev-
erally liable (or liable in solido) for harm caused, and each may be called upon to satisfy
the entire award. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Theories under which legal
responsibility may be reduced by the proportional fault of another party by another
means, such as reducing recovery by plaintiff against any one defendant, are yet to be
fully developed. See supra notes 382-87 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text regarding jurisdiction over for-
eign states and instrumentalities. This problem would not, of course, be present in a suit
involving a foreign government as co-plaintiff, but the government may, for a variety of
reasons, including strategic ones, absent itself from the proceedings. See infra note 409.
402. See supra notes 82-93, 292-97 and accompanying text regarding immunity of
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posed. A direct offset against claims by a foreign government
will pose different 40 4 but comparable hindrances. Because it is
unlikely individual plaintiffs would be at fault,405 and there is no
established basis for imputing defalcations of governments to
their nationals,406 contributory fault would seemingly affect only
direct claims of foreign governments and instrumentalities in
their own right.0 7 Only a fraction of the likely demands for re-
lief would then be affected. This situation might be addressed
by expanding the rights of foreign governments to assert the
claims of their citizens in United States courts and then in turn
reducing the recovery by the amount the foreign government is
at fault.408 Such a structure portends uncertain results, 409 how-
foreign governments and instrumentalities.
403. See infra notes 415-26 and accompanying text.
404. In this connection, recall the counterclaim exception to the FSIA under United
States law, which can surmount both jurisdictional and immunity obstacles. 28 U.S.C.
1607 (1988). See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
The fault likely to be asserted would be in the form of inadequate operation or
supervision, or other "regulatory failure" on the part of the government in whose terri-
tory the facility is located. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. For a chronicle of
the same problem as it has affected litigation in the wake of the Union Carbide disaster,
see Galanter, supra note 365, at 277.
It is remotely possible that a defense in the nature of assumption of risk could be
posed, the theory being that the plaintiffs assumed the hazard by living in the proximity
of the reactor. However, in view of the wide area that might be affected by the discharge
of massive amounts of radiation, and the consensual nature of this defense, it would not
likely be held applicable. See KEETON, supra note 245, at 478.
406. See supra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
407. It will be recalled that under United States law, a foreign government may
assert only a limited class of claims related to its "quasi-sovereign" interests, and not
those of its individual citizens. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
408. In view of the likelihood that the regulatory failures of the Indian Government
may have played a role in the disaster at Bhopal, this idea of expanding the rights of
foreign governments to assert the claims of their citizens has been urged in Lisa F. But-
ler, Comment, Parens Patriae Representation in Transnational Crises: The Bhopal
Tragedy, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 175 (1987). The contrary is argued in Lisa M. Hawkes,
Note, Parens Patriae and the Union Carbide Case: The Disaster at Bhopal Continues,
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181 (1988), in which the author asserts that participation of the
Indian Government on behalf of the people individually not only would violate United
States law requirements as to parties plaintiff, but in fact hindered the settlement of the
litigation.
409. If the risk of wholesale judicial imputation of fault to its nationals through its
presence as parens patriae is present, the government may simply forego assertion of its
quasi-sovereign claims, or raise them in a separate forum, as a matter of strategy.
It could also attempt to walk the legal tightrope of rendering assistance to its peo-
ple, as by class action sponsorship, without being a party of record, and thus pose an
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ever, and the central issue of ultimate accountability will still
not have been frontally addressed.
The better solution requires transcending current legal the-
ory. The court should ascertain the proportion of damage and
injury attributable to the acts or omissions of the operating gov-
ernment, in frank recognition of its paramount obligations to its
people when it chooses the path of nuclear development. This
should be accompanied by the application of comparative fault
to reduce the recovery of plaintiffs against United States de-
fendants.410 An added benefit that may flow from this approach
is the incentive foreign governments would have to seek to par-
ticipate by way of intervention, in order to be allowed to make
presentations in support of their interests and those of their na-
tionals. Until, however, an international responsibility regimen
can be established to supply marshalled resources and jurisdic-
tional unity in the wake of nuclear disaster, the foregoing ap-
proach is only systemically just under the law of nations, and
conforms to accepted principles of moral responsibility.
IV. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
UNITED STATES COURTS
Despite the advantages to plaintiffs in bringing suit in the
United States,41' litigation concerning a massive nuclear acci-
dent in another country may be carried on elsewhere, for quite
sufficient reasons. 1 2 If a compensation award by a foreign tribu-
nal is not satisfied abroad,15 then laws governing the enforce-
additional dilemma for the court to resolve.
410. See supra notes 381-98 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
Since the problems of international liability for nuclear injury have begun to be con-
sidered, it has been recognized that enforceability of judgments would be among the
foremost benefits to foreign parties in United States courts. See HARVARD STUDY, supra
note 98.
412. Among other things, a United States court may determine the lawsuit should
be transferred on the grounds of forum non conveniens or may decline to hear it as a
matter of international is pendens in order to avoid the problems of multiple and incon-
sistent results. See respectively, supra notes 109-44, 160-64 and accompanying text.
413. It is all but certain judgment creditors would find themselves in the United
States in search of reachable assets of most United States defendants.
For a useful listing summary of the practices of various nations with respect to exe-
cuting foreign judgments as well as the few multilateral conventions including the Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 18 I.L.M. 21 (1979) (as amended by the Convention of Accession), see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 491, reporters' notes
6, 7 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1983). Broadly speaking, the conditions imposed resemble
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ability of foreign judgments414 will be a central component of the
protection of United States defendants from oppressive or dis-
proportionate -liability.
A. United States Courts and Foreign Judgments in General
The United States is not a party to any international agree-
ment concerning the recognition or enforcement of foreign judg-
ments;415 there is also no domestically applicable federal enact-
ment. Accordingly, as with numerous other matters of arguably
national import, the subject is left to state law.41 ' However, com-
mon threads can be identified among the States, 417 the most im-
portant of which rest upon considerations of jurisdiction and
public policy.41
8
those found in the United States, although it is important to note that, unlike the
United States, reciprocity is a prominent requirement of the laws of many nations. See,
e.g., Japan's Minji Soshoho (Code of Civil Procedure) arts. 200, 514 & 515; Foreign Judg-
ments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch, 13 (Eng.) and Code of
Civil Procedure (ZPO) § 328 (F.R.G.).
It is also worthy of note that under the EEC Convention, a judgment against a
United States defendant in a member's courts, even if based upon "exorbitant" jurisdic-
tion, could nevertheless be entitled to enforcement against its assets in any other mem-
ber nation. See Kerr, The EEC Judgments Convention - Some Repercussions Beyond
the EEC, INT'L B. NEWS 13 (Apr./May 1981).
414. This passage is devoted to issues concerning whether such foreign judgments
should be given effect according to their terms -- that is, enforced by way of execution
simply by their introduction as juridical faits accompli. It should also be noted that in
some instances, even if refused such conclusive effect, foreign judgments might be ac-
cepted in part as evidence of matters litigated. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 492 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1983).
415. However, several of the treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation be-
tween the United States and other nations provide for the reciprocal recognition and
implementation of arbitration agreements and awards. See, e.g., Michael H. Brenscbeidt,
The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 11 INT'L LAW. 261 (1977).
416. Thus, enforcement actions would be prosecuted in state court or in federal
courts based upon diversity of citizenship. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp.', 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971).
417. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
492 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1983).
Many States have enacted the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recog-
nition Act. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. art. 53 (McKinney 1978 and 1992 Supp.).
The act in general provides for mandatory non-recognition if due process requirements
are not met or personal jurisdiction is not obtained, and sets forth other discretionary
grounds, including, inter alia, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, faulty notice, fraud,
public policy, conflict with another judgment, violation of a forum selection agreement,
or "seriously inconvenient" forum. Id.
418. One venerable constraint which has not fared well of late in the United States
is the requirement of reciprocity. See, e.g., Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440; Cowens v. Ticon-
deroga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 N.Y.S. 284, aff'd, 159 N.E. 669 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
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If a United States defendant succeeds in having an action
transferred to another tribunal on grounds of forum non con-
veniens,419 its ability to contest the-enforcement of a judgment
rendered there will, not surprisingly, be impaired. It is virtually
certain one basis for challenge will be removed by the customary
requirement to agree to the jurisdiction of the foreign court,420
and although a defendant may not be compelled to honor the
award as a condition to relocation of the case,421 it may be hard
pressed to attack a judgment rendered in the system whose effi-
cacy and fairness it championed in arguing for transfer.4 2
Difficulties in implementing decrees and awards rendered
abroad will face not only plaintiffs. Any defendant who is unsuc-
cessful in convincing a foreign court to reduce its liability due to
the responsibility of the home government or its agencies423 may
face immunity as a barrier to collecting under contribution or
indemnity outside the United States, 424 and the FSIA's limits on
enforcement of judgments against other national governments
within the United States. 425
Thus it again appears United States defendants may be well
advised to refrain from resistance to having nuclear disaster
suits brought in their home courts, despite the risks.
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 (1987). Cf. Her Majesty Queen in Right of Province of
British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979) (reciprocity is a factor
which may be taken into account even if no longer mandatory).
419. See supra notes 109-44 and accompanying text. Again, comparison to the
Union Carbide litigation is inevitable.
420. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 136 regarding the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit's disapproval of such a condition in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant
Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd in part 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, Executive Committee Members v. Union of India, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
422. Such rhetorical chickens returned to roost for Union Carbide as negotiations
progressed toward settlement and the parties skirmished in the arena of public opinion,
with the defendant being scathingly criticized for praising the Indian court system and
then in turn seeking disqualification of its judges as well as resisting its rulings. See
Stephen R. Weisman, Bhopal Suit Marches On, In Circles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1988, at
E24.
423. See supra notes 381-98 and accompanying text regarding apportionment of lia-
bility based upon comparative fault, and parties absent due to lack of jurisdiction or
immunity.
424. See supra notes 82-93, 292-97 and accompanying text regarding immunity of
foreign governments.
425. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610 and 1611 (Supp. 1992). These sections set out the limitations
on ability to execute on property of a foreign government in the United States. See also
supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text regarding FSIA.
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XVIII:2
B. Factors in Nuclear Liability Judgments
Recent experience suggests that a massive international dis-
aster of human origin, of which the nuclear accident is the ar-
chetype, will be followed by a tumultuous venting of moral, psy-
chological, and emotional forces. In such a climate, it is
problematic whether any judicial system presently constituted
would be perceived as capable of functioning at its foremost.
The enormous pressures in the aftermath of such a calamity
may portend that some courts' judgments outside the United
States ought not be given full effect in the United States against
all parties sought to be held liable.426
For one thing, it is likely that in such an emotionally-
charged setting core concepts of legal responsibility might not be
observed; this may include matters encompassed within general
notions of due process, 427 as well as other more specific items.
4 28
Relatedly, special problems would be posed by the presence of
the foreign government as plaintiff in its own courts,429 and
426. Not only would this be a factor in the United States, but also in any nation
party to a multinational agreement concerning third-party nuclear liability with respect
to a judgment rendered in a non-contracting party nation, or in a nation whose law con-
cerning limitation of liability differed greatly from its own. In addition, the problem of
multiple suits and judgments remains ever present.
427. See HARVARD STUDY, supra note 98, at 34-35.
In connection with this subtopic, the litigation surrounding the incident at Bhopal
continues to provide an instructive prototype. It was a matter of recurring concern that
the plaintiffs there would ultimately have had great difficulty executing the judgment the
Indian courts rendered. See Stephen Labaton, Bhopal Outcome: Trial is Avoided, N.Y.
Tibms, Feb. 15, 1989, at D3.
An excellent example arose in the realm of theory of liability. The Indian Govern-
ment posited that Union Carbide, as a multinational corporation (whose separate entity
existence from its Indian subsidiary was likely to have been disregarded - that being
another illustrative dimension of the problem), owed a "nondelegable duty" to be sure
its overseas activities caused no harm. From the manner in which the case evolved, espe-
cially including the order for an "interim payment" by Union Carbide of $195 million
before liability had been established, observers concluded that the government's liability
construct had been accepted. See Weisman, supra note 422, at E24.
428. For example, what weight would be given to arguments based upon force
majeure or other supervening causes such as the acts of third parties? In many other
systems, there are fewer restrictions upon the admissibility of evidence and the function
of judges differs markedly. See HARVARD STUDY, supra note 98, at 32-33.
In the Union Carbide litigation in India, a judge entered an order barring the de-
fendant from entering into any out-of-court settlement with any individual party. See
Stephen R. Weisman, New Court Setback for Carbide in Bhopal Case, N.Y. TiMES, July
1, 1988, at D3.
429. The Government of India enacted national legislation in 1985 making it the
sole legal representative of all Indian Bhopal victims, and has acted as such throughout
all negotiations leading to settlement. Such a situation has, if nothing else, the effect that
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many other defects can readily be envisioned.43 °
C. Multiple Judgments in Multiple Fora
The desire to obtain compensation for losses suffered in a
mass nuclear disaster will very probably compel plaintiffs to
seek redress in more than one forum.43 ' This may be due, for
instance, to liability limitations under domestic laws,432 tradi-
tionally lower damage awards in domestic courts,433 or, apropos
the current subtopic, the perceived need to obtain judgments
that enjoy the greatest likelihood of enforcement where assets
may be found. Conflicts between courts' judgments are among
the recognized bases for refusal to honor foreign decrees,43 4 and
this may assist United States parties in avoiding the potentially
ruinous effects of multiple and inconsistent dispositions.
It bears re-emphasis, however, that the preferable solution
is to attempt to address a priori the question of multiple judg-
ments, in the interest of systematic resolution of the important
issues presented and the just extraction of compensation from
those responsible. This might be accomplished by the careful ap-
plication of forum non conveniens,4m or international lis
pendens.4 86
In addition, steps might be taken to neutralize the incentive
for plaintiffs to bring duplicative litigation. Courts could adopt
the plaintiff would be highly vulnerable to domestic political criticism if a settlement
were seen as inadequate. See Weisman, supra note 422, at E24. In addition, the govern-
ment considered itself empowered to disregard completely the effects of any proceedings
in other courts (specifically, suits in state court in the United States) in which it was not
involved. In 1990, the Indian Government began efforts to avoid the settlement of the
previously-negotiated settlement of the litigation and reopen both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings. See Andrew Blum, Bhopal: The Case that Just Won't Go Away, NAT'L L.J.
May 21, 1990, at 15; India Seeks To Reopen Bhopal Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1990, at
Di.
By way of contrast, see also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text regarding
foreign governments as plaintiffs in United States courts.
430. In addition to the myriad procedural obstacles which may be present, there is
the prospect of domination of the judiciary by the political branches in some nations,
and that of judicial partiality, all of which loomed in the Union Carbide dispute.
431. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text regarding multiple suits.
432. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text regarding national legislation
imposing limitations upon liability, and corresponding provisions of the multilateral
treaties regarding nuclear liability.
433. See supra notes 95-99, 228 and accompanying text.
434. This is among the grounds enumerated in the Uniform Foreign-Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act in force in most States. See supra note 417.
435. See supra notes 109-44 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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choice of law principles to make uniformity of results in the
United States and elsewhere more likely.437 Or, federal legisla-
tion could be enacted that would limit recovery in United States
courts to that which injured plaintiffs could obtain in the coun-
try of occurrence.438
So long as private law mechanisms are the available tools,
United States defendants will be justified in seeking solutions of
the foregoing types. However, when struck to the touchstone of
moral justice and held in the light of needed order in the inter-
national realm, such answers are disturbingly flawed. Rather, as
is true of other private law constructs, they argue eloquently in
favor of the travails necessary to the creation of a globally oper-
ative and comprehensive regimen of responsibility.439
V. CONCLUSION
On a planet which, for better and worse, seems to have its
present-term destiny harnessed to nuclear energy, and in which
there are so many users and suppliers worldwide, no system of
laws based upon the separate-nation-state paradigm is likely to
suffice to meet the problems of just redress of injury and respon-
sibility allocation that may arise in the wake of massive transna-
tional nuclear disaster. The efforts that have been made to sur-
pass the limitations of the existing order by international
convention have not yet attained general application or even
widespread acceptance, and contain deficiencies in any event
that render them incomplete.
There is significant likelihood that an incident at a foreign
nuclear facility may implicate one or more United States compa-
nies and the United States Government as potentially liable par-
ties at least in part. There is an equally strong probability that
relief will be sought in United States courts, in an effort to maxi-
437. That is, if the law of the state in which the incident occurred is given complete
application, then at least in theory the recovery of plaintiffs would be the same whether
suit was commenced here or abroad, subject always to the instant issues of judgment
enforceability. See also supra notes 210-30 and accompanying text regarding choice of
law.
438. This is among the suggestions contained in HARVARD STUDY, supra note 98, at
18.
439. As reviewed supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text, the multilateral trea-
ties provide for jurisdictional unity and corollary guarantees of the enforcement of dam-
ages awards among the signator nations. It may be persuasively urged that these features
are the most beneficial parts of the treaties; if such mechanism were in effect worldwide,
then this writing would perforce be unnecessary.
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mize meaningful recovery. Although our domestic tribunals can-
not be said to have been intended as fora for such momentous
adjudications, there are many means under United States juris-
prudence as it has evolved, and the law of nations, to deal with
the challenges posed. Multiple suits and judgments can be
avoided, a choice can be made among applicable laws that allows
for the legitimate interests of nations concerned to be given due
recognition, and liability can be justly apportioned among par-
ties and governments responsible. United States law, including
conflict of laws provisions, is also suited to giving full effect to
matters of defense likely to arise in such mass litigation. In addi-
tion, in the event suit is brought outside the United States
against American concerns, a measure of justice can be achieved
by applying established principles concerning recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
All of the foregoing can be accomplished by the use of es-
tablished, accepted and mostly tested precepts of domestic and
international law, thereby ameliorating in significant measure
the prejudice to the world order, and the efforts which have
been made to strengthen its legal foundation, that might other-
wise result. At the same time, the extraordinary 'effort required
bears eloquent witness to the need to work toward a global regi-
men that will operate to handle transnational nuclear litigation;
the same is true concerning other mass toxic tort claims.
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